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“[T]he False Claims Act . . . has been . . . the Department’s primary 
civil enforcement tool to combat fraud . . . .”1 
“The [False Claims Act] . . . can be an oppressive bludgeon. . . .; a 
favorite weapon of the federal government to regulate by ter-
ror. . . .”2 
“[The False Claims Act] creates market place incentives to encour-
age the private sector to do the public’s work. . . . [It] change[s] the 
dynamics in the workplace . . . .”3 
 Gripping tales of intrigue,4 smuggling,5 deceit,6 courage,7 dogged 
persistence,8 extortion,9 and waste10 pour forth when one studies the 
                                                                                                             
 1. Health Care Initiatives Under the False Claims Act That Impact Hospitals: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 38 (1998) [hereinafter Subcomm. on Claims Hearing] (statement of Donald K. 
Stern, U.S. Attorney, Mass. Dist., and Chair, Attorney General’s Advisory Comm., U.S. 
Dept. of Justice). 
 2. James J. Graham & T. Jeffery Fitzgerald, Curbing False Claims Act Abuse, BUS. 
CRIMES BULL., Oct. 1998, at 1. 
 3. Interview with John R. Phillips, Co-Director, Center for Law in the Public Inter-
est, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 3, 1987), in CORP. CRIME REP., Nov. 9, 1987, at 11 [hereinaf-
ter Phillips Interview]. Phillips is generally credited with passage of the 1986 amendments 
which revitalized the False Claims Act (FCA). This interview is a fascinating account of 
how the amendments came about, and how the FCA changes the dynamics within the 
United States Department of Justice and within industries relevant to FCA liability. Id. at 
5-12. 
 4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 
1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1994). Chester Walsh was a General Electric (GE) executive sent by 
GE to Israel to serve as liaison to the Israeli military with regard to a contract between the 
U.S. Department of Defense and Israel to supply the Israeli military with GE-
manufactured F-110 fighter engines. After Walsh arrived in Israel, he discovered a scheme 
by a high-level GE executive and a brigadier general in the Israeli military to defraud the 
United States government on the contract. Fearing for his personal and job security, Walsh 
used aliases to consult with attorneys about what to do regarding his suspicions. Id. 
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Civil False Claims Act (FCA).11 The FCA creates a cause of action on 
the part of “any person” who believes that another has submitted 
false claims to the federal government.12 It has been heralded as one 
of the most effective crime-fighting tools ever devised,13 and cursed as 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. After Walsh discovered fraud upon the United States Government by a high-
ranking GE executive and a brigadier general in the Israeli military, he feared for his per-
sonal safety. Id. Apparently, his concerns were reasonable. After the GE fraud came to 
light, the Israeli General was court-martialed and pled guilty to conspiring to kidnap a po-
tential witness and to injure and threaten the witness “to prevent him from testifying.” 
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580, 583 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994). After seeing another GE whistleblower trans-
ferred, Walsh feared for his job security as well as his personal safety and requested a 
transfer to Switzerland. Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1037. While awaiting trans-
fer, Walsh began collecting evidence, including secretly recording conversations. Id. He hid 
this evidence with common household goods when he moved from Israel to Switzerland. Id. 
 6. For example, Grace Pierce, M.D., was demoted from her position as associate di-
rector of medical research at Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation after she refused to pro-
ceed on human trials she and fellow researchers considered carcinogenic. Although Dr. 
Pierce’s position on the carcinogenic nature of the drug in question was supported by FDA 
guidelines, her supervisor, the executive director of medical research, “accused her of irre-
sponsibility, lack of judgment and conduct unbecoming a director.” ALAN F. WESTIN, 
WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 113 (1981). 
 7. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. 
Supp. 2d 1323, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2001). Alderson was fired and endured years of financial 
hardship and personal and family stress after refusing to prepare two sets of Medicare cost 
reports for his employer. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 
2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000), rev’g 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Over a period of two years, 
Merena spent hundreds of hours assisting and working with federal attorneys and agents 
to investigate fraud at SmithKline Beecham Laboratories. United States ex rel. Merena v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 420, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 9. WESTIN, supra note 6, at 113. 
 10. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendants in qui tam action for insufficiency of 
evidence). Relator filed suit after the Office of Inspector General of the United States De-
partment of Veterans Affairs conducted an investigation and concluded that “allegations 
could not be substantiated.” Id. at 1071. 
 11. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2002). 
 12. Id. § 3730(b). 
 13. For example, in fiscal year 2000 the “United States collected $1.5 billion in civil 
fraud recoveries,” most of which, $1.2 billion, was collected through a private justice action, 
the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA). FCA News: Top Qui Tam Recoveries 
of 2000, 21 TAF Q. REV. 16, 18 (2001) [hereinafter FCA News] (reproducing November 2, 
2000 press release from the Department of Justice). As one Department of Justice official 
explained in 1996: “The recovery of over $1 billion demonstrates that the public-private 
partnership encouraged by the statute [the FCA] works and is an effective tool in our con-
tinuing fight against fraudulent use of public funds.” TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, THE 
1986 FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS, TENTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 15 (1996) (quoting 
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice); see 
also Subcomm. on Claims Hearing, supra note 1, at 39 (Donald K. Stern, U.S. Attorney, 
Mass. Dist., and Chair, Attorney General’s Advisory Comm., U.S. Dept. of Justice, stating 
that “the False Claims Act . . . is a critical [civil enforcement] tool in fighting and deter-
ring.”); Id. at 15 (Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs, Office of In-
spector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, asserting that “[t]he False Claims 
Act has been an essential tool to protect the integrity of the Medicare program.” To achieve 
this goal “of ‘zero tolerance’ of Medicare fraud and abuse . . . the Government relies on a 
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irresponsible and disruptive to a healthy economy.14 What is clear is 
that the False Claims Act, with its unique partnering of private indi-
viduals and governmental investigators, fundamentally alters public 
                                                                                                             
number of enforcement options—criminal, civil, and administrative, as well as educational 
outreach efforts. Chief among the enforcement tools has been the False Claims Act.”); Id. 
at 25 (Dr. Robert A. Berenson, director, Center for Health Care Plans and Providers Ad-
ministration, Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services, claiming that “the False Claims Act is an important tool for . . . law enforcement 
. . . to pursue fraud and abuse.”). 
[To deal with health care fraud and abuse,] Congress in recent years [has] ex-
pand[ed] statutory authority and [increaseed] resources to deal with the prob-
lem. However, none of these things are likely to play a more important role in 
recovering improper payments or in acting as a deterrent than the False 
Claims Act. Use of the FCA by Federal authorities has become an important 
tool for fighting fraud and abuse in many programs, including the Medicare 
program. 
Id. at 63 (statement of Ruth Blacker, member, National Legislative Counsel, American As-
sociation of Retired Persons). 
 14. See William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation 
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 205 (1998) (describing 
how the False Claims Act is regarded by many government contractors as “a costly, sub-
stantial burden of doing business with the government”); John T. Boese & Beth C. 
McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-
Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 50 (1999) (According to Boese, foremost expert on the FCA 
and a respected defense counsel, because of the FCA, “health care providers today are ex-
pected to operate in an almost kafkaesque environment, where conventional conduct is 
made illegal and where the government is permitted broad prosecutorial discretion, the ex-
ercise of which is unpredictable and subject to being overruled by both private citizens and 
other branches of the government.” Id.; see also Michael Kendall, The Indiscriminate Tar-
geting of Hospitals with False Claims Act, BUS. CRIMES BULL., June 1997, at 4-5. 
[T]he government is threatening to use the False Claims Act to punish billing 
errors that are frequently the result not of intentional lies but of negligence or 
attempts to comply with vague rules. Virtually any billing dispute can be la-
beled a violation of Medicare billing rules. This is a lucrative strategy. Given 
the cost of litigation and the consequences of losing, health care providers fre-
quently settle in response to the government’s threats [to sue under the FCA]. 
Id.; Harvey Berkman, Spoils to Bounty Hunters, Federal Contractors Gripe, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 4, 1996, at B1, B1-B2. 
Critics of [the FCA] argue that the rise in whistleblower suits does not reflect a 
sudden unearthing of a large amount of fraud. Rather, they contend, compa-
nies, without intending to defraud, can make mistakes in handling complex 
government contracts and find themselves pressured to settle suits to avoid the 
far larger penalties than can follow a False Claims Act trial. 
Id.; Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 
2000, at A18. 
Has it [our renowned health-care system] become host to widespread malfea-
sance? While politicians would like us to think so, the simpler answer is that 
health-care regulations have just become too complicated to understand. 
 . . . . 
 Given the tangled web of Medicare legislation, more fraud investigations are 
inevitable. Rather than engaging in a long, protracted fight to set the record 
straight, throughout which share prices suffer and business slumps, a health 
company’s best bet may simply be to hand over the files and get on with busi-
ness. 
Id.; Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the Whis-
tleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 45 (1998) (sup-
plying an overview of industry attacks on the False Claims Act). 
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regulatory theory and practice. It does so by changing the world of 
regulation from a two-party dynamic between regulator (R) and tar-
geted business (T) to a three-party dynamic between R, T, and a pri-
vate party (P) who files suit under the False Claims Act and thereby 
becomes a player in the regulatory game. 
 This new dynamic presents fascinating questions: Why would 
regulators cede any of their independence and prosecutorial discre-
tion to private parties? Should regulators breach the traditional and 
often necessary confidentiality in which they work by allowing pri-
vate individuals to join them in investigating and prosecuting 
wrongdoing? Why would a private individual want to work with 
regulators, especially when doing so may create significant personal, 
professional, and financial hardships? How does the private-public 
partnering produced by the FCA affect the decisions and strategies 
adopted by targets and defendants? Using Game Theory analysis, I 
look at these questions. Because of its focus on how and why people 
decide whether to cooperate, Game Theory is an especially enlighten-
ing lens with which to view the regulatory world created by the False 
Claims Act.15 Through its disciplined modeling, Game Theory allows 
us to address these questions rigorously and supply some answers.  
 I have two goals in this Article. The first is to explore how a pri-
vate attorney general model such as the FCA alters the regulatory 
world, and whether the alteration is for better or worse. This is a 
worthy topic because of what it tells us about the merits of any 
mechanism that integrates private citizens into law enforcement ef-
forts. As our world becomes more complex and global—and more vul-
nerable to systemic wrongdoing—such integration may be a neces-
sary component of an effective public regulatory system. 
 My second goal in this Article is to demonstrate the extraordinary 
versatility and effectiveness of Game Theory for analyzing legal is-
sues. Developed in the fields of mathematics and economics, Game 
Theory remains on the fringe of legal thought, used by a few;16 ig-
nored by most. I hope to convince others of what I have come to real-
ize—Game Theory is enormously useful for thinking about legal is-
sues and public policy questions. 
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the False Claims Act 
and emphasizes the changing roles it creates for public regulators, 
regulated industry, and private parties who join in the regulatory 
game. This Part shows that the FCA is important because of what it 
                                                                                                             
 15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19-23 (5th ed. 1998); 
MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 1 (1994). 
 16. Legal academics who have employed Game Theory to analyze legal and policy is-
sues include Jason Scott Johnson.  See Jason Scott Johnson, A Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343 
(2002). 
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tells us about the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of any system that 
deploys private persons into public regulatory efforts. Part II of this 
Article summarizes general principles of Game Theory. Part III uses 
Game Theory to examine the changes in the regulatory world 
brought about by the False Claims Act. Part III concludes by drawing 
lessons from Game Theory about optimal strategies for the players in 
this new regulatory world. Stories from FCA cases abound through-
out this Article, for it is through them that theory meets reality. As 
these stories show, FCA cases involve high stakes and strange alli-
ances. 
I.   THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A.   Overview 
 The False Claims Act,17 first passed in 1863,18 and amended sev-
eral times since,19 most dramatically in 1986,20 grows out of a long 
tradition of using private parties to supplement law enforcement ef-
forts.21 Such actions, termed “informer” actions, were common in 
thirteenth-century England and colonial America.22 These early ac-
tions provided for minimal, if any, oversight of “informers,” and were 
                                                                                                             
 17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2002). 
 18. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-98. Incensed at shoddy equipment 
delivered by suppliers to the Union Army and scam artists who delivered nothing at all 
though were paid for it, President Abraham Lincoln sought to have the False Claims Act 
passed. Priscilla R. Budeiri, The Return of Qui Tam, WASH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 24, 
25. He described those at whom the Act was aimed: 
Worse than traitors in arms are the men who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast 
and fatten on the misfortunes of the Nation while patriotic blood is crimsoning 
the plains of the South. 
Id. at 26. 
 19. Rev. Stat. 3490-94 and 5438 (1875); 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (Sept. 17, 1943); False 
Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153; Pub. L. No. 103-272, 
108 Stat. 1362 (1994). 
 20. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153. The 
1986 Amendments are credited with revitalizing the FCA, which had fallen into disuse. 
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.04[H] (2d ed. Supp. 2003). 
The 1986 amendments increased the amount of recovery a private party who brought an 
FCA action (termed a “relator”) could receive; guaranteed a minimum amount of recovery 
for the relator; relaxed the “jurisdictional bar” provisions which had prevented many rela-
tors from filing suit; clarified and relaxed the mens rea requirement; expanded the statute 
of limitations; clarified the burden of proof; and added protection for whistleblowers who 
are retaliated against by their employers. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 45-47 (2002). 
 21. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539 (2000); Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in 
the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 909-17 (2002) [hereinafter Bucy, Information 
as a Commodity]; Bucy, supra note 20, at 12-54; Note, The History and Developments of 
Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81 [hereinafter History and Developments]. 
 22. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 909-17; Beck, supra note 21, 
at 565-608; History and Developments, supra note 21, at 83-91. 
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subject to many abuses.23 By the mid-twentieth century, they had 
been abolished in England24 and fell into disuse in America.25  
 In American jurisprudence today there are a number of actions 
that private parties may bring alleging that a defendant has violated 
some federal or state law.26 To the extent these actions supplement 
the efforts of law enforcement in detecting, proving, and deterring 
lawbreaking, the private parties who bring them serve as “private at-
torney generals.” In almost all of these actions, the private party who 
brings the action has been personally injured by the defendant’s con-
duct.27 The False Claims Act is unique among these actions because 
it allows a private party who has not been personally injured to bring 
the FCA action alleging violation of public laws by the defendant.28  
 Briefly, here is how the FCA works. A person who believes that he 
has information and evidence that someone else (individual or com-
pany) has filed false claims against the federal government may file a 
lawsuit making such allegations.29 This plaintiff (termed a “relator”) 
is required to file his lawsuit under seal (not even serving it on the 
defendant). The relator is also required to give a copy of the lawsuit 
to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), along with a writ-
ten report of “all material evidence and information” the relator pos-
sesses.30 The lawsuit stays under seal, often for two years or more, to 
allow the DOJ to fully investigate the charges made by the relator.31 
The secrecy provided by sealing the complaint not only protects a de-
fendant’s reputation if the relator’s information amounts to noth-
                                                                                                             
 23. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 909-17. For example, a party 
that expected to be charged with a crime would “locate a friendly informer who would file 
suit” against the defendant and settle for an amount less than the defendant would have 
paid the government had there been a prosecution by the government. Id. This strategy 
worked to defendants’ advantage since prosecution by an informer precluded prosecution 
by the government. Id. at 913. 
 Other “common abuse by informers [included] filing suit in a venue far from where the 
defendant lived,” bringing suit “under obsolete or little known statutes, or for popular con-
duct that constituted a technical offense,” or simply extortion not to prosecute. Id. at 914. 
 24. Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (Eng.) (abolishing most in-
formers actions); Act to Redress Disorders in Common Informers, 1956, 18 Eliz., ch. 5, §4 
(imposing sanctions against informers who brought vexatious suits). 
 25. 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (Sept. 17, 1943), codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 232-235 (1976) 
(limiting relators’ ability to bring FCA actions and limiting the proceeds relators could re-
ceive if they brought an action).  
 26. See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000 & 
Supp. 2001); American Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2002); The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2002); Guardian Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 
593-95 (1983) (implying § 1981 under Title VI); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 
(1979) (implying § 1981 under Title IX). 
 27. Bucy, supra note 20, at 13. 
 28. The FCA provides, “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation [of this Act] 
for the person and for the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2002). 
 29. Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
 30. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 31. ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 33 (2000). 
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ing,32 but also facilitates the DOJ’s further investigation of the rela-
tor’s information.33  
 At the conclusion of its investigation, the DOJ decides whether it 
will intervene in the lawsuit as an additional plaintiff. If it does, the 
DOJ assumes “primary responsibility” for the case, although the re-
lator remains as a plaintiff and is guaranteed a participatory role.34 
In some cases, the DOJ handles the entire case after intervening; in 
others, relators work hand-in-hand with government prosecutors. In 
some cases, relators and their attorneys assume the bulk of the in-
vestigative and litigative duties.35 
 If the DOJ does not join the lawsuit, the relator may continue 
pursuing the case, litigating it alone.36 Even if the DOJ does not join 
a relator’s case, it retains authority over the relator’s lawsuit in sev-
eral ways: the DOJ monitors the case and may join it at any time, 
even for limited purposes, such as appeal;37 the DOJ may settle or 
dismiss a relator’s suit over the relator’s objections as long as the re-
lator has been given an opportunity in court to be heard;38 the DOJ 
may seek limitations on the relator’s involvement in the case,39 or 
                                                                                                             
 32. Bucy, supra note 20, at 69-70. 
 33. Phillips Interview, supra note 3, at 9. Phillips, who is generally credited as the 
person responsible for the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, explained how the sealing provi-
sion came about: 
The Justice Department resisted these qui tam provisions of the False Claims 
Act. If you look at the record, the Justice Department didn’t want them 
changed at all. One argument that was advanced was, “you are going to make 
our job more difficult because as soon as you file these complaints, it is public 
information, and we can’t do our normal investigations. If we want to put a 
wire on somebody or do an undercover investigation, you have blown the cover 
instantly, so this is a bad idea.” My response was to say, “fine, we will draft a 
seal provision so that it is under seal until you decide to join the case. . . .” It is 
a very unusual provision in that regard. What [it] did was [to] completely ne-
gate the argument advanced by the Justice Department. 
Id.; See, e.g., WEST, supra note 31; S. REP. NO. 99-345 at 16 (1986) reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5281. 
 34. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
 35. For other examples of FCA qui tam cases where the relator and relator’s counsel 
assumed large amounts of responsibility for the preparation of the case, see United States 
ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001); 
United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (facts more fully discussed in United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998), rev’d, 205 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2000)). 
 36. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). 
 37. Id.; see, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 770 (2000); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 486, 
489 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 38. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B). The DOJ may even move for dismissal or oppose a 
settlement without intervening. See, e.g., Juliano v. Fed. Asset Disposition Assoc., 736 F. 
Supp. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1990) (moving to dismiss relator’s case by the DOJ after declin-
ing to intervene); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 340-41 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (intervening by the DOJ to oppose the settlement reached by relator and defen-
dant after declining to take the case). 
 39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C). 
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seek alternative remedies (such as administrative sanctions) in lieu 
of the relator’s lawsuit.40  
 If the government joins the relator’s case, the relator is guaran-
teed at least 15 percent of any judgment or settlement and the court 
can award more—up to 25 percent. If the government does not join 
the lawsuit, the relator is guaranteed 25 percent and could receive up 
to 30 percent.41 The amount within the statutory award depends 
upon the relator’s helpfulness to the government.42 Because the 
FCA’s damages and penalty provisions tend to generate exceptionally 
large judgments,43 relators’ percentages involve substantial sums.44 
 The case of United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health 
Group45 shows how the FCA works. It is typical in that it shows the 
steps of an FCA qui tam action. It is atypical because of the unusual 
contribution made by the relator to pursuing the case; in this respect, 
Alderson exemplifies the FCA working to its fullest potential. 
 In the 1980s, Alderson was the Chief Financial Officer at North 
Valley Hospital in Whitefish, Montana. He had been so employed for 
six and one-half years.46 In August 1990, Quorum Health Group took 
over as the management company for the hospital. Soon thereafter a 
Quorum representative instructed Alderson to prepare two Medicare 
cost reports. Hospitals that participate in the Medicare program by 
treating Medicare patients must submit annual cost reports. These 
are lengthy, detailed reports that provide extensive information 
about a hospital’s costs.47 Alderson was told to prepare an “aggres-
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. § 3730(c)(5). 
 41. Id. § 3730(d)(2). 
 42. The FCA has four built-in features to reward only those relators who actually 
supply helpful information. First, the FCA directs courts to determine what percentage, 
within the statutory range, of the judgment should be given to the relator based upon how 
helpful the relator was in “advancing the case to litigation.” Id. § 3730(d)(1). Second, a 
court is directed to reduce the share of the award further if the relator “planned or initi-
ated” the FCA violation and to exclude the relator from receiving any portion of the award 
if she has been convicted of conduct constituting the FCA violation. Id. § 3730(d)(3). Third, 
the FCA’s jurisdictional bar provision prohibits a qui tam case from going forward if the in-
formation it includes is already public (unless the relator is the “original source” of the in-
formation). Id. § 3730(e)(4). Lastly, the FCA provides that only the first qualifying qui tam 
lawsuit may proceed. Id. § 3730(b)(5). 
 43. For example, recent judgements in FCA qui tam cases include an $875 million 
settlement from TAP Pharmaceuticals, 55 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGT. 10 (2002), a $745 mil-
lion settlement with HCA Healthcare Corporation to resolve some of the alleged FCA vio-
lations pending against HCA; a $385 million settlement with National Medical Care, Inc.; 
a $325 million settlement with SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratory; a $325 million 
settlement with National Medical Enterprises; and a $110 million settlement with Na-
tional Health Laboratories. BOESE, supra note 20, § 1.05[A]. 
 44. Recent relators’ awards include $44.8 million, $28.9 million, and $18.1 million. 
FCA News, supra note 13, at 20. 
 45. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
 46. Id. at 1325. 
 47. Form HCFA 2552, Cost Reports for Hospitals (on file with author). Cost reports 
are lengthy and complex, consisting of hundreds of worksheets and requiring detailed in-
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sive” cost report to submit to Medicare, and a “reserve” report to be 
used internally.48  
 Alderson refused to prepare the two inconsistent reports. He was 
terminated four days later.49 Within months, Alderson filed a wrong-
ful termination suit.50 During depositions regarding his termination, 
Alderson learned of additional irregularities in Quorum’s cost-
reporting practices. He sought documents that would shed further 
light on such practices and engaged a forensic accounting expert.51 In 
1992, two years after his termination by Quorum, Alderson filed a 
pro se FCA qui tam complaint alleging that Quorum’s cost reporting 
practice defrauded the Medicare program. As required by the FCA, 
Alderson provided the federal government with a copy of his com-
plaint and a written statement of the information and evidence he 
had gathered supporting the charges in his complaint.52  
 Unable to find another job after being fired from North Valley 
Hospital, Alderson and his family suffered financially for years after 
his termination. His family was forced to move from its comfortable 
home to a cramped apartment in another town. They used the college 
savings they had accumulated for their two teenage children.53  
 For nine years after he filed his pro se FCA complaint, Alderson 
spent thousands of hours working on his FCA case,54 retained two 
different law firms to represent him in the action55 and, either by 
himself or with his attorneys, met often with DOJ attorneys and/or 
investigators, mostly in Washington, D.C., and at his own expense.56 
At these meetings, Alderson explained how Quorum’s reserve cost 
report practice defrauded the Medicare Program.57 When DOJ attor-
neys expressed concern about a legal theory to support an FCA case, 
                                                                                                             
formation about the facility, its staff and operation. Providers are required to allocate vari-
ous costs, including capital expenditures, medical education costs, travel, malpractice in-
surance premiums and payments, and every type of patient care costs to various centers, 
designated by whether the patient was a Medicare patient and whether the expense is 
properly reimbursable to the Medicare program. ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 2.02[4] (2003). 
 48. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 1325-26. 
 53. Kurt Eichenwald, He Blew the Whistle, and Health Giants Quaked, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 1998, § 3, at 1. 
 54. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1330. 
 55. Approximately one year after filing his pro se qui tam complaint, Alderson re-
tained a law firm that specialized in health care law to handle his qui tam case. Id. at 
1325. In 1995, Alderson changed to a law firm that specialized in FCA qui tam cases. Id. at 
1327. This firm represented Alderson until the case was resolved. 
 56. Id. at 1325-29. 
 57. Id. 
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or what they viewed as weak evidence or minimal damage,58 Alder-
son addressed their concerns.59 The forensic accountant Alderson re-
tained, and continued to pay, met with DOJ officials in Washington, 
D.C. to assist Alderson in explaining the fraud to the DOJ attor-
neys.60  
 Working with the DOJ attorneys and investigators, Alderson 
identified voluminous documents that government investigators 
should subpoena from Quorum.61 At the DOJ’s request, he reviewed 
the documents obtained by subpoena.62 These were extensive: eight 
boxes of more than 11,000 records from 197 hospitals for seven years. 
For one year, working alone, Alderson analyzed the records and pre-
pared a spread sheet summary of relevant cost reserve information. 
He “culled a set of 2,500 documents that corroborated . . . specific re-
serve information” and presented his summary, spreadsheet, and 
relevant documents to the DOJ.63 
 Seven years after Alderson filed his action,64 the DOJ agreed to in-
tervene in Alderson’s lawsuit, but only after receiving “assurances 
from Alderson’s counsel of their ability and willingness to commit the 
necessary resources to the case and to undertake the principal role in 
prosecuting the litigation.”65 Thereafter, Alderson’s counsel: 
• assisted in drafting the DOJ’s amended complaint;66 
• retained auditors to analyze one-half of the cost re-
ports (government auditors analyzed the other half);67  
• handled the third-party discovery, including the 
preparation and service of subpoenas to 200 hospitals 
nationwide; performing this task required that Alder-
son’s lawyers hire two additional associates;68 
• “contributed substantially to the motion practice and 
discovery that followed the filing of the [amended] 
complaint”;69 
                                                                                                             
 58. DOJ attorneys believed the fraud to be $10 million or less, too low to consider. Id. 
at 1325-31. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1325-26. 
 61. Id. at 1326. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1326. 
 64. Id. at 1329. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1327. 
 68. Id. at 1330, 1330 n.22. 
 69. Id. at 1329-30. 
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• worked with the DOJ in combined efforts to respond to 
defense motions to dismiss;70 and 
• directed a two-year substantial, sustained mediation 
on behalf of the plaintiffs to reach a settlement in the 
case.71 
 The case ultimately settled for $85.7 million.72 Alderson’s share 
was approximately $20.6 million. The average relator’s award, when 
the government intervenes, is sixteen percent of the judgment recov-
ered.73 When awarding Alderson an unusually large award of twenty-
four percent, the court looked to the FCA, its legislative history, DOJ 
Guidelines for Relator’s Award,74 Alderson’s persistence,75 expertise, 
the personal sacrifices he made to help the government,76 and the 
significant contribution of Alderson’s counsel in pursuing the case.77 
Alderson’s attorneys were awarded $2.7 million in attorneys fees 
pursuant to the FCA’s requirement that culpable defendants should 
pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”78  
 The court that determined Alderson’s share described Alderson’s 
contribution to the case: “The record graphically demonstrates Alder-
son’s profound personal and professional commitment to success in 
this litigation. His commitment manifested itself in his persistent la-
bors and those of his attorneys and accountants, all of whom contrib-
uted mightily both before and after the United States intervened.”79 
B.   The Changing Regulatory Dynamics Created by the FCA 
 Before the FCA was revitalized with amendments in 1986 and be-
came a factor in federal law enforcement, the only effective way to 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. at 1330. 
 71. Id. Alderson also attended and participated in all of the mediation conferences, 
held throughout the United States. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1339. 
 73. Panel: FCA Enforcement in the Post-Stevens World, A.B.A. NAT’L INST. ON THE 
CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND QUI TAM ENFORCEMENT (2000) (Discussion with Michael 
Hertz, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 74. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-35. 
 75. Id. at 1336-38. According to the court, “[o]nly [Alderson’s] dogged resolution, even-
tually supported by competent professionals and an occasionally reluctant government, re-
sulted in the millions now available for distribution.” Id. at 1338. 
 76. Id. at 1337-38. 
 77. Id. at 1335. According to the court, “[t]he record establishes that Alderson’s coun-
sel contributed significantly (in both quality and quantity) and at certain moments cru-
cially to this case. That contribution deserves manifest and telling weight in determining 
the proper relator’s award.” Id. The award of attorneys fees and costs was in addition to 
the contingency portion of his award that Alderson agreed to pay to his attorneys. Id. at 
1335 n.35. 
 78. Id. at 1330 n.25 (awarding attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(d)(1) (2002)). 
 79. Id. at 1338. 
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investigate what appeared to be intentional fraud80 against the gov-
ernment was before a grand jury, as a criminal matter.81 Grand jury 
investigations of complex economic wrongdoing are tedious and 
lengthy.82 Investigators must pierce enough of the corporate veil to 
figure out what has taken place, who is involved, how far and deep 
the wrongdoing goes, and since the case is being investigated as a 
criminal matter, whether the fraud was intentional rather than the 
result of mistakes, inexperience, overwork, or sloppiness.  
 Grand jury investigations proceed step-by-slow-step. They often 
begin with interviews of the source who first alerted law enforcement 
that there may be a possible problem. Next, relevant financial re-
cords are subpoenaed. These records are analyzed to determine what 
documents, transactions, individuals, or companies may be involved. 
More records are subpoenaed and analyzed.83  
 This process continues until the investigation stops turning up 
new information. Often, the most helpful evidence comes from slow, 
painstaking tasks such as charting checking and savings account de-
posits and withdrawals, and correlating those with significant busi-
ness transactions. Generally, only after documentary investigation 
has revealed what is going on, or the investigation has reached an 
impasse, do investigators resort to questioning live witnesses. This is 
because there are risks in questioning witnesses without a full pic-
ture of what was going on and who was involved. Throughout an in-
vestigation, investigators must guard against alerting those who may 
destroy or alter evidence, or threaten or tamper with witnesses.  
 Rarely in grand jury investigations will a knowledgeable insider 
offer helpful information or be willing to cooperate until law en-
forcement has established that individual’s involvement in the 
wrongdoing. Most insiders are too fearful of the consequences of co-
operating with the government to do so under any other circum-
stance. Thus, prosecutors secure cooperation from a knowledgeable 
insider only by negotiating leniency in exchange for the insider’s tes-
timony. Such negotiation is always a gamble since prosecutors may 
not know until it is too late that they have cut a deal with an indi-
vidual who has greater culpability than those he is being asked to 
                                                                                                             
 80. The FCA includes a mens rea requirement of “knowingly,” which the FCA defines 
as “actual knowledge of the information,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information,” or “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(b) (2002). This is the same definition for mens rea used in many criminal offenses. 
See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701-04 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 81. See, e.g., JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 154 (1987) (regarding the value of 
the grand jury in conducting investigations of wrongdoing). 
 82. Id. at 23, 222, 243-45, 248-49. 
 83. See generally PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 2.06, 4.02 (3d ed. Supp. 1997); SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 6 (2d ed. 2001). 
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testify against.84 Such mishaps are always a possibility since investi-
gators rarely have a full understanding of the fraud at the time they 
must decide who to approach for cooperation. There is another dan-
ger in conscripting witnesses with a cooperation-for-leniency ex-
change: such individuals often are not trustworthy.85 They tend to 
minimize their own involvement or that of their friends and close col-
leagues.86 Corroboration is always necessary to verify their informa-
tion.87 It is also difficult for investigators to know whether they have 
fully uncovered the scope of the wrongdoing and wrongdoers, or the 
number and identity of all victims.88 
 Imagine what a knowledgeable insider can add to this investiga-
tion process. It would be invaluable to have an insider who knows 
everything about the organization being investigated and who can 
explain the full scope of the wrongdoing, identify everyone who was 
involved, when they became involved, and the extent to which they 
were involved. A knowledgeable insider can identify which records 
and transactions to examine, what companies and businesses are in-
volved in the relevant transactions, and who the victims are. With 
such information, investigations could proceed more quickly and 
thoroughly, clearing those who are not culpable and gathering avail-
able evidence against those who are.  
 It is this dynamic that the FCA changes. The FCA encourages 
honest, non-culpable insiders to come forward and to work with in-
vestigators throughout an entire case. Because of the way it is struc-
tured (honest insiders can receive a significant recovery, but culpable 
insiders receive less, or nothing) the FCA entices honest insiders, not 
the culpable individuals grand jury investigations tend to unearth. 
Because of their credibility advantages, these non-culpable insiders 
are more valuable to government investigators than are those who 
are cooperating only to save themselves and who become willing to 
cooperate only after the government has already proven much of 
what occurred. By tying the amount of the insider’s award to the in-
sider’s helpfulness, the FCA encourages insiders to work with inves-
tigators by supplying information and providing other assistance.89 
                                                                                                             
 84. STEWART, supra note 81, at 139-40, 202-08, 220. 
 85. Id. at 214, 223, 241. 
 86. Id. at 25-27, 158, 165, 217. 
 87. Id. at 163. 
 88. See generally DIAMOND, supra note 83, § 4.02; BEALE ET AL., supra note 83, § 6:1. 
 89. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2002) (requiring that in determining what percentage, 
within the mandatory range, of the judgment shall be awarded to the relator, a court 
“tak[e] into account the significance of the information and the role of the person bringing 
the action in advancing the case to litigation”); United States ex rel Alderson v. Quorum 
Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333-34 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (listing DOJ guide-
lines). 
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 Besides bringing helpful inside information of wrongdoing, qui 
tam relators also bring investigative and litigative talent to regula-
tors. The FCA, both by its terms and its practice, provides significant 
financial inducement not only for insiders but also for experienced, 
skilled attorneys who represent relators’ cases. Under the FCA, suc-
cessful relators recover attorneys fees and costs from defendants.90 In 
practice, additional compensation for relators’ counsel has evolved. 
Relators generally negotiate with their attorneys to pay a percentage 
of the relator’s award to counsel.91 This total package of attorneys 
fees, costs, and percentage of the relator’s award can be quite lucra-
tive—enough to lure skilled counsel from other sophisticated areas of 
practice.  
 The case of Michael R. Lissack demonstrates the dual resources of 
insider information and legal talent that qui tam relators bring to 
regulators.92 Michael R. Lissack was a highly successful investment 
banker at Smith Barney, becoming, for example, the second youngest 
person to serve as a managing director in Smith Barney’s history. 
One day, Lissack made an anonymous phone call to a United States 
Attorney’s office that was investigating certain investment firms for 
various frauds. Lissack described another fraud, “yield burning,” that 
was quite massive and about which law enforcement knew nothing.93  
 By law, the investment banks are required to price securities no 
higher than fair market value. They are also required to reimburse 
the United States Treasury for any profits they reap on their han-
dling of municipal securities.94 Yield burning occurs when investment 
banks price securities in excess of fair market value and retain the 
profits this generates, rather than passing them on to the United 
States Treasury in the form of lower interest payments as required.  
 In Lissack’s initial phone call to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and in 
multiple later conversations, all made anonymously, Lissack ex-
plained yield burning to prosecutors who were unfamiliar with the 
practice, and described how it was diverting millions of dollars from 
the Treasury.95 
 One and one-half years later, in February 1995, when nothing had 
yet been done to stop yield burning, despite his telephone calls, Lis-
sack decided to force the government to act by taking action himself. 
                                                                                                             
 90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Erika A. Kelton, The False Claims Act and Wall Street: How a Qui Tam Case Re-
formed the Municipal Bond Market, 19 TAF Q. REV. 35-44 (2000); Charles Gasparino, 
Muni Matters: Cities Have a Headache Thanks to Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1997, 
at A1; cf. Wall Street Update, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2002, at C2. 
 93. Kelton, supra note 92, at 35. 
 94. Id. at 36-37. 
 95. Id. at 35-36.  
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He filed a FCA qui tam lawsuit against national and regional in-
vestment banks. After seven years, this case settled for a total of 
$200 million, with thirty investment banks paying the damages 
awarded.96  
 Lissack’s FCA suit got the attention of the Securities Exchange 
Commission, which initiated multiple investigations and ultimately 
sanctioned individuals and banks. Lissack’s qui tam suit also got the 
attention of the Internal Revenue Service, which initiated a review of 
the tax-exempt status of hundreds of tax-free municipal bonds. The 
IRS concluded its review by issuing a new Revenue Procedure to pro-
tect the Treasury from losses of any yield-burning activity in the fu-
ture. The IRS’s new procedure placed the burden on public issuers to 
detect future yield-burning situations, or to repay any yield-burning 
profits realized. 
 In addition to filing a federal FCA action, Lissack filed a qui tam 
action under the California False Claims Act. In this suit, Lissack al-
leged that the yield-burning activity of one investment banker, Laz-
ard Feres & Company, caused the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (LAMTA) to incur losses of approximately 
$3 million. The State of California intervened in Lissack’s suit and 
hired Lissack’s qui tam team of lawyers to represent LAMTA. In 
1998, Lazard settled the California action, agreeing to pay treble 
damages of $9 million.97 
 The Lissack case shows the contributions that a knowledgeable 
insider and his counsel can make to exposing and preventing fraud: 
Lissack alerted regulators to a significant, systemic, complex theft 
that was depriving the federal government of millions of dollars and 
of which regulators were unaware. When regulators failed to act to 
stop the practice one and one-half years after Lissack told regulators 
about it, he rallied regulators to action by filing his own lawsuit. To 
prepare the case, Lissack’s legal team gathered public bond transac-
tion documents from more than 500 issuers and retained economic 
experts who generated evidence with multiple regression analysis on 
more than 1900 individual Treasury securities.98 Their analysis dem-
onstrated how yield burning defrauded the federal government.99 
With his knowledge of investment banking and the yield-burning 
practice, Lissack was able to anticipate and rebut defenses.100 Lissack 
and his attorneys supplied significant expertise, labor, and resources 
to investigate and prepare the case. Lissack’s whistleblowing led to 
                                                                                                             
 96. Telephone Interview with Erika A. Kelton, counsel for Michael Lissack, Phillips & 
Cohen (Mar. 25, 2003). 
 97. Kelton, supra note 92, at 42. 
 98. Id. at 39. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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fundamental changes in how municipal financing occurs, which bet-
ter protects federal and state treasuries from massive graft and 
theft.101 
C.   Tensions Created by the FCA 
 Despite the benefits the FCA presents to government regulators 
and to participaing private parties, the FCA creates tensions. For 
starters, it forces regulators to compromise the veil of secrecy that 
traditionally has surrounded government investigations.102 The FCA 
also aligns the interest of private individuals to that of government 
regulators instead of to professional colleagues and employers. This 
shift in loyalty often creates considerable personal and professional 
struggles.103 For all of these reasons—habit, confidentiality, personal 
hardship—it is difficult for regulators and private individuals to 
work together to investigate and prove wrongdoing. Often, the ten-
sions grow as the FCA case proceeds.104 In some cases, the two plain-
tiffs, the DOJ and the relator, battle.105 The DOJ may oppose a rela-
tor, as when the DOJ argues that a relator should be dismissed from 
the case.106 The relator and the DOJ may disagree on trial strategy, 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 44. 
 102. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). “A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, 
an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney 
for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made [as permitted in this Rule] 
shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury . . . .” Id. “A knowing violation 
. . . may be punished as a contempt of court.” Id. 
 103. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 948-58. 
 104. Although the relator should be aware that opposing the DOJ on such issues may 
earn the relator a reduced percentage of the judgment for failing to be cooperative. See, 
e.g., United States ex rel. Coughlin v. IBM Corp., 992 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 105. Several courts have noted the DOJ’s antagonism to relators, especially when it 
comes to sharing the judgement. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580 
(S.D. Ohio 1992). 
No one likes “snitches,” but they can be valuable. In view of their widespread 
use, it is worthy of note that the Department of Justice has considered such in-
dividuals as adversaries rather than allies. This is not the first case where this 
Court has noted the antagonism of the Justice Department to a whistleblower. 
The reason continues to be unknown, but the attitude is clear. 
Id. at 584; see also United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 352, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2000): 
I recognize that the government’s present litigation stance is that Mr. Merena 
helped very little and merely provided basically clerical assistance that the 
government could have obtained without him. In view of the many public acco-
lades previously given him by the same government officials responsible for the 
prosecution of the case, I have trouble accepting or even rationalizing the gov-
ernment’s present position other than attributing it to an over-zealous attempt 
to lower the amount of the award rightfully due. 
 106. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 
No. 99C06313, 2001 WL 40807, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001); United States ex rel. Wil-
liams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991); Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
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such as lifting the seal to permit discussions with the defendant107 or 
granting the DOJ an extension of the sealing period.108 Although the 
DOJ and the relator may work cooperatively for years, the DOJ may 
oppose the relator when dividing the settlement.109 
 Strange alliances also develop. The relator and the defendant may 
work together against the DOJ—as when the DOJ opposes a settle-
ment reached by the relator and the defendant.110 Or, the relator and 
the defendant may join forces to oppose individuals who seek to qual-
ify as qui tam relators.111 The DOJ and the defendant may join forces 
to exclude the relator.112 Perhaps most oddly of all, offices within the 
DOJ may oppose one another as to how a relator should be treated.113 
 The case of United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp.114 demonstrates these odd dynamics. A financial systems ana-
lyst at SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratory (SBCL),115 Robert 
Merena served as supervisor of the “Response Department,” where 
he handled SBCL’s payments from Medicare and other insurers.116 
                                                                                                             
 107. This is a common strategy in qui tam cases. See Kathleen McDermott, Qui Tam, 
An AUSA’s Perspective, 11 TAF Q. REV. 20, 25-26 (1997). 
 108. While it may be to the relator’s benefit to agree to extensions of the seal so as to 
allow the DOJ to fully investigate the relator’s claims and prepare the case if the DOJ de-
termines it is meritorious, the delay hurts the relator because it gives time for more rela-
tors to file qui tam lawsuits regarding the same transactions. As long as the initial qui tam 
suit is under seal, of course, no one, including future relators, will know about it and 
thereby be deterred from filing their own qui tam action. Although the FCA is clear that 
only the first relator to file a qui tam action may proceed with the case, and all other sub-
sequent qui tam actions arising from the same transaction must be dismissed, the first-to-
file relator will have to protect her status, often through lengthy, involved litigation. Part 
of the reason such litigation becomes complex is that the parties likely will have to delve 
deeply into the facts of the various qui tam complaints, to determine whether the various 
actions truly arise from the same transaction, and whether some relators (the first to file, 
perhaps) may be jurisdictionally barred from proceeding, thereby clearing the way for the 
subsequently-filing relators to proceed. See generally Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 14, at 
36-37. 
 109. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. 
Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001); United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Gen. Elec., 808 F. Supp. at 583-84. 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 436-41 (6th 
Cir. 2000). 
 111. Marc Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, A Case Study: Department of Justice v. Qui 
Tam Relators, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 2 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., June 3, 1998, at 
425. 
 112. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 
No. 99C06313, 2001 WL 40807 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001). 
 113. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 436-37. Prosecutors within the DOJ testified differently 
as to how much assistance Robert Merena, a relator, had provided and therefore what per-
centage of the recovery he was entitled to upon settlement of the case. Id. 
 114. 114 F. Supp. 2d. 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000), on remand from 205 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2000), 
rev’g 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 115. Id. at 360. 
 116. Merena spent his entire SBCL career at SBCL’s national headquarters. Merena, 
52 F. Supp. 2d at 443. SBCL provided clinical laboratory services throughout the United 
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Merena became concerned about suspicious billing practices at 
SBCL. After alerting federal officials and retaining counsel, Merena 
met with federal officials and described the several fraudulent bill-
ings schemes he suspected were going on at SBCL.117  
 Three months after meeting with federal officials, Merena filed a 
qui tam action under the FCA. Thereafter, Merena “spent literally 
hundreds of hours assisting the Government.”118 Remaining em-
ployed at SBCL for eighteen months after he initially approached the 
Government, Merena was able to supply the Government with docu-
ments,119 including SBCL’s internal directory of personnel and a 
complete set of SBCL’s 1993 monthly billing and accounts receivable 
reports.120 Once SmithKline learned that Merena was a whistle-
blower, “it no longer became practicable for him to keep his posi-
tion.”121 Unable to find employment with other companies once his 
whistleblower role became public, Merena and his family fell into 
dire financial straits, depleting their savings for living expenses.122 
 In his meetings with Government attorneys and agents, Merena: 
• explained how the various suspected fraudulent bill-
ing schemes worked;  
• provided names of key individuals at SBCL, along 
with a description of their duties,123 and his impres-
sion of which individuals would be most likely to coop-
erate with the Government;124  
• provided “an overview of SBCL’s operations through-
out the country”;  
• explained SBCL’s computer billing system including 
its “scheme of ‘jamming’ diagnosis codes, whereby 
SBCL’s computer automatically added other diagnosis 
codes for particular claims where specific  diagnoses 
are required”;125  
                                                                                                             
States. Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 360. Merena visited each of SBCL’s 27 laboratory sites 
as part of his duties. Id. 
 117. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 442-44. 
 118. Id. at 442; Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 424-25. 
 119. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 442. 
 120. Id. at 447. 
 121. Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 425. 
 122. Id.; Donna Shaw, A Year Later, Whistle-Blower Still Waits for His Millions, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 1998, at A1. 
 123. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 
 124. Id. at 447. 
 125. Id. at 443. 
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• assisted the Government in drafting document re-
quests to SBCL;126  
• “reviewed documents received from SBCL in response 
to three subpoenas, two of which he was helpful in 
preparing”;127  
• explained “many of the internal documents [the Gov-
ernment] received . . . in response to the subpoenas”;128 
• assisted FBI and LABSCAM Task Force agents in 
preparing for interviews of witnesses “and in review-
ing notes after the witness interviews.”129 
In 1995, the Government began settlement negotiations with SBCL. 
In 1996, it intervened in Merena’s qui tam action and reached a set-
tlement of $325 million with SBCL.130 After two years of working 
closely with Merena, the DOJ tried, unsuccessfully, to minimize his 
contribution so it could pay less of the judgment to him. Merena ul-
timately received a relator’s award of $26 million, but not until there 
had been three years of acrimonious litigation between the DOJ and 
Merena.131  
 The DOJ and Merena disagreed over what portion of the settle-
ment was eligible to calculate the relators’ share, whether the rela-
tors were jurisdictionally barred, which relators were eligible to 
share in the judgment and, most significantly, the degree to which 
the relators had contributed to the case.132 One year after the qui tam 
case had been settled with the defendants, a seven-day hearing was 
held in district court to determine Merena’s shares.133 At this hear-
ing, various DOJ officials testified, apparently contradicting each 
other as to the value of Merena’s contribution to the case.134 Clearly 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. at 442-50. 
 127. Id. at 446. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 424; Shannon P. Duffy, SmithKline to Pay $335 Million in Whistleblower 
Suit, 216 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1997, at 1. 
 131. United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352, 
372 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Determination of Merena’s share of the settlement was heavily liti-
gated with different offices within DOJ opposing each other regarding an appropriate per-
centage for Merena. Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 111, at 425-26. 
 132. Merena, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 430-54. 
 133. Id. at 429. 
 134. Merena worked primarily with attorneys and agents in the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 450. James Sheehan, chief, Civil Division, 
for this office testified by deposition as to Merena’s assistance. Id. at 442-43. Carol Lam, 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, and Laurence Freedman, assis-
tant director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, DOJ, also testified. According 
to Mr. Freedman, “the Philadelphia Task Force did not even know much about the case.” 
Id. at 445. According to the court: 
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exasperated, the District Court, which found “that Mr. Merena con-
tributed substantially and provided most of the information utilized 
in the successful prosecution and settlement,”135 questioned the 
DOJ’s motive and tactics: 
I recognize that the government’s present litigation stance is that 
Mr. Merena helped very little and merely provided basically cleri-
cal assistance that the government could have obtained without 
him. In view of the many public accolades previously given him by 
the same government officials responsible for the prosecution of 
the case, I have trouble accepting or even rationalizing the gov-
ernment’s present position other than attributing it to an over-
zealous attempt to lower the amount of the award rightfully due.136 
 Note the remarkable aspects of this case: P (private party) and P’s 
counsel worked extensively and candidly137 with R (regulator) prior to 
the filing of P’s qui tam action; R broke its tradition of confidentiality 
to work with P and P’s counsel to investigate the case; P worked with 
R while P was still employed at T (targeted business), bringing R 
helpful records and evidence;138 P provided R with expertise on a 
complicated fraud; P and P’s counsel worked hand-in-hand with the 
Government to investigate and prepare the case from the beginning 
                                                                                                             
[T]he attorneys [from DOJ offices in] San Diego and Washington, DC . . . seek 
to take far more credit for the overall success of the proceedings than is rightly 
due. The suggestion has been presented that San Diego and Washington took 
care of . . . the most valuable part of the case, and that the United States At-
torney’s office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, . . . through Mr. Shee-
han . . . played only a minor part in bringing about the successful conclusion of 
the actions. Perhaps the reason the litigation has been presented in this light is 
because the contacts that Relator Merena . . . had with the Government was in 
providing assistance . . . [to this district] and the Government wants to mini-
mize the contributions of the Relators in order to lower their ultimate award. 
Id. at 450. 
 135. Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 371. 
 136. Id. at 370. 
 137. Candor with R by P and P’s counsel is essential, as explained by an experienced 
relator’s counsel: “To work successfully, the relators must be totally candid with the gov-
ernment agents.” William J. Hardy, A Relator Counsel Perspective, 10 TAF Q. REV 14, 14 
(1997). 
 138. In other cases, P’s who are still employed at T have worn recording equipment, 
providing taped conversations as evidence. Federal agents (referring to conversations 
taped by another relator while that relator was still employed at defendant’s offices) dis-
cussed the contribution such evidence has to building a case: 
[I]f possible, it is important to become involved covertly as soon as practicable, 
while the conspiracy is still forming, to make evidence gathering more effective. 
Furthermore, experience has also shown that traditional “paper trail” white 
collar cases are very complicated and difficult to present to a jury. “Tape cases,” 
on the other hand, are more attractive to prosecutors and easier for juries to 
follow. Thus, time can really be of the essence in these matters where the 
fraudulent activity is ongoing. 
T. Clay Mason & Larry D. Leonard, A Government Investigator Perspective, 10 TAF Q. 
REV. 10, 12 (1997). 
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of the case until its settlement;139 for years after working coopera-
tively, R and P litigated bitterly over what should be the relators’ 
share.140 As Merena demonstrates, the FCA alters the relationship 
between private individuals and public regulators and produces dy-
namics unlike anything else in regulatory theory or practice. 
II.   GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GAME THEORY 
A.   But First, a Personal Note 
 Before delving into Game Theory and the insights it provides to 
the changing dynamics created by the FCA, I should state that I 
came to Game Theory intrigued and skeptical. I am now a convert.  
 I was intrigued because I had a sense that Game Theory was an 
ideal analytical tool for examining any far-ranging public policy ini-
tiative. As a federal prosecutor, I had seen first-hand the strengths 
and weaknesses of the two-player regulatory model and saw the 
practical and significant changes in this two-player regulatory game 
brought by the FCA. I suspected that Game Theory was an ideal per-
spective for examining any policy initiative that altered dynamics 
among participants. 
 I came to Game Theory quite skeptical, however, because it 
seemed to me that Game Theory was nothing more than a self-
fulfilling prophecy where the outcome of any game is determined by 
benefit-cost values arbitrarily assigned to each player’s moves. As I 
used Game Theory analysis to play games of regulation, watching 
how they were influenced by the introduction of the FCA, I came to 
realize that by calculating and justifying the benefits and costs I at-
tributed to various moves of the players, my analysis became more 
precise, thoughtful, and thorough. The rigor Game Theory imposed 
provided innumerable, significant insights. I became a Game Theory 
convert. 
B.   Overview of Game Theory 
 Developed in the early and mid-twentieth century by a mathema-
tician, John von Neumann, and an economist, Oskar Morgenstern,141 
                                                                                                             
 139. After settlement this cooperation fell apart as one office within the DOJ opposed 
another when determining Merena’s appropriate share of the judgement. Raspanti & Lai-
gaie, supra note 111, at 425-26; Tom Lowry, Whistleblowers, Justice Clash Over Settle-
ments, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1998, at B3; Donna Shaw, Dispute over Whistle-Blowers’ Fees 
Hits Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 19, 1998, at C01; Donna Shaw, Judge Boosts Reward in 
Fraud Cause to $52 Million, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 9, 1998, at A01. 
 140. See Merena, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 352; United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 141. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953). 
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Game Theory is a method for studying how people make decisions.142 
Game Theory arises from the notion that routinized, describable hab-
its and behaviors govern day-to-day interactions, much as rules gov-
ern parlor games such as bridge and poker.143 Like other “rational 
choice” theories, Game Theory assumes that decision-makers are ra-
tional actors who pursue their self-interest.144 Game Theory also as-
sumes that when determining their strategy, actors take into account 
what they expect other rational, self-interested decision-makers will 
do.145 Like all economic modeling, Game Theory simplifies social 
situations and offers insights from such simplification.146 
 Game Theory relies upon key concepts to examine decisions peo-
ple make. A normal form game (also called a strategic form of a 
game) is the simplest model of interaction.147 It has three elements: 
(1) players, (2) strategies available to players, and (3) payoffs players 
receive for each strategy or combination of strategies players pur-
sue.148 While strategies are courses of conduct that are physically pos-
sible, payoffs are the consequences of actions. An example of a nor-
mal form, two-player game is a child (Player One) and a parent 
(Player Two) and the child’s effort to get cookies before a meal. The 
payoff for the child is getting cookies before dinner; the payoff for the 
parent is having the child come to dinner with a healthy appetite. 
The child’s decision to eat cookies before dinner probably will be in-
fluenced by his expectation of what his parent will do if she finds out 
the child has eaten cookies before dinner. The child will adopt differ-
ent strategies (bargaining for cookies or sneaking cookies) based 
upon his expectations of his parent’s strategy (willing to agree to a 
compromise of two cookies or standing firm and imposing punish-
ment for eating pre-dinner cookies). 
 Whereas a normal form game describes the situation where play-
ers are making simultaneous decisions, an extensive form game as-
sumes the parties will interact over time.149 The elements of an ex-
tensive form game are (1) players, (2) when each player can act, (3) 
strategies are available to a player whenever it is time for the player 
                                                                                                             
 142. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
158-66 (1991); POSNER, supra note 15, at 19-23; see also AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. 
NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 1-4 (1991). 
 143. MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY (rev. ed. 1983). 
 144. ELLICKSON, supra note 142, at 156-59; POSNER, supra note 15, at 19-23. 
 145. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION vii (1984); ELLICKSON, supra 
note 142, at 156-64; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 1; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET 
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11-12 (1994). 
 146. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 7; ELLICKSON, supra note 142, at 157. 
 147. OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3. 
 148. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 7-8. 
 149. Id. at 52; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3. 
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to act, (4) information a player has about other players when it is 
time for the player to act, and (5) payoffs to each player.150  
 Parties in games may have complete information (they know who 
the other players are, and the strategies and payoffs available to all 
players), or incomplete information (lacking some of the above).151 
When a player has complete information but does not know which 
strategy the other player will choose, she has complete but imperfect 
information. When a player has complete information and knows 
which strategy the other player will choose, she has complete and 
perfect information.152 Games are zero-sum when one player wins 
only if the other party loses (baseball, poker, etc.). Games are non-
zero-sum if all players can win (a teacher and a student both win 
when the student learns his math). Non-zero-sum games work be-
cause players have the same goal.153 
 Solution concepts are general principles of behavior that tend to 
govern and predict, which strategies a player will choose. Legal rules 
can provide players with solution concepts.154 For example, the legal 
rule that those caught stealing another’s property could go to jail 
may affect an actor’s decision whether to steal if given the opportu-
nity to do so.  
 The Nash Equilibrium is a solution concept that states that each 
player will choose a strategy that is best for that player given the fact 
that other players are also choosing strategies that are best for 
them.155 Stated another way, the Nash Equilibrium requires that 
players, when choosing their best strategy, take into account what 
other players are likely to do.  
 Here is an example of the Nash Equilibrium. Assume that A, B, 
and C belong to a club of fifty members. Also assume that A, B, and 
C all wish to run for the presidency of the club at an upcoming elec-
tion. Further assume that A, B, and C discuss their presidential am-
bitions before the election and realize that all three will probably pull 
support from the same thirty club members, with the remaining 
twenty members voting for D, the sole other candidate for club presi-
dency. A, B, and C recognize that if all three campaign for the presi-
                                                                                                             
 150. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 51; HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 
10-11 (2000). 
 151. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 10; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3; 
cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 188 (2000). 
 152. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 10; DAVIS, supra note 143, at 9. 
 153. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 43; DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 142, at 13-14; 
ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO, THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 5-10 (2000). 
 154. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 11, 24-31. 
 155. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155-62 
(1954); cf. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 145, at 19-28; DAVIS, supra note 143, at 119-23; DIXIT & 
NALEBUFF, supra note 142, at 74-80; GINTIS, supra note 150, at 6; OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, 
supra note 15, at 155-57. 
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dency, they will split the votes among their supporters, and all will 
lose, with the result that D will be elected. Realizing this, A, B, and C 
agree that their best, collective strategy is to decide which of them 
will run for president, which will run for president-elect, and which 
will run for secretary-treasurer (and we will assume, by tradition, 
move up to president-elect the next year). Having made their deci-
sion, A, B, and C campaign accordingly. Each is elected to the posi-
tion campaigned for and their desired result is achieved: D is de-
feated and A, B, and C are elected to the three officer positions, se-
curing the presidency among them for the next three election cycles. 
 Game Theory analysis begins with a triggering event, then as-
sesses the possible strategies of all players in responding to the 
event. Each player’s benefits and costs are calculated for each strat-
egy. In short, Game Theory is simply a disciplined way of assessing 
the benefits and costs of the choices one faces.  
C.   The “Games” Played in This Article 
 Using the above Game Theory concepts, we will examine how the 
introduction of the FCA alters the regulatory game. We will analyze 
two Games: Game One is without the FCA; Game Two is with it. The 
Games we will analyze are extensive form games since the parties 
make their decisions over time, rather than simultaneously. The 
players are R (public regulators), T (targeted business), and P (pri-
vate individuals with inside information). The Games are repeated 
games or iterated, since at least one player, R, and possibly another, 
P’s counsel, will interact repeatedly. 
 In these Games, the players have incomplete, imperfect informa-
tion. No player has complete information about who the other players 
are (for example, more defendants could surface as an investigation 
proceeds) or when the other players can act. The players know that 
there are limited strategies available to each player (essentially, co-
operate with regulators, or not). It is reasonable to assume that play-
ers have complete information about the payoffs facing each player 
(there aren’t many options for payoffs: a finding of liability on the 
part of T with resulting payoffs to R and P, or a finding of no liability 
for T, which is a payoff for T). Players almost certainly do not have 
complete information as to what other players know about each 
other. In fact, T, and possibly P, may try to conceal facts. It is also 
unlikely that R will reveal to either T or P all relevant information it 
has. 
 As between P and R, the Games are most likely non-zero-sum 
since P and R share at least one common goal: establishing T’s liabil-
ity. However, if this goal changes (for example, R may decide that it 
is in the public interest to dismiss P’s case or R may seek to limit the 
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percentage of award P gets), the Game between P and R becomes 
zero-sum. If either P or R wins, the other loses. The game between R 
and T rarely will be anything but zero-sum since a finding of liability 
on the part of T is almost always the only way R wins.  
 For purposes of these Games, we will make three major assump-
tions. First, we will assume that R is honest, competent, and acting 
in the public interest. We make this assumption not for normative 
reasons but because it is necessary. Doing otherwise introduces infi-
nite permutations into the Games, making it impossible to generalize 
behavior. Second, we will assume that T, a public company, has ac-
tually engaged in significant wrongdoing, namely, that T has con-
cealed its true financial status from lenders and investors in public 
reports by falsifying expenses. Again, this is not a normative state-
ment about wrongdoing by regulated industries, but necessary for 
our discussion. Lastly, we shall assume that approximately twenty-
seven percent of the information about T’s wrongdoing that P sup-
plies to R is helpful to R.156  
 Game theory employs an inverted tree diagram to illustrate an ex-
tensive form game where the branches represent different strategies 
available to each player. There are six diagrams in Appendix B that 
illustrate the two Games we are playing. For ease of discussion, each 
Game is diagramed from only one player’s perspective. Thus, in 
Game One, which is the regulatory game without the FCA, Game 
1(A) views the game from R’s perspective; Game 1(B) views it from 
T’s perspective; and Game 1(C) views it from P’s perspective. In 
Game Two, which is the regulatory game with the FCA, Game 2(A) 
views the Game from R’s perspective; Game 2(B) views it from T’s 
perspective; and Game 2(C) views it from P’s perspective. Each tree 
diagram reflects the strategies available to the player profiled. Fol-
lowing each diagram is a discussion of how the values at each point 
                                                                                                             
 156. Admittedly, twenty-seven percent is a rough approximation. It is calculated as fol-
lows: Historically the DOJ has intervened in twenty-three percent of qui tam cases. Pre-
sumably these are meritorious. In addition, relators have proceeded to judgment or settled 
another two percent of qui tam cases (where the DOJ did not intervene). Letter from the 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Author, FOIA Request 145-F01-6072 (Oct. 20, 2001) (on file with 
author). It is likely that not all two percent of these cases were meritorious but were set-
tled for convenience. Thus these percentages should be discounted somewhat. It is also 
probably true, however, that the DOJ has not intervened in every meritorious case and 
that relators dismissed some meritorious cases after the DOJ elected not to intervene. This 
conclusion is supported by the significant work relators and their counsel undertook to 
convince the DOJ to intervene in some cases. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 45-
79 (discussing United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001), 92-101 (discussing the case of Lissack), 114-40 (discussing United 
States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
This conclusion is also evidenced by the fact that experienced relators’ counsel often de-
clined to proceed if the DOJ decided not to intervene. See Mitchell R. Kreindler, So You 
Wanna Be a Whistleblower’s Lawyer? (Nov. 28, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at 
A.B.A. National Institute on Civil False Claims Act and on file with author). 
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of strategy (Node) were determined. The values are based upon the 
significance of each benefit or cost, discounted by how speculative 
that benefit or cost may be. 
III.   APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A.   Game 1(A): Regulatory Game Without the FCA: From R’s 
Perspective 
 As noted, Game One is regulation without the presence of a 
mechanism like the FCA that encourages private parties to bring in-
formation about wrongdoing to regulators and encourages these pri-
vate parties to work with regulators to investigate and litigate such 
wrongdoing. Game 1(A) looks at this regulatory Game from the per-
spective of regulators (R). The triggering event for Game 1(A) is R’s 
obtaining information that T possibly is engaged in wrongdoing. We 
will presume that this information is not extensive, detailed, or con-
clusive of wrongdoing. It is suggestive only, such as a significant drop 
in stock price or high-profile and public resignations by key leader-
ship within T for unexplained or suspicious reasons.157 From this 
triggering event R has choices of strategies: whether to investigate T 
(Nodes I and II), and whether to initiate action against T (Nodes III 
and IV). At Node V, R wins, and at Node VI, R loses the action it ini-
tiated.158 
1.   Nodes I & II: Whether R Opens an Investigation of T 
 At Node I, R decides not to investigate T even though R has in-
formation that T is engaged in wrongdoing. There are legitimate rea-
sons why R might make such a decision. R may determine, for exam-
ple, that it cannot afford to allocate its scarce investigative resources 
to investigate a business without more concrete information. This 
leads to the first benefit R reaps with its decision not to investigate 
T: R will save investigative resources that can be directed to other 
investigations. There is another possible benefit. If T learns of R’s de-
cision not to open an investigation, T could be deterred in continuing 
its wrongdoing since T doesn’t want R to investigate it. If T knows 
that T is on R’s radar screen, T may decide to cease wrongdoing and 
                                                                                                             
 157. Similar events preceded HealthSouth’s $1.4 billion scandal, HealthSouth Faked 
$1.4 Billion Profits, The SEC Alleges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2002, at A1, and the bank-
ruptcy of Enron. See also Matt Krantz, Peeling Back the Layers of Enron’s Breakdown, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 1B; Jim Yardley, Critic Who Quit Top Enron Post is Found 
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at B1, B6. The seventh-largest commercial bankruptcy in 
United States history, Enron’s downfall apparently was brought on by the company’s prac-
tice of hiding, from public scrutiny, millions of dollars of Enron debt on the books of off-
shore partnerships. The Enron Scandal, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 3B. 
 158. See infra app. A, at 677-79 (describing charts 1-6 of Game 1(A)). 
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not further pique R’s interest. Because both T’s awareness and T’s 
response are speculative, this possible benefit is deemed to be mini-
mal. 
 R’s decision not to investigate creates possible costs for R: (1) T 
may be encouraged, if not emboldened, to continue its wrongdoing, 
especially if T is aware of R’s decision not to investigate T; (2) R’s de-
cision may give T time to revise and improve its fraud methodology, 
allowing T to become even more sophisticated in committing and 
concealing its wrongdoing; (3) If T is allowed to continue its wrongdo-
ing and possibly expand it, more persons may become victims of T’s 
fraud; and (4) If other businesses become aware of R’s decision not to 
investigate T’s wrongdoing, they too will be encouraged to continue, 
or commence, similar wrongdoing.  
 For these reasons, the costs of R’s decision not to investigate T 
once R receives information that T is engaging in wrongdoing out-
weigh R’s benefit.159 
 At Node II, R opts for the opposite strategy: R decides to investi-
gate T. By adopting this strategy, R obtains the converse of many of 
the benefits and costs noted at Node I. Thus, R achieves the following 
possible benefits: (1) R discourages T from engaging in at least some 
of its wrongdoing. (2) R discourages other observant business from 
engaging in wrongdoing. Businesses not already subject to investiga-
tion have reason to be concerned when another business in the same 
industry comes under investigation,160 since often R expands its in-
vestigation of one business to include other similar businesses on the 
assumption that they too are engaging in the same wrongdoing.161 
Additional possible benefits accruing to R include: (3) Opening an in-
vestigation of T makes it difficult for T to continue refining its 
wrongdoing methodology, and (4) makes it less likely T will expand 
its wrongdoing to include more victims. (5) During its investigation of 
T, R develops some institutional knowledge and expertise about T, 
T’s industry, and the type of behavior T is engaging in. This knowl-
                                                                                                             
 159. See infra app. A chart 1, at 677. 
 160. The “national initiative” undertaken by the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (OIG), demonstrates this. For example, in 
1996 the OIG sent a letter to the 125 teaching hospitals associated with all 125 academic 
medical centers in the United States informing these hospitals that they were subject to an 
audit of their teaching physicians’ Medicare Part B billings. This national initiative arose 
after Medicare Part B irregularities were found at one such medical center, the University 
of Pennsylvania. Pamela H. Bucy, The PATH from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 3-14 (2000). 
 161. Russell Hayman, Dissecting a Health Care Fraud Investigation, in HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD & ABUSE: HOW TO NAVIGATE THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 223, 238-44 (PLI Corp. Law 
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1129, 1999) (reviewing regional and national 
initiatives by federal regulators aimed at multiple health care providers), available at WL 
1129 PLI/Corp 223. 
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edge may be generic—how to more effectively investigate a general 
type of wrongdoing—or specific to T or T’s industry. While such insti-
tutional knowledge could benefit R in future investigations, its value 
is highly speculative since turnover at R could dissipate it. Thus, this 
last benefit is minimal. 
 R also incurs costs with its decision to investigate T: (1) Be-
cause R has little information about T’s possible wrongdoing and 
no inside information about it, R’s investigation will consume con-
siderable resources. R’s investigation is also likely to be relatively 
unfocused and inefficient with unlikely chance of uncovering the 
full extent of T’s wrongdoing and all individuals who are involved. 
(2) Because R’s resources are limited, R incurs an opportunity cost 
when it directs its resources toward T. By spending scarce inves-
tigative resources on T, R will be unable to investigate other de-
serving targets.162 For these reasons, R’s benefits at Node II, 
where R opts to investigate T, slightly outweigh R’s costs.163 
2. Nodes III and IV: Whether R Initiates Action at the Conclusion 
of Its Investigation of T 
 Whether R initiates action against T after completing its investi-
gation of T depends upon whether R uncovered T’s wrongdoing. The 
action R brings could be criminal, civil, administrative, or as minimal 
as increasing R’s oversight of T.164 At Node III, R declines to initiate 
action against T because R did not find T’s wrongdoing. At Node IV, 
where R uncovers T’s wrongdoing, R initiates action. 
 The benefits for R at Node III of not initiating an action against T 
are minimal: (1) R puts an end to R’s investigative costs; and (2) R 
generates some institutional knowledge from its unsuccessful inves-
tigation of T. 
 The costs to R of closing its investigation of T without taking ac-
tion are: (1) R has incurred investigative expenses without learning 
about T’s wrongdoing; (2) R will not be able to protect victims who 
                                                                                                             
 162. Elizabeth Amon, White Collar Crime, Heat Going Up, NAT’L L.J., July 8, 2002, at 
A15. 
 163. See infra app. A chart 2, at 677. 
 164. Because administrative sanctions such as exclusion from contracting with the fed-
eral government can effectively bankrupt a corporation, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 
(2002); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1–1001.3005 (2002); FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 47, § 5.01, some 
types of administrative action can be quite draconian. Initiation of a punitive civil action 
(such as filing a complaint under the False Claims Act) can also be an extremely severe 
sanction because of the extraordinarily high damages and penalties such an action can 
bring. Surprisingly perhaps, the least severe sanction, at least from a corporation’s point of 
view, may be criminal prosecution. Although the consequences of a criminal conviction po-
tentially can be harsh for a fictional entity (revocation of corporate charter or court-
supervised reorganization, for example), these are unlikely. Fines are more likely, and 
these fines can be reduced significantly if a corporation cooperates with prosecutors. 
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have been, are being, and likely will be hurt by T’s wrongdoing; (3) 
R’s decision not to initiate action against T could damage R’s credibil-
ity as an effective regulator, perhaps even neutralizing much of the 
deterrence R achieved at Node I when it opened an investigation of 
T; (4) R’s decision may damage morale within R if the decision is 
viewed as the result of incompetence, corruption, or inadequate re-
sources, rather than merit. Given our assumption for these Games, 
R’s employees and any other observers might believe that T is en-
gaged in wrongdoing; and (5) By shutting down its investigation 
without bringing charges, R signals to T that T can successfully 
elude R.165 
 This last cost is incurred if T is aware that R was investigating it, 
which is likely given the nature of fraud investigations. Unlike R’s 
decision at Node I, where R only possibly signaled encouragement to 
T by not investigating, R’s decision to close its investigation without 
taking action against T almost certainly will send a signal of encour-
agement to T and other observant businesses. At Node I, when R 
opted not to investigate T, it is unlikely that T or other businesses 
knew of R’s decision. The decision not to investigate a possible target 
is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion generally hidden deep 
within the confines of R. In fact, it would be inappropriate for R to 
publicize its decisions not to investigate an individual or business 
since simply stating as much could disparage or defame targets.166 If 
R actually opens an investigation of T, however, it is almost certain 
that T, and possibly other businesses, will know that R was investi-
gating T. It is also virtually certain that T will surmise R’s decision 
to close its investigation without initiating action. During a typical 
fraud investigation, subpoenas requiring document or witness pro-
duction will be served on targets, obviously alerting targets that R is 
investigating them.167 Almost certainly, T’s attorneys will engage in 
discussions with R about document and witness productions.168 When 
no more subpoenas come and no further R action occurs, T will cor-
rectly conclude that the matter has been resolved. Pursuant to T’s 
                                                                                                             
 165. Eric Posner discusses signaling, suggesting that in repeated games, participants 
signal to other players their willingness to cooperate in the future games. POSNER, supra 
note 151, at 18-22. According to Posner, signaling is an important way not only to enter re-
lationships, but also to maintain them. Id. at 21. Even so, as Posner notes, “signals do not 
work perfectly or even particularly well” because it is cheaper for some people to send sig-
nals than for others, and it can be difficult to get information about signals. Id. at 21-22; 
see also id. at 18-22, 50-55, 70-72, 98-100, 127-28, 174-77. Ellickson also focuses on signals, 
noting how Shasta County rural residents use signals to cooperate (follow social norms for 
dealing with trespassing cattle). ELLICKSON, supra note 142, at 71-81. 
 166. See, e.g., PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES AND MATERIALS 448 (2d 
ed. 1998); United States v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
 167. Hayman, supra note 161, at 225-26, 236-37. 
 168. See, e.g., Peter H. White, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiating and Defending Immunity 
for “Targets and Subjects”, 29 LITIG. 1, 44 (2002). 
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request for notification by R of its status, T may even be told that it 
is no longer a target of R. In this way R’s decision not to bring an ac-
tion against T will signal to T and other observant businesses that T 
can continue its wrongful activity. Signaling such encouragement ob-
viously presents a significant cost.  
 For these reasons, the costs to R of closing its investigation with-
out taking action against T outweigh the benefits.169 
 At Node IV, R initiates action against T after finding grounds to 
do so during its investigation. The benefits of initiating action are: (1) 
Enhanced credibility for R in the eyes of T and other businesses; (2) 
Enhanced credibility in the eyes of T’s employees and competitors 
who may have valuable evidence against T and are more willing to 
come forward once R has initiated an action; (3) Enhanced morale 
within R; (4) Ability to minimize, if not prevent, additional harm to 
victims; (5) Deterrence of T’s wrongdoing;170 and (6) Deterrence of 
wrongdoing by other observant businesses. 
 R incurs the following costs with its decision to initiate action 
against T: (1) Because R lacks inside information about T’s wrongdo-
ing—at least of the helpful type that a qui tam relator can provide—
R probably will not fully discover the scope of T’s wrongdoing. As a 
result, R may not be successful, or as successful as it otherwise could 
have been, in the legal action it initiates against T or in protecting 
the public from T’s wrongdoing; and (2) Without inside information 
about T’s wrongdoing such as who is involved, who might provide 
evidence, what records are relevant, and where assets are located, R 
will incur significant investigative and litigative costs in pursuing 
the action it has initiated against T. R’s investigation, even if suc-
cessful, will be inefficient, consuming unnecessary investigative re-
sources.171 
 For the forgoing reasons, R’s benefits outweigh its costs in opting 
to initiate an action against T at the conclusion of its investigation.172 
3. Nodes V and VI: R Wins or Loses the Action It Brought  
Against T 
 At Node V, R prevails in the action it initiated at Node IV. The 
benefits R obtains are significant and obvious: (1) There will be a 
public acknowledgment of T’s wrongdoing;173 (2) R’s victory will help 
                                                                                                             
 169. See infra app. A chart 3, at 678. 
 170. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1858-66 
(2001). 
 171. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
 172. See infra app. A chart 4, at 678. 
 173. Kevin J. O’Brien, Will There Be a Legal Legacy, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A20 
(referring to one of the DOJ’s purposes in prosecuting Arthur Andersen for obstruction of 
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educate and inform the relevant industry as to what is permissible 
behavior and what is not;174 (3) Collection of judgment, fines, or pen-
alties. Almost certainly, T will make a significant payment to R (or 
R’s umbrella organization, such as the federal government) in judg-
ment, fines, or penalties; (4) T likely will cease committing its 
wrongdoing (or at least as much of it as R has detected); (5) Other 
observant businesses engaging in similar wrongdoing or contemplat-
ing doing so will be deterred; and (6) R’s credibility will be enhanced. 
This may have several ripple effects. Citizens may become more will-
ing to assist in future regulatory efforts overall or may become more 
favorably disposed to regulators when sitting as jurors. More indi-
viduals may even become inclined to choose career paths at regula-
tory agencies. 
 R will incur costs even though R wins the action. These costs in-
clude: (1) The lost opportunity of pursuing other deserving T’s. Be-
cause of R’s limited resources, R’s decision to pursue T necessarily 
means that R is unable to pursue other wrongdoers; and (2) Possibly, 
an inability to recoup from T, R’s full investigative expenses. This 
will, of course, depend upon T’s solvency and the priority of other T 
creditors or victims. 
 For the reasons stated, R’s benefits outweigh R’s costs when R 
wins the action it brought against T.175  
 At Node VI, R loses the action it initiated at Node IV. Surprising 
perhaps, but there are two benefits to R from this adverse outcome. 
One is certain, the others, speculative: (1) The certain benefit is that 
with its loss, R’s investigative and litigative costs will end; and (2) 
The possible benefits are that R will deter T and possibly other ob-
servant businesses from engaging in wrongdoing simply because 
these entities want to avoid the tangible and intangible costs a busi-
ness sustains in responding to R’s investigation, and in defending it-
self (albeit successfully) in the action R initiated against T. These 
businesses may decide that such costs are so significant that they 
will operate “cleaner” businesses in the future so that they do not 
come under R’s investigative scrutiny.  
                                                                                                             
justice as obtaining a “public admission by Andersen that it committed a crime in destroy-
ing Enron-related documents”). 
 174. If we were concerned with obvious forms of wrongdoing this would not be an issue. 
Every legally sane person knows that rape, murder, robbery, and the like are wrong and 
public prosecution of such behavior, while achieving other goals perhaps, does little to 
communicate the wrongfulness of this conduct to possible future perpetrators. This is not 
the case with economic wrongdoing, however, for often the line between aggressive busi-
ness strategies and wrongdoing is not clear. Successful regulatory action, whether crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative, can help communicate where the line is and what conduct 
crosses it. 
 175. See infra app. A chart 5, at 679. 
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 Not surprisingly, R’s costs at Node VI are significant: (1) R loses 
credibility with the regulated industries, among R’s own employees 
and among the general public; (2) R will have incurred substantial 
investigative and litigative expense with no result; (3) R incurs op-
portunity costs since by allocating resources to pursue T, R is unable 
to investigate other deserving targets; and (4) R’s loss in the action 
almost certainly signals to T and other observant businesses two 
things. First, if T’s targeted behavior was of ambiguous lawfulness, 
R’s loss may communicate that such behavior is lawful.176 Second, 
even if it is clear that T’s behavior was unlawful, R’s loss signals that 
R is unable to successfully pursue such behavior and that businesses 
may engage in it with impunity.  
 For these reasons, R’s costs are significant, and R’s benefits are 
minimal when R loses the action it has brought against T.177 
B.   Game 1(B): Regulatory Game Without FCA: From T’s Perspective 
 Game 1(B) continues with a regulatory “Game” that does not in-
clude a mechanism such as the FCA which encourages private par-
ties to bring information about T’s wrongdoing to regulators and to 
work with regulators to investigate and litigate against T. In Game 
1(B) this regulatory system is viewed from the perspective of T, the 
targeted business. The triggering event for Game 1(B) is T’s commis-
sion of wrongdoing. T’s strategy options flow from this event: whether 
T discloses its wrongdoing to R (Nodes I and II); whether T cooper-
ates in the investigation that R opens (Nodes III and IV); whether T 
cooperates with R after R initiates an action against T (Nodes V and 
VI). At Nodes VII and VIII, T responds: at Node VII, T loses the ac-
tion R initiated; at Node VIII, T prevails.178 
1.   Nodes I and II: Whether T Discloses Its Wrongdoing to R 
 T’s strategy at Node I, not to disclose its wrongdoing to R, may be 
a rational option even though, as discussed infra,179 the consequences 
of T’s wrongdoing can be mitigated considerably if T discloses its 
wrongdoing to R before R discovers it. The reason non-disclosure may 
be advantageous is because R may never discover T’s wrongdoing 
even though R has been alerted to it. Or even if R discovers T’s 
wrongdoing, it is not clear that R would respond with consequences. 
It is possible that R would lose interest in T (if more egregious of-
fenders came along to absorb R’s interest and resources), or that R’s 
                                                                                                             
 176. See supra note 164. 
 177. See infra app. A chart 6, at 679. 
 178. See infra app. B, at 699 (diagramming Game 1(B)). 
 179. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. 
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priorities and personnel would change, focusing R’s attention on ac-
tors besides T. 
 If R never detects T’s wrongdoing or if R fails to respond if R does 
learn of it, T reaps an obvious and substantial benefit by adopting a 
strategy of non-disclosure:180 T (1) avoids a finding of culpability, (2) 
avoids resulting sanctions, and (3) avoids the collateral consequences 
that may flow from the imposition of sanctions. These collateral con-
sequences likely include adverse publicity and adverse reaction by 
T’s shareholders, lenders, or business associates.181 
 The costs to T of adopting a non-disclosure strategy are: (1) The 
uncertainty of not knowing if, or when, R will learn of T’s wrongdo-
ing—such uncertainty makes business planning and preparation dif-
ficult; (2) The likelihood that if R learns of T’s wrongdoing, R will im-
pose greater sanctions on T than whatever R would have imposed 
had T demonstrated good faith and corporate responsibility by dis-
closing its malfeasance before getting caught; and (3) T loses some 
ability to control its fate by waiting to see if and when R does any-
thing. By adopting a non-disclosure strategy, T is in the position of 
reacting to R’s initiatives, leaving T with less ability to influence R’s 
assessment of T’s liability, R’s view of appropriate sanctions, and the 
collateral consequences that flow from sanctions.  
 The ability of targets to influence regulators is significant. If T 
alerts R to T’s wrongdoing before R otherwise learns of it, T can pos-
sibly persuade R that T’s wrongdoing was less intentional than R 
may assume. Especially in areas governed by complex rules and 
regulations, T may be able to demonstrate to R that T’s conduct was 
not the result of an intent to defraud, but resulted from a reasonable 
interpretation of applicable rules. It is common, in complex corporate 
investigations, for defense counsel to present T’s evaluation of R’s 
case to R before R decides what action to take.182 If T’s counsel effec-
tively demonstrates that there is a satisfactory explanation for T’s 
behavior, showing it to be legitimate (or at least resulting from inno-
                                                                                                             
 180. See generally Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of 
Internal Investigations to the Government or Other Third Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE 
INVESTIGATIONS 279, 291-94 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003); Dennis 
G. Kainen, When the IRS Comes Knocking, 29 LITIG. 40, 42 (2002); Shelly R. Slade, Truth 
and Its Consequences: Should You Voluntarily Disclose Overbillings to Law Enforcement?, 
12 HEALTH LAW., No. 5, 36, 37-39 (2000); Linda C. Quinn et al., Disclosing Bad News: An 
Overview for Securities Counsel, in RESPONDING TO BAD NEWS: HOW TO DEAL WITH THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, STOCKHOLDERS, THE PRESS, ANALYSTS, REGULATORS AND THE 
PLAINTIFFS’ BAR 329, 341 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1149 
1999), available at  WL 1149 PLI/Corp 329. 
 181. See infra note 182. 
 182. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 31, at 26; Hayman, supra note 161 at 237; Christopher 
Myers et al., Warding Off Criminal Liability with an Effective Corporate Compliance Pro-
gram, 29 LITIG. 69 (2002); United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke’s 
Med. Ctr., No. 99C06313, 2001 WL 40807, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16 2001). 
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cent mistake rather than intentional misconduct), early dialog be-
tween R and T could influence R to close its investigation of T with-
out bringing an action against T. Even if T cannot prevent R from 
taking action completely, T may still be able to favorably influence 
what action R will take, convincing R to return lesser charges 
against T because of the good faith and corporate responsibility T has 
shown by coming forward. (4) By adopting a non-disclosure policy, T 
also foregoes the opportunity to influence the collateral consequences 
of R’s action against T. T would like to impact the publicity that may 
surround disclosure of T’s wrongdoing. Negative publicity can affect 
T’s share value, which could lead to shareholder derivative suits, 
class action fraud suits, and investigations by even more regulatory 
agencies.183 Once they learn that an investigation is pending against 
T, lenders or potential business partners of T may become reluctant 
to deal with T because of the uncertainty such an investigation in-
troduces about T’s ability to engage in future business endeavors.184 
Some, perhaps many, of T’s personnel may become distracted by the 
investigation or concerned about their job security. Some may choose 
to leave T for other opportunities. Even choosing when T incurs ad-
verse publicity can be important. By disclosing its wrongdoing on a 
day dominated by other news or at a time that news media are not 
likely to be attentive, T can minimize publicity. By disclosing its 
wrongdoing at the same time T announces constructive responses to 
such activity, T can favorably influence the content of publicity. By 
alerting key business partners, lenders, and shareholders prior to 
disclosure, T can minimize the disruption to its business that results 
from publicity. 
                                                                                                             
 183. Bucy, supra note 20, at 62-64. 
 184. Id.; cf. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 47, § 6.05; Bucy, supra note 160, at 3, 12-14, 
40-48. The experience of Dartmouth-Hitchcock, an academic medical center, demonstrates 
the hardship businesses can face once they become subject to investigation. The Office of 
Inspector General (OIG), Department of Health and Human Services informed Dartmouth 
that it was being investigated for improperly billing Medicare for services rendered by 
medical residents. It was given the choice of conducting its own audit under OIG supervi-
sion or paying for the OIG to conduct an audit. Dartmouth opted to conduct its own audit. 
In ten months, after a review of about half of the sampled admissions, and a finding of no 
billing errors, the OIG allowed Dartmouth to terminate its audit. By this point, Dartmouth 
had spent approximately $1.7 million to conduct the audit. During the audit period, 
planned expansion was delayed because of concerns by Dartmouth’s investment banker 
and credit agency about the audit outcome. GENERAL ACCOUNTING SERVICES, REP. NO. 
HEHS 98-174, MEDICARE CONCERNS WITH PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH) 
AUDITS 13-14 (1998). In another instance, St. Vincent’s Hospital, a suburban hospital in 
Massachusetts, received a letter from the DOJ stating that a government audit indicated 
that St. Vincent’s had submitted false claims to Medicare and was facing $2.6 million in 
penalties and damages under the False Claims Act. The hospital, which processed more 
than 80,000 claims totaling almost $300 million during the period in question, challenged 
the DOJ’s audit, ultimately settling for $19,000. Bucy, supra note 20, at 63. 
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 Lastly, by deciding that it will not disclose its wrongdoing and 
waiting to see if R discovers its wrongdoing, T also loses the opportu-
nity to minimize, or at least manage, the resources T spends respond-
ing to R’s investigation and action. It can be enormously expensive to 
defend against an investigation by R. There are significant out-of-
pocket expenses in providing R with copies of records that R may 
subpoena. Burdensome amounts of time of T’s employees and offices 
may be consumed in responding to document requests, or in testify-
ing or responding to interview requests. T may lose business oppor-
tunities because of the time its personnel are devoting to the investi-
gation.  
 T can avoid many of these expenses, however, by disclosing its 
wrongdoing. By opting to work with R to flesh out what wrongdoing 
occurred, T can determine, to some extent, when and how it incurs 
unavoidable litigation expenses. Such resource management includes 
affecting when documents or individuals are produced, who within T 
responds to R’s inquiries, and what business transactions T may pur-
sue while the investigation is pending. An ability to manage the ex-
penditure of its resources could prove quite valuable to T, since doing 
so allows T to conduct its business with as little interruption as pos-
sible.  
 The costs to T of adopting a non-disclosure strategy depend, of 
course, on the likelihood that T will get caught in the future. The 
greater the chances of getting caught, the higher the costs to T in not 
disclosing its wrongdoing. Assuming for purposes of this Game that 
the chances are moderate to slim that R will discover T’s wrongdoing, 
T’s benefits at Node I where T adopts a non-disclosure strategy out-
weigh, albeit barely, T’s costs.185 
 At Node II, T discloses its wrongdoing to R. By so doing, T obtains 
the following benefits:186 (1) T ends the uncertainty of not knowing if 
or when R will discover its wrongdoing; (2) T is able to influence R’s 
assessment of T’s liability; (3) T almost certainly positions itself to 
receive less onerous sanctions from R than it would receive if R dis-
covered T’s wrongdoing itself; (4) T obtains the opportunity to spin its 
wrongdoing in the most favorable light possible and thus influence 
the collateral consequences that are likely to result from publicity 
about T’s wrongdoing and R’s response to it; (5) T can minimize or at 
least manage the resources it expends to respond to R’s investigation; 
and (6) T can minimize any liability T, or T’s executives, incur for not 
                                                                                                             
 185. See infra app. A chart 7, at 680. 
 186. Cf. Myers et al., supra note 182, at 49, 51; Slade, supra note 180, at 36; Quinn et 
al., supra note 180, at 341; Darryl Van Duch, Keeping a Boss Out of Trouble, NAT’L L. J., 
Feb. 5, 2001, at B1, B4. 
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disclosing wrongdoing. Certain criminal statutes and theories of li-
ability make the knowing failure to disclose wrongdoing a crime.187 
 The costs to T of adopting a disclosure policy are: (1) Foregoing 
the possibility that T gets away with its wrongdoing; (2) Incurring 
the sanctions R will impose; and (3) Incurring the collateral conse-
quences that flow from a finding of liability and resulting sanctions. 
 For these reasons, T’s benefits at Node II, where T opts to dis-
close its wrongdoing to R, exceed T’s costs.188 
2. Nodes III and IV: Whether T Cooperates with R when R Opens 
an Investigation of T 
 T’s next strategy choices, at Nodes III and IV, depend upon what 
R does. Obviously, T’s prior options, to disclose or not to disclose its 
wrongdoing to R, continue if, for whatever reason, R does nothing to 
investigate T after receiving information of T’s possible wrongdoing. 
It is when R opens an investigation of T that T faces its new decision: 
whether to cooperate with R in its investigation. 
 At Node III, T can achieve three possible benefits by choosing a 
non-cooperation strategy. Without T’s cooperation, R will have to find 
and prove T’s wrongdoing by itself and R may not uncover T’s wrong-
doing or may not uncover all of it. Thus, non-cooperation would allow 
T to: (1) avoid a finding of culpability; (2) avoid sanctions; and (3) to 
avoid the collateral consequences of such sanctions. 
 However, T incurs possible costs by adopting a non-cooperation 
strategy: (1) Because of our assumption for these Games that T is 
engaging in wrongdoing, T faces the prospect that R will uncover all 
of T’s wrongful conduct during R’s investigation. This prospect could 
disrupt T’s future planning; (2) T loses the opportunity to influence 
R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) T loses the opportunity to affect 
the sanctions R seeks; (4) T loses the opportunity to impact the col-
lateral consequences, such as publicity, that flow from R’s investiga-
tion of T; and (5) T loses the opportunity to control, or minimize, the 
resources T will spend in responding to R’s investigation. 
 For the above reasons, T’s costs significantly outweigh T’s benefits 
when T adopts a non-cooperation strategy after R has opened an in-
vestigation of T.189 
                                                                                                             
 187. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (2002), creates a felony offense to conceal 
or fail to disclose the fact that one may have improperly received Medicare payments in the 
past. See, e.g., FABRIKANT ET AL, supra note 47, §2.02[5]; Gary C. Lynch & Eric F. 
Grossman, Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing, in RESPONDING TO BAD NEWS: HOW TO 
DEAL WITH THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, STOCKHOLDERS, THE PRESS, ANALYSTS, 
REGULATORS AND THE PLAINTIFF’S BAR 207, 211 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Se-
ries No. B. 1149, 1999), available at WL 1149 PLI/Corp 207; Slade, supra note 180, at 36. 
 188. See infra app. A chart 8, at 680. 
 189. See infra app. A chart 9, at 681. 
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 At Node IV, T opts to cooperate with R during R’s investigation of 
T. This cooperation could be anything from simple civility in produc-
ing whatever R requires to fully disclosing any and all suspected 
wrongdoing.  
 T obtains the following possible benefits by cooperating with R: (1) 
T is able to make a more informed decision about future strategies. 
By cooperating with R, T is likely to learn what aspects of T’s busi-
ness R is focusing on, and much about R’s commitment to the case 
and resources available to pursue it;190 (2) T may be able to influence 
R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) T may be able to obtain less on-
erous sanctions. Even if T cannot convince R that T is not culpable, T 
may be able to influence R’s decision as to what sanctions it will seek 
against T once it is determined that T is culpable; (4) T may be able 
to influence the collateral consequences that befall T because of R’s 
finding of culpability and imposition of sanctions; and (5) By cooper-
ating with R during R’s investigation of T, T may be able to reduce or 
at least manage the resources it expends when responding to R’s in-
vestigation.  
 It should be noted when assessing the benefit to T of cooperating 
with R, once R has opened an investigation, that the earlier T begins 
cooperating, the more T benefits. If T waits until R’s investigation is 
almost complete, R is more likely to view T’s cooperation as pure ex-
pediency, not indicative of good faith or contrition. Also, the later T 
begins cooperating, the less valuable to R is T’s cooperation since R 
has already expended resources that could have been conserved if T 
had cooperated earlier. Lastly, T will not be able to develop as much 
of a rapport with R if T waits until most opportunities for dialog have 
passed. 
 The costs to T of cooperating with R once R has initiated action 
against T are: (1) T almost certainly will have to cease its wrongdo-
ing, which presumably has been lucrative for T or T would not have 
been doing it; and (2) Although it may be able to minimize and man-
age the resources it devotes to responding to R’s action, T will still 
expend significant resources. 
 For the above reasons, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs when T 
adopts a strategy of cooperating with R during R’s investigation of 
T.191 
                                                                                                             
 190. Cf. Hayman, supra note 161, at 227 (“Understanding the type and status of the 
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3. Nodes V and VI: Whether T Cooperates with R Once R Initiates 
Action Against T 
 At Node V, where T adopts a non-cooperation strategy with R once 
R has initiated an action against T, T obtains two benefits: (1) T 
forces R to prove its case against T. If R is unable to do so without T’s 
cooperation, T escapes liability and all of the consequences that flow 
from such a finding; and (2) T can learn much about R’s case against 
T when R files its action: what R knows, and doesn’t know, what re-
sources R is willing to allocate to pursue T.192 Such information will 
allow T to make more informed decisions about T’s optimal strategies 
from this point forward.  
 The costs to T of pursuing a non-cooperation strategy once R has 
initiated action against it are: (1) Uncertainty in not knowing how 
the action will be resolved and difficulty in planning given such un-
certainty; (2) T’s lost opportunity to affect R’s assessment of T’s cul-
pability; (3) T’s lost opportunity to affect the severity of sanctions R 
will seek; (4) T’s lost opportunity to affect the collateral consequences 
that flow from the sanctions R will seek; and (5) T’s lost opportunity 
to minimize and manage the resources T expends in responding to 
R’s action. Although these are the same types of costs T encountered 
at Node III when T opted not to cooperate with R’s investigation, 
each of these costs will increase once R has filed an action against T 
for the simple reason that when R’s case progresses from investiga-
tion to action, T has forever lost opportunities to influence R.  
 For these reasons, T’s costs significantly outweigh T’s benefits in 
Game One when T adopts a non-cooperation strategy with R when R 
initiates an action against T.193 
 T reaps the following benefits at Node VI by adopting a coopera-
tion strategy with R after R initiates an action against T: (1) An en-
hanced ability to make decisions about T’s future strategies since T is 
now more informed about what R knows or doesn’t know, how strong 
R’s case is against T, and what resources R is willing to devote to 
pursuing the action against T; (2) Ability to influence R’s assessment 
of T’s culpability; (3) Ability to influence R’s selection of sanctions 
against T; (4) Ability to manage the collateral consequences of the 
sanctions R seeks against T; and (5) Ability to minimize and manage 
the resources T expends in responding to R’s action. 
 Although these are the same types of benefits T experienced when 
T made the decision to cooperate with R when R was just opening its 
investigation of T, the value of these benefits to T is different. The 
first benefit, T’s enhanced ability to make decisions, increases in 
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value. Now that R’s investigation has crystallized into specific 
charges, transactions, and defendants, T has quite detailed informa-
tion from which it can make decisions about future strategies. The 
next set of benefits: T’s ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s cul-
pability, R’s selection of sanctions, the collateral consequences of R’s 
sanctions, and the resources T spends in responding to R’s action, are 
worth less to T if T has only begun cooperating with R after R’s ini-
tiation of an action against T. As noted in the earlier discussion re-
garding the value of T’s cooperation with R after R opens an investi-
gation of T,194 R will not be as impressed by T’s cooperation since R 
has already expended resources T could have helped conserve if T 
had cooperated earlier. T’s cooperation is likely to be viewed by R as 
expediency, not indicative of contrition and good faith, and thus, T 
has lost significant opportunities to influence R’s future decisions re-
garding T. 
 T’s costs of cooperating with R once R has initiated an action 
against T are: (1) T will have to stop or significantly curtail its 
wrongdoing. Presumably this will be to T’s detriment since, other-
wise, T would not have been engaging in such wrongdoing; and (2) T 
will expend resources in responding to R’s investigation. 
 For the above reasons, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs when T 
opts to cooperate with R.195 
4. Nodes VII and VIII: Whether T Wins or Loses the Action R Has 
Brought Against T 
 Surprising perhaps, but T obtains some benefits at Node VII 
where T loses the action R has brought against T: (1) T sees an end to 
the tangible and intangible costs it was incurring in litigating the ac-
tion against R; (2) T sees an end to the uncertainty in which it has 
operated because of R’s ongoing investigative and litigative efforts 
toward T; and (3) The unfavorable outcome in R’s action against T 
may cause beneficial changes in T, such as corporate restructuring or 
dismissal of culpable or ineffective leaders.196  
 T’s costs when losing the action R has brought are substantial: (1) 
Although resolution of the case will end the immediate costs T was 
spending to defend the action, there may be lingering effects from 
those costs. Reputational or morale damage, or lost or aborted busi-
ness opportunities, for example, could have lasting effects on T’s pro-
ductivity; and (2) There will be sanctions against T. These probably 
                                                                                                             
 194. See supra Part III.B.2. at 640. 
 195. See infra app. A chart 12, at 682. 
 196. Cf. Interview with Neil V. Getnick, Partner, Getnick & Getnick, in New York, 
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will include fines,197 payment of damages and penalties,198 and im-
plementation of costly internal structures, such as extensive corpo-
rate compliance plans.199 
 For the above reasons, T’s costs in losing the action R has brought 
against it outweigh the minimal benefits T reaps.200  
 T’s benefits at Node VIII where T prevails in the action R brings 
against T are significant: (1) Most obviously, T avoids the sanctions 
and the collateral consequences of sanctions, that would result from 
being found liable; (2) T’s victory may enhance its reputation as a 
winner, which may help T in future dealings with R, or with other Ts 
on transactions unrelated to the action with R; (3) If the alleged 
wrongdoing on the part of T was of an ambiguous nature (Was there 
malfeasance or simply aggressive but permissible business tactics?), 
T’s victory at Node VIII may be viewed as an imprimatur that such 
conduct is permissible; and (4) T achieves an end to the uncertainty 
that has lingered over T’s business since R initiated its investigation. 
 T obtains one possible cost even though it has prevailed in the ac-
tion: T may suffer from some lingering effects from defending itself in 
the investigation and action. For the above reasons, T’s benefits out-
weigh T’s costs when T wins the action R has brought against it.201  
C.   Game 1(C): Regulatory Game Without the FCA: From P’s 
Perspective 
 Game 1(C), from P’s perspective, is the last view of Game One. 
The triggering event is P’s knowledge of T’s wrongdoing. From this 
event, P has three, limited choices. At Node I, P chooses to do noth-
ing with the information of T’s wrongdoing. At Node II, P reports the 
wrongdoing internally within T. At Node III, P reports T’s wrongdo-
ing externally to sources such as the media, congressional commit-
tees, or additional regulatory agencies. P can pursue the strategies at 
Node II and Node III simultaneously.202 
1.   Node I: P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing 
 The benefits to P of doing nothing upon learning of T’s wrongdoing 
are: (1) P will not precipitate retaliation by T; and (2) P will not incur 
                                                                                                             
 197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8, pt. C, Fines (Nov. 2003), available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/2003guid/tabcon03_1.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
 198. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2002). 
 199. Slade, supra note 180, at 40-41; Kirk S. Jordan & Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance 
Programs: What the Government Really Wants, in 1 CORP. COMPLIANCE 529, 554-68 (2000). 
 200. See infra app. A chart 13, at 683. 
 201. See infra app. A chart 14, at 683. 
 202. See infra app. B, at 700 (diagramming Game 1(C)). 
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any personal or professional consequences from reporting T’s wrong-
doing. 
 The costs to P of adopting a do-nothing strategy are: (1) T’s 
wrongdoing, if left to continue, may undermine T’s existence, and 
thus, P’s professional security; (2) If T’s wrongdoing comes to light 
through avenues besides P, P may be held accountable, in whole or in 
part, for T’s malfeasance. This is more likely if P is highly-placed 
within T. Such culpability could be alleged in shareholder derivative 
actions, civil suits for fraud, or even criminal prosecutions;203 and (3) 
P may experience personal angst for failing to report T’s wrongdoing, 
especially if many innocent people are victimized by the wrongdoing. 
This last cost will vary considerably depending upon P’s personality, 
the extent to which the wrongdoing will harm individual victims, and 
P’s awareness of such harm. This cost is quite speculative and thus, 
is discounted. 
 For the above reasons, the benefits to P of adopting a do-nothing 
strategy outweigh P’s costs.204 
2.   Node II: P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Internally 
 This Node assumes that P is either an employee of T (likely) or at 
the least, an insider in T’s industry (perhaps a competitor or vendor 
to T). Realistically, P will fit into one of these roles or would not have 
access to significant information about T’s wrongdoing.205 
 P’s benefits at Node II, where P reports T’s wrongdoing internally, 
are: (1) Possibly preventing greater troubles for T in the future.206 If 
T responds to P’s internal whistleblowing by remedying the problem 
P identifies, T may be able to avoid future harm to victims, competi-
tors, or business associates, as well as future complaints, lawsuits, 
and regulatory actions; (2) By reporting the problem, P may be 
viewed within T as demonstrating leadership. This is especially true 
if higher management was truly unaware of the wrongdoing and a 
culture of compliance pervades T. If P’s action is viewed favorably, P 
may advance within T or within the relevant industry; and (3) By re-
porting the wrongdoing, P may minimize the psychological angst P 
would have experienced in not taking action that could prevent oth-
ers, perhaps many others, from becoming victims. The value of this 
benefit increases if the harm to victims is significant, but is specula-
tive since it is difficult to know how various Ps will respond. 
                                                                                                             
 203. See, e.g., White, supra note 168, at 44. 
 204. See infra app. A chart 15, at 684. 
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 P’s costs at Node II are: (1) Possible retaliation by T and/or the 
relevant industry;207 (2) P’s time and energy in reporting T’s conduct; 
and (3) P’s personal and professional hardships that result from re-
porting the wrongdoing.208 
 For the above reasons, P’s benefits and costs neutralize each 
other.209 
3.   Node III: P Reports Externally 
 At Node III, P reports T’s wrongdoing externally to sources such 
as the press, professional self-policing organizations, or regulatory 
bodies. The benefits to P of adopting this strategy are: (1) Possible 
prevention of future problems for T; (2) P demonstrates leadership 
                                                                                                             
 207. Job loss is probably the most consistently identified consequence of blowing the 
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See, e.g., MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 79-80 (1992); 
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individuals experience. For example, in one survey of ninety whistleblowers, fifty-four per-
cent said they were harassed at work, eighty-two percent were harassed by superiors, 
eighty percent reported physical deterioration following their whistleblowing experience, 
and eighty-six percent reported “negative emotional consequences, including feelings of 
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workers. See, e.g., Leo Kohls, Refusing to Drive Unsafe Vehicles, in WESTIN, supra note 6, 
at 95-97; Henry I. Kurtz, Asserting Professional Ethics Against Dangerous Drug Test, in 
WESTIN, supra note 6, at 107-08; Robert Lipsyte, What Happens After the Whistle Blows?, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at D1. 
 In addition to immediate, tangible repercussions, there are cultural disincentives to pro-
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mation of wrongdoing. Albert D. Clark, Ethical Implications of Whistle Blowing, 42 LA. 
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and advances within T; and (3) P minimizes or prevents P’s personal 
angst. These are the same benefits P realized when reporting T’s 
wrongdoing internally. When P reports T’s wrongdoing externally, 
however, there are additional benefits: (4) By reporting T’s wrongdo-
ing publicly, P more convincingly demonstrates P’s non-culpability 
for the wrongdoing; (5) P may obtain protection from T’s retaliation 
because T will look guilty and vindictive if T retaliates against P af-
ter P has publicly disclosed T’s wrongdoing; and (6) T may be more 
eager to cease its wrongdoing and quickly repair the damage it has 
created because of the publicity P’s external disclosure has brought. 
 The costs to P of reporting T’s wrongdoing externally are: (1) P in-
creases the likelihood of ostracization, if not retaliation, within T and 
within the relevant industry. The accompanying personal or profes-
sional hardships for P could be significant;210 (2) P’s time and energy; 
and (3) Depending on the amount of publicity P’s disclosure gener-
ates, T’s response, and P’s personality, P may feel discomfort at be-
coming a public figure, especially if T responds to P’s external report-
ing by publicly disparaging P.211 
 For the above reasons, P’s benefits outweigh P’s costs when P opts 
to report T’s wrongdoing externally.212 
D.    Game 2(A): Regulatory Game with the FCA: From R’s Perspective 
 In Game Two, there is a mechanism, such as the FCA, that en-
courages private parties (P) to bring information about wrongdoing 
to regulators and to work with regulators to investigate and litigate 
such wrongdoing. Game 2(A) looks at this regulatory game from the 
perspective of regulators (R). The triggering event, as in Game 1(A), 
is R’s knowledge of T’s possible wrongdoing. Unlike Game 1(A), how-
ever, R learns of T’s possible wrongdoing in Game 2(A) from P. Also, 
unlike the sketchy, inconclusive information R received in Game 1(A) 
about T’s wrongdoing, P provides R with detailed information of T’s 
wrongdoing since, as noted supra, the FCA requires that relators 
provide the DOJ with a copy of the complaint P has filed (under seal) 
against T, as well as all information and evidence P has regarding 
T’s wrongdoing.213 
 From this triggering event, R has two choices: conduct a minimal 
investigation (Node I), or a thorough investigation (Node II). Note 
that R’s options vary from Game One where R had the choice of 
whether to open an investigation or not. In Game Two, where the 
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FCA is part of the regulatory scheme, R has a statutory obligation to 
investigate P’s information once P has served R as required.214 After 
R has conducted its investigation, R has two choices: decline to inter-
vene in P’s lawsuit (Node III), or intervene in P’s lawsuit (Node IV). 
If R intervenes, both R and P achieve benefits or incur costs, depend-
ing on the outcome in the action brought against T. At Node V, R and 
P win the action, and at Node VI, R and P lose the action.215 
1. Nodes I and II: How Much of an Investigation R Should 
Conduct upon Learning from P of T’s Possible Wrongdoing 
 In Game Two, at Node I where R opts to conduct a minimal inves-
tigation of P’s information that T is engaged in wrongdoing, R ob-
tains the following benefits: (1) If T knows that R is aware of T’s 
wrongdoing, T may be deterred from continuing it. Because both T’s 
awareness and T’s response are speculative, this is deemed to be a 
minimal benefit; and (2) By conducting only a minimal investigation, 
R saves resources that could be directed to other investigations. 
Given the complexity of economic wrongdoing in general, and the 
type of wrongdoing the FCA is aimed at in particular—government 
contracting fraud—the amount of R’s resources needed to investigate 
P’s information could be considerable because it takes significant 
time and sophistication to investigate such complex malfeasance.216 
On the one hand, because of our assumption for these Games that T 
is engaged in wrongdoing and thus a worthy target of R’s investiga-
tory resources, this would seem to be a minimal benefit. On the other 
hand, it is not clear that P’s information is helpful in identifying T’s 
wrongdoing. In fact, given our estimate that Ps are helpful to R only 
twenty-seven percent of the time,217 R could waste considerable re-
sources investigating P’s information.  
 This situation—P dictating who and what R investigates—
demonstrates both the strength and weakness of the FCA paradigm. 
The strength is that the FCA enlists a new player, P, who potentially 
brings the valuable resource of inside information to regulatory ef-
forts. The weakness is that this new player forces R to play and to in-
vest resources that could be better allocated elsewhere.218 One way to 
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manage this so that the FCA remains more of a strength than a 
weakness to R is to ensure that R has flexibility to conduct a minimal 
review of P’s information when R deems such review appropriate.219  
 R will incur the costs it incurred in Game One when R opted not 
to investigate allegations of T’s wrongdoing but had no inside infor-
mation about T’s wrongdoing from P: (1) R’s decision will empower T 
to the extent T is aware of R’s decision; (2) R’s decision will empower 
other businesses to the extent they are aware of R’s decision; (3) R’s 
decision will allow T time to refine its malfeasance strategies; (4) R’s 
decision will allow more victims to be hurt. There are two additional 
costs to R in Game Two from Game One because of P’s participation: 
(5) Because of our assumption that T is engaged in wrongdoing, it is 
safe to assume that multiple Ps within T know at least something 
about T’s wrongdoing. Unlike Game One where there is no P, R’s dis-
regard of P’s information in Game Two signals to all future Ps, inside 
or outside of T, that R is not responsive, supportive or interested in 
whistleblowers.220 This signaling almost certainly will discourage 
other Ps from coming forth; and (6) If T knows that P has provided R 
with information, R’s passivity in the face of such information may 
encourage T and other aware businesses to retaliate against Ps 
within their ranks.  
 For these reasons, R’s costs outweigh R’s benefits in Game Two 
when R opts to do only a minimal investigation of T upon learning of 
T’s possible wrongdoing.221 Also, because of P’s participation in Game 
Two and the additional signaling R’s strategy now conveys, R’s costs 
of conducting only a minimal investigation of T increase in Game 
Two from Game One when P was not a player. 
 At Node II in Game Two where R opts to actively investigate T, R 
reaps the following benefits: (1) Deterrence of T’s wrongdoing; (2) De-
terrence of other observant businesses in their wrongdoing or 
planned wrongdoing; and (3) Development of institutional knowl-
edge. These benefits are amplified in Game Two from Game One. The 
first benefit, deterring T’s wrongdoing, will be enhanced in Game 
Two if T is aware that R is working with P because T will know that 
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when P, an informed insider, is working with R, R’s case against T 
will be stronger. The value of this deterrence will not be enhanced 
greatly however because it is not likely, at the investigation stage, 
that T will know that P is working with R. Neither R nor P will want 
to disclose P’s involvement to T, or to anyone. R will want to keep P’s 
identity as a whistleblower secret so that P can continue to gather in-
formation that assists R’s investigation.222 P will want to maintain 
secrecy because of the retaliation and ostracization P is likely to face 
if others know of P’s assistance to R. The third benefit, developing in-
stitutional knowledge within R about T’s wrongdoing and that of 
other actors in T’s industry, is considerably enhanced in Game Two 
because of P’s information about T’s behavior and about T’s industry.  
 Also, in Game Two, where P is a player, there is a new benefit for 
R when R chooses to actively investigate T. By working with P, R 
signals to future Ps that R responds and supports Ps, thereby en-
couraging future Ps to come forward.223  
 R’s cost in opening and actively investigating T in Game Two is 
the same type of cost R experienced in Game One (investigative 
costs, the allocation of which prevent R from investigating other Ts), 
but it hurts R less. This cost decreases from Game One because of P’s 
assistance in Game Two, at least in the twenty-seven percent of the 
cases where P is helpful.224 In these cases, P will be able to explain to 
R what wrongdoing is taking place within T; interpret and explain 
T’s policies and procedures; identify who within T is involved in the 
wrongdoing and who is likely to serve as credible, knowledgeable 
witnesses; describe what documents, records and correspondence ex-
ist to corroborate R’s case and where those documents may be stored; 
and alert regulators as to where T’s assets are held or are being fun-
neled.225 Because of P’s assistance, R’s investigation will be more effi-
cient and focused than it was in Game One and R’s overall investiga-
tive costs will be less.226 For this same reason, R’s opportunity cost of 
not pursuing other defendants because of the resources R allocated to 
pursue T is reduced. Since R’s case against T will be stronger in 
Game Two with P’s help, the likelihood of foregoing better investiga-
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tions decreases. With P’s help, R will be proceeding in a strong case 
against T.  
 For these reasons, R’s benefits outweigh R’s costs when R opts to 
actively investigate T in Game Two upon learning from P of T’s pos-
sible wrongdoing.227  
2.   Nodes III and IV: Whether R Intervenes in P’s Lawsuit Against T 
 The FCA permits R to intervene at the inception of P’s case and 
continue as the primary plaintiff throughout the duration of the case 
or, alternatively, to intervene fully or for limited purposes at any 
stage of the case.228 R can, for example, intervene solely to seek dis-
missal of P’s case or to litigate an issue on appeal. 
 At Node III, R opts not to intervene in P’s action. R realizes the 
following benefits with this strategy: (1) R saves resources. By declin-
ing to intervene, R recognizes a significant benefit even in light of 
our assumption that T is engaged in wrongdoing if R makes this de-
cision in the appropriate cases—those in which P’s information is not 
helpful. Conversely, if R chooses not to intervene in those cases in 
which P’s information is helpful, this benefit is minimal. For pur-
poses of assessing this benefit we will assume that in the majority of 
cases that R makes an appropriate decision and declines to intervene 
when P’s information is not helpful; and (2) Even if R makes an in-
appropriate decision and decides against intervention in a meritori-
ous case, R can still realize a benefit. Under the FCA, if R does not 
intervene in a case brought by a P, R still collects a hefty percentage 
(seventy to seventy-five percent) of the judgment if P successfully 
pursues the case.229 Although historically it is unusual for relators in 
non-intervened cases to prevail, it is possible.230 
 R will incur the following possible costs by declining to inter-
vene.231 These are possible costs because R incurs them only if R has 
                                                                                                             
 227. See infra app. A chart 19, at 686. 
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 231. WEST, supra note 31, at 46. 
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incorrectly assessed the merits of P’s case and failed to intervene 
when it should have: (1) R’s decision will cause P’s case to fail. Few 
Ps have adequate litigative and investigative resources to fully and 
successfully pursue a case alone. Sometimes, courts assume that P’s 
case is not meritorious if R does not intervene. Thus in most situa-
tions, R’s non-intervention decision will doom P’s case to dismissal, 
or to less success than might otherwise be possible. This is a cost only 
when P’s case is meritorious. Otherwise, it is a benefit. 
 Secondly, by not intervening, even for limited purposes,232 R loses 
the opportunity to guide and direct P’s exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Allowing Ps to pursue inappropriate cases or urge irrespon-
sible interpretations of the FCA has significant collateral costs, such 
as creating unnecessary expense and damage for defendants, gener-
ating hostility toward the FCA among policy makers, and creating 
precedent that binds R and responsible Ps in all FCA cases.233 R’s 
careful monitoring of Ps’ qui tam actions is also important for consti-
tutional reasons. The FCA is vulnerable under the “Appointments”234 
and “take-care”235 clauses if R does not maintain adequate supervi-
sion over Ps.236 
 Thirdly, by declining to intervene, R may empower T and other 
observant businesses to continue their wrongdoing if T and other 
businesses are aware that P has presented information of T’s wrong-
doing to R and that R has declined to intervene. There are two ways 
T and other businesses could learn of R’s non-intervention decision. 
The first is through R’s investigation of T. If R investigates T before 
making its non-intervention decision by serving subpoenas, inter-
viewing T’s personnel, or engaging in discussion with T’s counsel, T 
will obviously learn of R’s investigation. When R does not sue T, or 
when P continues with P’s suit against T alone, after R has declined 
to join the case, T will know that R did not believe the suit was meri-
torious. 
 Fourthly, by not intervening and by abdicating inappropriate 
prosecutorial discretion to Ps, R may be losing an opportunity to 
                                                                                                             
 232. The FCA allows R to intervene for limited purposes such as to move for dismissal 
of a non-meritorious case, or to urge a particular interpretation of the FCA on appeal. 31 
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shape society’s norms. R is able to send powerful signals to economic 
actors through its regulatory agenda—what conduct is wrong, why it 
is wrong, and what substitute conduct is permissible.237 To the extent 
that R allows Ps, who are motivated by the prospect of a large recov-
ery rather than by public interest, to initiate and pursue cases of 
questionable merit, R allows muddled signals to be sent to economic 
actors. This confused message may lead actors to adopt nonproduc-
tive strategies that damage their competitiveness and hurt the na-
tional economy. 
 For these reasons, R’s costs at Node III outweigh R’s benefits 
when R opts not to intervene in P’s lawsuit against T.238 
 At Node IV, where R intervenes in P’s action against T, R achieves 
the same types of benefits R realized in Game One where R brought 
an action against T alone: (1) Enhanced credibility for R among T 
and observant businesses; (2) Enhanced credibility for R among po-
tential witnesses against T; (3) Enhanced morale within R; (4) Mini-
mizing, if not preventing, harm to victims; (5) Deterring T’s wrongdo-
ing; and (6) Deterring wrongdoing by other observant businesses. 
These benefits are amplified in Game Two since with P’s information 
it is more likely, at least in twenty-seven percent of the cases,239 that 
R will discover the full extent of T’s wrongdoing and that R will ulti-
mately prevail in the action. There is also a new benefit in Game 
Two: (7) By working with P, R sends a powerful signal of support and 
encouragement to future whistleblowers.  
 In Game Two, R incurs the same types of costs it incurred in 
Game One where R brought an action against T without P’s involve-
ment: (1) Investigative expenses; and (2) Opportunity cost—by pur-
suing T, R is unable to pursue other targets. Both of these costs de-
crease in Game Two from Game One. P’s information makes R’s in-
vestigation more focused and efficient, thus reducing the resources R 
must devote to pursue T. When P’s counsel is experienced, assistance 
to R by P’s counsel further reduces the amount of resources R must 
devote to T’s case. Both phenomena will allow R to put more of its re-
sources into other investigations, thereby reducing R’s opportunity 
cost.  
 For these reasons, R’s benefits outweigh R’s costs in Game Two 
when R opts to intervene in P’s suit against T.240  
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3. Nodes V and VI: R Wins or Loses the Action It Brought with P 
Against T 
 At Node V, when R, working with P, prevails in the action it 
brought against T, R achieves the same types of benefits it obtained 
with its victory in Game One: (1) Public acknowledgment that T’s 
behavior is wrong; (2) Education of relevant industry as to permissi-
ble and impermissible behavior; (3) Enhanced credibility for R; (4) 
Payment by T of judgment, fines, and penalties; (5) Deterrence of T’s 
wrongdoing; and (6) Deterrence of wrongdoing by other observant 
businesses. These benefits are amplified in Game Two from Game 
One. With P’s information, it is likely in Game Two that R will re-
solve the case against T more thoroughly and more advantageously 
to R than R could have done without P’s information and assistance, 
at least in the twenty-seven percent of cases where P’s information is 
helpful.241 Also, as noted supra, there is an additional benefit to R in 
winning the action in Game Two: (7) R’s success in the action will 
signal encouragement to future whistleblowers. 
 Although R prevails in the action it brought with P against T, R 
will incur costs with its victory: (1) The opportunity cost of foregoing 
actions against other Ts. As noted, because R’s resources are limited 
and R does not have adequate resources to pursue all deserving Ts, 
pursuit of one T necessarily means R cannot pursue other Ts. (2) De-
pending on T’s assets and the judgment ordered or settlement 
reached, R may not be able to recoup all of its investigative and liti-
gative expenses from T as part of the settlement of the case. 
 Both of these costs decrease for R in Game Two from Game One 
where R did not work with P. R’s investigative and litigative costs 
will not be as great in Game Two because P’s information makes R’s 
case against T more focused and efficient, and because assistance 
from P’s counsel supplements R’s resources. This will free up more of 
R’s resources to pursue other Ts, thus reducing R’s opportunity cost. 
Additionally, reduced investigative and litigative costs make it less 
serious for R if R is unable to recoup all of its costs from T after R 
prevails. 
 For these reasons, R’s benefits at Node V are significantly greater 
than its costs when R wins the action it brought, with P, against T.242 
 At Node VI, in Game Two when R, working with P, loses the ac-
tion it brought against T, R still achieves two benefits: (1) An end to 
R’s investigative and litigative cost; and (2) Possibly, some deterrence 
of T and other observant businesses if these actors view the costs of 
responding to R’s investigation and action as so significant that they 
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opt to operate their businesses more honestly in the future so as to 
avoid R’s scrutiny. 
 R incurs the same types of costs in Game Two as it incurred in 
Game One: (1) Lost credibility; (2) Lost tangible and intangible ex-
penses incurred in pursuing the action against T; (3) Opportunity 
cost of not pursuing other deserving T’s by allocating resources to 
pursuing T; and (4) Signaling to T and other observant businesses 
that they can continue their wrongdoing with impunity. The first 
cost, lost credibility, is amplified in Game Two from Game One. In 
Game Two, R loses more credibility than in Game One because R 
has, by its failure, not only lost a specific case but has demonstrated, 
for all to see, the failure of a regulatory scheme that strives to part-
ner private parties with regulators in pursuit of wrongdoers.  
 As noted throughout Game Two, R incurs an additional cost be-
cause of the enhanced signaling to other players that occurs in Game 
Two. Since Game Two is played with the participation of P, R’s loss 
in the action signals to future Ps that it may not be worth their while 
to bring information about T’s wrongdoing to R, or to work with R to 
investigate or litigate against T. No Ps want to endure the hardship 
they will by becoming whistleblowers only to lose the actions they 
pursue with R.  
 For these reasons R’s costs outweigh R’s benefits when R and P 
lose the action they have brought against T.243  
E.   Game 2(B): Regulatory Game with the FCA: From T’s Perspective 
 Game 2(B) looks at Game Two from T’s perspective. The trigger-
ing event is T’s commission of wrongdoing. From this event, T faces 
the decision of whether to disclose its wrongdoing (Nodes I, II), 
whether to cooperate with R when R opens an investigation of T 
(Nodes III, IV), or whether to cooperate with R (Nodes V, VI) or with 
P (Nodes VII, VIII). At Nodes IX and X, T either wins or loses the ac-
tion brought against it.244 
1.   Nodes I and II: Whether T Discloses Its Wrongdoing to R 
 At Node I where T decides not to disclose its wrongdoing to R, T’s 
benefits in Game Two are the same T realized in Game One: T possi-
bly avoids (1) any finding of culpability, (2) imposition of sanctions, 
and (3) collateral consequences that may flow from culpability and 
sanctions. T’s costs in adopting a non-disclosure strategy are: (1) Un-
certainty in not knowing whether R will investigate T in the future, 
and resulting difficulty planning; (2) Lost opportunity to influence 
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R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) Lost opportunity to influence the 
sanctions R will seek against T; (4) Lost opportunity to influence the 
collateral consequences, such as publicity, that will flow from R’s as-
sessment of T’s culpability and the imposition of sanctions on T; and 
(5) Lost opportunity to minimize and manage the costs T will incur 
when responding to R if R learns of T’s wrongdoing. These are the 
same types of costs T incurred in Game One. In Game Two they sim-
ply hurt T more. As noted in Game One, the value of T’s costs in 
adopting a non-disclosure policy depend upon the likelihood of T get-
ting caught in the future. This is where the presence of P as a player 
makes a difference in Game Two. When P, an insider who has 
knowledge of T’s wrongdoing, is willing to give information to R and 
to work with R in pursuing T, the chances of T getting caught in-
crease significantly, at least in those cases where P’s information is 
helpful. Thus, the costs to T of adopting a non-disclosure strategy in-
crease in Game Two from Game One.245 
 At Node II, where T decides to disclose its wrongdoing to R, T ex-
periences the converse of its costs and benefits at Node I.246  
2.   Nodes III and IV: Whether T Cooperates in R’s Investigation 
 Once R opens an investigation of T, T must decide whether to co-
operate with R. As in Game One, T obtains the following benefits by 
deciding not to cooperate with R’s investigation: (1) T avoids a find-
ing of culpability; (2) T avoids sanctions; and (3) T avoids collateral 
consequences of sanctions R may seek. Because of the presence in 
Game Two of P, these benefits decrease in value for T in Game Two 
since as noted, their value depends upon whether R learns about T’s 
wrongdoing. The benefits of non-disclosure are not worth much if R 
discovers T’s wrongdoing, and the chances of R discovering T’s 
wrongdoing increase in Game Two with P’s information about T’s 
wrongdoing. Thus in Game Two, T’s benefits of non-disclosure be-
come more speculative and less valuable. 
 T incurs the same types of costs in Game Two as T sustained in 
Game One when it adopted a non-cooperation policy: (1) Uncertainty 
in not knowing whether R will initiate an action against T; (2) Lost 
opportunity to affect R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) Lost oppor-
tunity to affect the severity of sanctions that may be imposed on T; 
(4) Lost opportunity to affect collateral consequences flowing from 
the sanctions that may be imposed on T; and (5) Lost opportunity to 
minimize and manage the resources T expends in responding to R’s 
investigation. With one exception, all of these costs are greater for T 
in Game Two. The one exception is the cost of not knowing what R 
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may do. This uncertainty decreases in Game Two, since with P as a 
player, it becomes more certain that R will initiate an action against 
T. The remaining four costs all increase, however, for the same rea-
son. The more likely it is that R will initiate an action against T, the 
greater the opportunities lost for T in adopting a non-cooperation pol-
icy. 
 For these reasons, T’s costs of adopting a non-cooperation strategy 
in Game Two outweigh the benefits of choosing such a strategy.247 
 The converse is true at Node IV of Game Two where T decides to 
cooperate with R. P’s participation in Game Two, which makes it 
more likely that R’s investigation will be focused, efficient and will 
result in successful action against T, increases the benefits T obtains 
by cooperating with R. One of T’s costs of cooperating, expenditure of 
resources, decreases in Game Two because of P’s participation. The 
resources T spends in responding to R’s investigation are likely to be 
less in Game Two, since with P’s guidance, R’s investigation will be 
more focused and efficient. The other cost T incurs because it adopts 
a cooperation strategy, cutting back on its wrongdoing, remains the 
same in Game Two as in Game One; P’s presence should not affect 
this. 
 For these reasons, the benefits to T of cooperating with R when R 
opens an investigation of T outweigh T’s costs in doing so.248  
3. Nodes V and VI: Whether T Adopts a Strategy of Cooperation 
with R After R Has Intervened in P’s Suit 
 After R’s investigation, T faces slightly different steps in Game 
Two than in Game One. This is because P and R face different 
choices in Game Two and their decisions affect T. Because of the 
structure of the FCA, R doesn’t get to decide whether it will initiate 
an action against T after it has investigated T. In Game Two, P has 
already seized the initiative and R is left to decide whether it will in-
tervene in the action P has already filed. Granted, R can file an 
amended complaint if it chooses to intervene in the action brought by 
P, but the point is that P, not R, has seized the initiative in choosing 
to pursue T. If R does not intervene in P’s lawsuit, P has the option of 
continuing the lawsuit on her own. Thus, T’s decision whether to co-
operate after an action has been filed against it, is two-fold. T must 
decide whether it will cooperate with R if R intervenes in P’s already-
filed action. If R declines to intervene in P’s lawsuit but P continues 
it alone, T must decide whether to cooperate with P.  
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 Adoption by T of a non-cooperation strategy with R after R has in-
tervened in P’s case presents T with the following benefits: (1) R, now 
working with P, will have to prove its case against T without T’s 
help. If R and P are unable to do so, T’s non-cooperation strategy suc-
ceeded. (2) It is possible that even with P’s help, R’s action will fail to 
identify all of T’s wrongdoing. By continuing a non-cooperation pol-
icy, T maximizes this chance. This benefit is tempered by the fact 
that if R wins the action against T, regulators will gain enough ac-
cess to T’s internal records that R almost certainly will discover the 
rest of T’s wrongdoing and T will suffer even greater consequences 
for not fully disclosing its activity to R (and possibly for concealing it, 
depending on T’s testimony at trial or comments during settlement 
conferences).249 (3) When R intervenes in P’s action, T obtains the 
benefit of knowledge—about R’s focus, devotion of resources, and 
strength of case. The presence of P in Game Two enhances T’s pros-
pects for obtaining information about the case against it. Under the 
FCA practice, T may be able to gain, through discovery, the “evidence 
and information” P supplied to R when P initially filed P’s lawsuit. 
Potentially this could provide T with considerable information about 
R’s case against it. In addition, if P and R have disagreements over 
strategy and those disagreements are resolved by a court after hear-
ings, T may gain further access to information about the case against 
it through R and P’s squabbles. 
 The costs T incurs in Game Two by adopting a non-cooperation 
strategy are: (1) Uncertainty in how R’s action will be resolved; (2) 
Lost opportunity to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability; (3) 
Lost opportunity to influence R’s choice of sanctions; (4) Lost oppor-
tunity to influence the collateral consequences that flow from the 
sanctions; and (5) Lost opportunity to minimize or manage the re-
sources T expends in responding to R’s action. As noted supra, these 
opportunity costs increase from Game One where P was not a player 
because P’s participation in Game Two increases R’s chances of suc-
cess in the action. This, in turn, increases the value of the opportuni-
ties lost when T chooses not to cooperate. In Game Two, R faces an-
other cost. Now that R has filed an action and it becomes more likely 
that a court (administrative or judicial) will become involved and the 
court may be more inclined to impose harsh sanctions on T if R pre-
vails in the action. The court may view T’s non-cooperation as waste-
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ful of R’s and the court’s time and resources. For these reasons, T’s 
costs exceed T’s benefits at Node V.250 
 At Node VI, where T opts to cooperate with R after R has filed an 
action against T, T’s benefits and costs are the converse of those just 
noted, yielding a net benefit to T of opting to cooperate with R.251  
4. Nodes VII and VIII: Whether T Cooperates with P if P 
Continues with the Case Alone After R Declines to Intervene 
 If P continues its case against T after R declines to intervene, T 
must once again decide if it will cooperate, this time with P. The 
benefits to T of adopting a non-cooperation strategy remain, as be-
fore, as the opportunity to avoid: (1) liability, (2) sanctions, and (3) 
collateral consequences flowing from the sanctions. The value of 
these benefits increases considerably for T when the sole plaintiff is 
P. Historically, once the DOJ has declined to intervene in an FCA 
suit brought by a P, the suit has little chance of success. This could 
be for a variety of reasons: the suit was not meritorious to begin with 
(which is why the DOJ declined to intervene); the suit is meritorious, 
but P is unable to fully investigate or litigate it without R’s help; or 
the suit is meritorious, but courts assume that it is not if the DOJ 
declines to intervene.252 Whatever the reason, because declined FCA 
actions have had little chance of success, T’s strategy of non-
cooperation almost certainly will be more beneficial to T than if R 
had intervened. 
 The costs to T of not cooperating with P are the same types of 
costs any defendant experiences when sued, whether by a private 
party (P) or regulatory authority (R): (1) Uncertainty of not knowing 
if P will prevail; (2) Lost opportunity to affect P’s assessment of li-
ability; (3) Lost opportunity to affect P’s request for sanctions; (4) 
Lost opportunity to affect the collateral consequences that flow from 
the judgment P may obtain; and (5) Lost opportunity to minimize or 
manage the resources T expends in responding to P’s suit. Given P’s 
unlikely chance of success in P’s suit against T, however, these costs 
are worth considerably less than when R is bringing an action 
against T. 
 For the reasons noted, T’s benefits outweigh T’s costs if T adopts a 
non-cooperation strategy with P when P decides to pursue the action 
against T alone after R has declined to intervene.253  
 T’s benefits and costs at Node VIII when T adopts a cooperation 
strategy with P are the converse of those at Node VII, where T 
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adopted a non-cooperation strategy with P. Given the historically 
poor chance P has of succeeding against T, the costs to T of adopting 
a cooperation strategy with P outweigh T’s benefits in doing so.254  
5. Nodes IX and X: Whether T Loses or Wins the Action Brought 
Against It 
 T achieves the same benefits in Game Two when it loses the ac-
tion brought against it as T obtained in Game One: (1) An end to the 
tangible and intangible expenses T was incurring to litigate; (2) An 
end to the uncertainty created for T by the ongoing litigation; and (3) 
Possible restructuring within T that could make T a more effective 
business entity. 
 T incurs the same costs with its loss in Game Two as it did in 
Game One: (1) Lingering effects of the investigation and action that 
are detrimental to T; and (2) Fines, damages, penalties, and man-
dated internal restructuring. There are, however, two additional 
costs that T will incur in Game Two. Both result from the presence of 
P as a player: The first is the encouragement to future Ps that R’s 
success against T will convey. The second additional cost is more 
global. T’s loss of an enforcement action brought by an industry in-
sider with R may generate greater intolerance of corporate financial 
aggression than would a victory brought only by R. The ability of 
regulatory actions to impact our norms of acceptable corporate be-
havior may increase if respected, or at least knowledgeable insiders 
are part of the enforcement team. Such intolerance may manifest in 
more shareholder derivative lawsuits, less job security for CEOs, 
more scrutiny by Boards of Directors, and less flexibility for corpo-
rate leaders to pursue risky business opportunities. For these obvi-
ous reasons, T’s costs outweigh T’s benefits when T loses the action 
brought against it.255 
 At Node X where T prevails in the suit brought against it by R 
and P, or just by P, T achieves the converse benefits and costs T ex-
perienced when losing the case with the addition of one additional 
benefit and one additional cost. The additional benefit is that public-
ity of T’s success and P’s resulting failure may well discourage future 
Ps from coming forward, especially if publicity about the case reveals 
hardships P almost certainly encountered when bringing the action. 
The additional cost T incurs in Game Two results from this same 
publicity. Although coverage of T’s win (and P’s participation and 
loss) will probably discourage some future Ps from coming forward, it 
will also inform others about the existence of such actions. For these 
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obvious reasons, T’s benefits outweight T’s costs when T wins the ac-
tion brought against it.256 
F.   Game 2(C): Regulatory Game with the FCA: From P’s Perspective 
 Game 2(C) views Game Two from P’s perspective. As in Game 
One, the triggering event is P’s knowledge of T’s wrongdoing. 
Whereas P had only three options for conduct in Game One, P has 
these three options plus many more in Game Two. As in Game One, 
P has the option of doing nothing (Node I), reporting the wrongdoing 
internally (Node II), and reporting the wrongdoing externally (Node 
III). The reporting externally option changes slightly in Game Two 
because P reports externally not by going to the press or to multiple 
regulatory bodies but by filing a qui tam lawsuit (under seal) and 
providing a written report of all “information and evidence” P pos-
sesses to the United States Department of Justice.257 If P chose this 
last option, P must next decide whether to work actively with R as R 
investigates the matter (Nodes IV and V), whether to continue in the 
case with R if R intervenes (Node VI), whether to pursue the case 
alone if R does not intervene (Node VII), and whether to dismiss the 
action if R does not intervene (Node VIII). The benefits and costs to P 
of winning or losing the action are assessed at Nodes IX and X.258 
1.   Node I: P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing 
 P’s strategy at Node I of doing nothing upon learning of T’s 
wrongdoing presents the same benefits and costs for P in Game Two 
as in Game One. P reaps the following benefits: (1) P will not precipi-
tate retaliation by T; (2) P will not incur T-imposed personal or pro-
fessional hardships because of P’s whistleblowing.259 P incurs the fol-
lowing costs: (1) T’s wrongdoing may undermine P’s professional se-
curity; (2) P ultimately may be held culpable for T’s wrongdoing; (3) P 
may experience personal angst for not reporting T’s wrongdoing. 
 P will experience one additional cost and two enhanced costs in 
Game Two. The enhanced costs are a greater likelihood that T’s 
wrongdoing will undermine P’s professional security, and a greater 
likelihood that P will be held personally culpable for T’s wrongdoing. 
The fact that all knowledgeable Ps are encouraged to come forward 
and alert the government to T’s malfeasance enhances these two 
costs if P adopts a do-nothing strategy. Because all Ps have incentive 
to report T’s wrongdoing to R in Game Two, it is more likely that R 
                                                                                                             
 256. See infra app. A chart 33, at 693. 
 257. In fact, under the FCA, relators cannot disclose the information they have in-
cluded in their qui tam lawsuit until the seal has been lifted. WEST, supra note 31, at 17. 
 258. See infra app. B, at 703 (diagramming Game 2(C)). 
 259. See supra notes 204-05. 
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will learn of T’s wrongdoing and act upon it. Once exposed, T’s exis-
tence, or at least T’s profitability, may be threatened. This could 
jeopardize P’s professional security if P is a T employee. In addition, 
once other Ps report T’s wrongdoing, Ps who may have been involved 
in the wrongdoing, even tangentially, have lost the opportunity to 
demonstrate their good faith, remorse, or minimal culpability by 
alerting regulators to it. With broad theories of liability such as con-
spiracy and complicity, there could be a serious problem for P since 
such theories ensnare those tangentially involved in wrongdoing.260 
The significance of these costs depends upon the likelihood that mul-
tiple Ps are aware of T’s wrongdoing. 
 The additional cost for P in Game Two when P adopts a do-
nothing strategy is a lost opportunity. The FCA gives successful Ps a 
share of any judgment recovered as a result of P’s efforts.261 Thus, Ps 
who decide to do nothing, or Ps who report only internally, lose the 
opportunity to share in any judgment recovered. Moreover, because 
the FCA gives only the first-reporting P the opportunity to become a 
qui tam relator and share in the judgment,262 Ps who ultimately re-
port T’s wrongdoing after initially opting to do nothing risk preemp-
tion by other Ps.  
 For these reasons, P’s benefits of adopting a do-nothing strategy 
remain the same in Games One and Two, but P’s costs increase in 
Game Two.263 
2.   Node II: P Reports Internally 
 P’s strategy of reporting internally has the same benefits in Game 
Two as in Game One: (1) Possible prevention of future problems for 
T; (2) P is viewed as demonstrating leadership and advances within 
T; (3) P minimizes or prevents P’s personal angst for failing to report; 
(4) In Game Two, P obtains an additional benefit. Because the FCA 
provides statutory protection for Ps against retaliation by employers 
and because internal reporting activates this protection in most 
                                                                                                             
 260. Conspiracy punishes the act of agreeing to commit a crime and everyone who 
agreed is guilty. Conspiracy liability includes actors who only agreed that another co-
conspirator would commit the crime and did nothing beyond the act of agreement to fur-
ther the crime intended. BUCY, supra note 166, at 5-6. Pinkerton liability goes even further, 
making a co-conspirator liable for all substantive crimes committed by another co-
conspirator if such crimes were in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably fore-
seeable as part of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946). 
Complicity liability makes a person guilty for having the intent that another person com-
mit a crime and rendering aid or assistance to that person. Such assistance can be as 
minimal as encouraging the other person. United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 
986, 999 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 261. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
 262. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2002). 
 263. See infra app. A chart 34, at 693. 
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situations,264 P can obtain this protection in Game Two by reporting 
T’s wrongdoing internally (assuming P is an employee of T).  
 By reporting internally in Game Two, P incurs the same costs P 
experienced in Game One: (1) Possible retaliation by T or others 
within the relevant industry; (2) Expenditure of P’s time and energy; 
and (3) Personal and/or professional hardships resulting from inter-
nal reporting. (4) In Game Two, P incurs an additional cost, however. 
Because the FCA rewards only Ps who come forward by using the 
FCA’s procedure (file a qui tam suit under seal, provide information 
to the Department of Justice) and because only the first P to file such 
a suit may proceed, the FCA, in effect, disadvantages Ps who report 
internally. The FCA only rewards Ps who report externally and only 
those who do so using FCA procedure. Thus, by reporting internally, 
Ps lose the opportunity to reap the benefits of using the FCA model. 
This is a somewhat speculative cost since it is not clear how many Ps 
know of T’s wrongdoing and, of those, how many are willing to expose 
themselves to the personal and professional costs of reporting 
wrongdoing. 
 For these reasons, P’s benefits and costs increase in Game Two 
when P opts to report internally.265 
3.   Node III: P Reports Externally 
 P’s strategy of reporting T’s wrongdoing externally presents the 
same benefits in Game Two as in Game One: (1) Possible prevention 
of future problems for T; (2) P is viewed as demonstrating leadership 
and advances within T; (3) Minimizes or prevents P’s personal angst 
for failure to report; (4) Allows P to show P’s nonculpability, or at 
least, to negotiate favorably with regulators regarding P’s culpability; 
(5) Obtains some protection against T’s retaliation of P; and (6) Moti-
                                                                                                             
 264. The FCA provides that: 
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or 
in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance 
of an action under this section . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to 
make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with the 
same seniority status . . . 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back 
pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the dis-
crimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). It is not necessary that an individual file a lawsuit under the FCA to 
receive this protection. See, e.g., Dookeran v. Mercy Hosp., 281 F.3d 105, 108 (3rd Cir. 
2002); United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
Neal v. Honeywell, 33 F.3d 860, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1994). All that is necessary (at least in 
some circuits) is that an employee make intra-corporate complaints of fraud. Neal, 33 F.3d 
at 864; see also Hopkins v. Actions, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 706, 708-09 (S.D. Tex. 1997). But see 
Smith v. Mitre Corp., 949 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that purely intra-
corporate complaints do not constitute acts in furtherance of an FCA suit). 
 265. See infra app. A chart 35, at 694. 
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vates T to remedy the situation. Of these, the fourth benefit will be 
amplified in Game Two since the FCA supplies protection against re-
taliation by employers against employees for whistleblowing actions 
that fall within the FCA. While P probably qualifies for this protec-
tion by reporting internally (at Node II), P clearly qualifies for this 
protection by reporting T’s wrongdoing externally.266 
 There are three additional benefits to P of reporting externally in 
Game Two than were available in Game One. The first is that the 
FCA provides P not with just another external reporting source, but 
with a particularly effective external source. The United States De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) is especially effective for several reasons. 
The FCA has a practice, within the DOJ, for receiving, evaluating, 
and working with Ps.267 Being able to contact a federal agency that is 
experienced in receiving and processing P’s information makes it less 
likely that a whistleblower’s information will get lost in a maze of 
bureaucracy. Also, the DOJ has resources to improve upon and sup-
plement P’s information—experienced and trained attorneys and in-
vestigators and helpful discovery tools (like Certificates of De-
mand)268 that are not available outside of the DOJ.269 These resources 
can build upon P’s information. Lastly, the DOJ has considerable 
power vis á vis Ts. The DOJ can levy sanctions on Ts such as admin-
istrative penalties, initiate actions such as civil suits for penalties 
and damages, and seek criminal charges. Because of this power, the 
DOJ can be quite productive in extracting concessions and settle-
ments from T. For all of these reasons, the DOJ is a formidable ally 
for P.270 
 The second benefit P obtains in Game Two that was not available 
to P in Game One arises from the fact that in Game Two, P almost 
certainly will need counsel who is experienced in FCA cases. This can 
be beneficial when counsel is able to alert P to what lies ahead and to 
provide guidance that helps P cope with difficulties P will face as a 
whistleblower. Counsel can also direct P to a wealth of sources that 
provide financial, social, and emotional support for Ps.271 P is more 
                                                                                                             
 266. The FCA protects “[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threat-
ened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions 
of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of an 
action under this section.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The FCA provides for an award of double 
backpay damages plus attorneys fees and costs for such violations. Id. 
 267. Bucy, supra note 20, at 69, n.372; see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 45-79 
(discussing United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 
(M.D. Fla. 2001), 114-40 (discussing United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
 268. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2002). 
 269. See supra notes 80-101. 
 270. WEST, supra note 31, at 26; Kreindler, supra note 156, at 10. 
 271. There are growing numbers of groups that provide support for whistleblowers, 
many started by former whistleblowers. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Bureaucracy: Aid and 
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likely to need counsel in Game Two than in Game One because re-
porting T’s wrongdoing to the DOJ under the FCA requires consider-
able sophistication. Failing to adequately follow FCA requirements 
could lead to any variety of strategic missteps, such as disqualifica-
tion of P under the FCA’s jurisdictional bar provision,272 R’s declina-
tion to intervene in P’s suit,273 or preemption by another P.274  
 The third and most significant benefit available to P in Game Two 
that was not present in Game One is that P is entitled to share in a 
percentage of any recovery obtained.  
 In Game Two, P’s strategy of reporting externally presents the 
same types of costs P incurred in Game One: (1) Possible retaliation 
by T and/or others within the relevant industry, resulting in personal 
and professional hardship; (2) Expenditure of P’s time and energy; 
and (3) P’s personal discomfort in becoming a public figure. The value 
of these costs is likely to change, however. The first cost, retaliation 
and resulting hardships, probably will increase in Game Two from 
Game One simply because the stakes are higher for T if P reports us-
ing FCA protocol. The potential liability imposed by the FCA on Ts is 
huge.275 These higher stakes lead to increased publicity, tension, and 
although the FCA contains protection against it, increased chances of 
retaliation against P. 
 In addition to enhanced costs in Game Two, P is likely to see an 
additional cost. This is the cost of retaining counsel. As noted supra, 
proceeding under the FCA necessitates retention of experienced 
counsel. The out-of-pocket cost to P of retaining counsel will be 
minimal since relators’ counsel tend to represent relators on contin-
gency fee arrangements based upon a negotiated percentage of any 
award the relator may receive,276 plus attorneys fees and costs 
                                                                                                             
Comfort for Whistleblowers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1985, at A28 (reporting on the growing 
support network for whistleblowers).  For example, such support takes the form of legal 
assistance, Farnsworth, supra, at A28, practical advice, see, e.g., Government Accountabil-
ity Project, Survival Tips for Whistleblowers, at http://www.whistleblower.org/www/ 
tips.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003), and financial assistance, see, e.g., Taxpayers Against 
Fraud (TAF), at http://www.taf.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003). A staffer of one such public 
interest group explained: “‘There’s a definite whistleblower’s community out there—and 
it’s growing . . . . We know where to find each other . . . . We know where to go for help. 
There’s a safety net.’” Farnsworth, supra, at A28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 272. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). 
 273. Bucy, supra note 20, at 51-52. 
 274. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
 275. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
 276. For example, in United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Electric 
Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994), relator’s counsel and relator agreed that counsel would 
receive twenty-five percent of the relator’s share. Id. at 1036. This percentage was in addi-
tion to attorneys’ fees and costs awarded by the court pursuant to the FCA. The total 
amount awarded to relator’s counsel in this case was $4 million. Id. This amount was ques-
tioned as excessive by the court and the case was remanded for a determination of whether 
the total fee was appropriate. Id. at 1045-49; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
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awarded by the court and paid by the defendant under the terms of 
the FCA. Nevertheless, this is a possible cost necessitated in Game 
Two. 
 For the above reasons, P’s benefits in reporting externally in 
Game Two outweigh P’s costs.277  
4. Nodes IV and V: Whether P Works Actively with R as R 
Investigates T 
 P’s next options depend upon what R does in response to P’s re-
porting of T’s wrongdoing. If R actively investigates T, P must decide 
to what extent it will work with R. The benefits to P of working 
closely with R are: (1) P’s percentage of any judgment obtained will 
increase, within the statutory range, proportional to P’s helpfulness 
to R in pursuing the matter against T.278 (2) P’s counsel will urge P to 
adopt a work-with-R-actively strategy. This is for two reasons. First, 
P’s counsel wants the case to succeed and active assistance by P and 
P’s counsel can facilitate success. As noted supra, historically, R’s in-
tervention is crucial to the ultimate success of an FCA case. P’s ac-
tive assistance, as well as P’s counsel’s active assistance to R during 
R’s investigation of T, could encourage R to intervene in P’s case. 
Since Ps’ counsel’s fee consists, at least in part, of a percentage of P’s 
award, P’s counsel wants the case to be as successful as possible. 
Second, when P’s counsel actively assists R, P’s counsel generates 
greater attorneys fees which the FCA requires defendants to pay. For 
these reasons, experienced counsel may be unwilling to represent P if 
P does not commit to a work-with-R-actively strategy. Thus, P may 
have to adopt such a strategy in order to retain experienced counsel. 
(3) P has a greater chance of influencing the remedy in the case by 
working actively with R. It may be important to P, for example, that 
certain changes be made within T so that similar wrongdoing is less 
likely to occur. Or, P may feel strongly that T should engage in com-
munity service as part of the judgment. (4) P may feel personal and 
professional satisfaction in working with R to expose T’s wrongdoing, 
to deter T and other observant businesses from engaging in such 
wrongdoing, and to protect victims and possible future victims from 
T’s wrongdoing and other similar wrongdoing.279 
 The costs to P of working actively with R are (1) expenditure of P’s 
time and energy and (2) P’s emotional stress.280 
                                                                                                             
 277. See infra app. A chart 36, at 694. 
 278. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RELATOR’S SHARE GUIDELINES, reprinted in United 
States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. 205 F.3d 97, 104-05 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
The DOJ Guidelines are also available at the website of Taxpayers Against Fraud at 
http://www.taf.org. 
 279. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 21, at 961-62. 
 280. See supra notes 207-08. 
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 For these reasons, the benefits to P significantly outweigh the 
costs if P adopts a work-actively-with-R strategy.281 The benefits and 
costs to P of not working actively with R are the converse of those 
just noted. Thus, the costs significantly outweigh the benefits if P 
chooses not to work actively with R once R begins to investigate T.282 
5. Nodes VI, VII and VIII: Whether P Proceeds with the Case After 
R Completes Its Investigation 
 After R investigates P’s allegations of T’s wrongdoing, R will de-
cide whether to intervene in P’s lawsuit against T (under seal thus 
far).283 If R intervenes, P is entitled to continue as a plaintiff with 
R.284 Node VI addresses this option. The benefits of doing so are so 
overwhelming that remaining as a plaintiff in the suit is almost a 
non-decision for P: (1) Now that R has opted to intervene in P’s law-
suit, P (now joined by R) probably will win the case.285 (2) P will not 
have to expend many tangible resources to litigate the case once R 
intervenes. Either R will bear the brunt of the expense in pursuing 
the case, or P’s counsel will be willing to do so since counsel works on 
a contingency fee and will recognize the case’s chance of success 
given R’s intervention.286 (3) Although P has been protected under the 
FCA from retaliation by T since at least the point at which P filed 
her qui tam action, R’s intervention further solidifies such protection.  
 Costs to P in continuing as a plaintiff once R has intervened would 
most likely result from the publicity that follows R’s intervention. 
Such publicity may highlight P’s role and cause greater ostracization 
of P by P’s friends, professional colleagues, and future employers. Al-
though the FCA protects P from professional retaliation by T for P’s 
whistleblowing activity, the FCA cannot protect P from subtle dis-
crimination by colleagues and friends, or from other business that 
may shun P and make P’s employment in the industry problematic.287 
One of these difficulties, finding future employment, can be allevi-
ated considerably if P receives a generous recovery from the qui tam 
suit.288 With such a financial cushion, P may gain the flexibility to 
pursue a variety of professional options. 
                                                                                                             
 281. See infra app. A chart 37, at 695. 
 282. See infra app. A chart 38, at 695. 
 283. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2002). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Bucy, supra note 20, at 51. 
 286. Many FCA cases, in fact, settle as soon as R intervenes as a result of extended ne-
gotiation among R, T and P prior to R’s intervention. WEST, supra note 31, at 26. Thus, 
most of the costs in pursuing an FCA case have been borne during the investigation. 
 287. See supra notes 207-08. 
 288. See supra notes 41-44. 
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 Thus, P’s benefits at Node VI in remaining in the case as co-
plaintiff once R intervenes are significant and P’s costs are mini-
mal.289 
 If R declines to intervene in P’s action, P still has the option under 
the FCA of pursuing the action alone. P opts for this strategy at Node 
VII. The benefits to P of doing so are: (1) P still has a chance, albeit 
slim,290 of winning the FCA action. (2) If P prevails in a case, P quali-
fies under the FCA for a higher statutory range (25-30 percent of 
judgment) than if R had intervened (15-25 percent of judgment). 
 The costs to P of pursuing a qui tam action alone instead of dis-
missing it after R has declined to intervene are: (1) P’s chances of 
prevailing in the lawsuit are poor.291 (2) P will incur significant tan-
gible and intangible expenses in pursuing the case to conclusion. 
These costs will include P’s time, emotional strain, and distraction 
from work, family, and recreation.292 (3) P may lose experienced 
counsel, who, aware of P’s minimal chance of success once R opts not 
to intervene,293 declines to represent P once R has made a non-
intervention decision. If P wishes to continue, P may have to do so 
alone, or with less experienced counsel. Given the complexity of most 
FCA cases, losing experienced counsel may further doom P’s chances 
in the case. (4) P may become subject to greater risks of retaliation. 
Although T incurs liability under the FCA if T retaliates against P,294 
T may nevertheless feel empowered to do so once R has decided not 
to intervene in the case, especially with subtle retaliation that may 
escape FCA liability. 
 Thus, at Node VII the benefits to P of pursuing a qui tam action 
after R has declined intervention are minimal while the costs are 
significant.295 Conversely, at Node VIII, where P decides to dismiss 
the action after R has declined to intervene, the benefits are signifi-
cant while the costs are minimal.296 
6.   Node IX and X: Whether P (with or without R) Prevails in the 
Action Brought 
 The benefits to P of winning the action P (alone or with R) has 
brought are significant: (1) P will receive monetary recovery as a per-
centage of the judgment obtained against T. This recovery may be 
                                                                                                             
 289. See infra app. A chart 39, at 696. 
 290. Bucy, supra note 20, at 51. 
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 292. See supra notes 207-08. 
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 294. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2002). 
 295. See infra app. A chart 40, at 696. 
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quite large.297 (2) P may be publicly vindicated. (3) P will see an end 
to what probably has been an emotionally draining and traumatic 
experience.298  
 The costs for P of prevailing in the lawsuit are: (1) Possible emo-
tional hardship in pursuing litigation that incriminates friends and 
colleagues, or otherwise jeopardizes the livelihood of people P cares 
about;299 and (2) Difficulty obtaining future employment within the 
relevant business or industry.300  
 For these reasons, benefits to P of winning the action at Node IX 
are significant while the costs are minimal.301  
 The benefit-cost analysis at Node X, if P loses the action it brings, 
whether with or without R, is not the converse of P’s winning the ac-
tion because the costs of losing are so significant. The ostracization P 
may face from friends and colleagues and the difficulty P may have 
finding employment, are likely to be considerably worse after losing 
the action. Moreover, the psychological and physical stress of serving 
as a whistleblower will be exacerbated by the loss since the verdict 
likely will be seen as a statement that P’s allegations were un-
founded. The only benefit to P in losing the action, an end to the 
traumatic experience of serving as a qui tam relator, will be consid-
erably offset by these costs. Thus, P’s costs in losing the action are 
significantly greater than P’s benefits.302 
IV.   WHAT GAME THEORY TELLS US ABOUT THE MERITS OF 
INCLUDING PRIVATE PARTIES IN THE REGULATORY GAME 
 It does not take Game Theory to see that introducing private par-
ties into regulatory efforts affects such efforts in two obvious ways: a 
new player is added to the regulatory game, and the strategies of ex-
isting players, the regulators, and targeted businesses become more 
complicated. Game Theory enriches these observations, however, by 
showing that integrating private parties into public regulatory ef-
forts raises the stakes for all players and alters the Nash Equilib-
rium for all players. 
A.   Raising the Stakes 
 Playing the Games in this Article shows that all parties’ potential 
gains and losses increase when private parties join the regulatory 
game. Not surprisingly, of all of the players, private parties have the 
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most to gain by joining the regulatory game. As Chart C4 shows,303 a 
private party’s greatest possible gain in Game One where private 
parties are not included as players is 40; in Game Two, where they 
are included, the greatest possible gain soars to 325, an increase of 
712%. Private parties’ potential costs when joining the regulatory 
game increase even more, however. The greatest loss a private player 
could sustain in Game One is 0; in Game Two it is -480,304 an in-
crease of 480%. Regulators’ benefits and costs also change when pri-
vate parties join the regulatory game. The greatest benefit regulators 
could achieve in Game One is 250; in Game Two it is 480, an increase 
of 92%. The greatest loss regulators could sustain in Game One is -
180; in Game Two, it is -280,305 an increase of 55%. Targeted busi-
nesses are affected the least when private parties join the regulatory 
game. The greatest benefit a targeted business could achieve in 
Game One was 275; in Game Two, it is 345, an increase of 25%. The 
greatest loss a targeted business could sustain in Game One is -370; 
in Game Two it is -450,306 an increase of 21%. 
 What causes this shift in potential gains and losses when private 
parties join regulators? There are different factors for different play-
ers. As Game Theory shows, the factors that impact the payoffs for 
private parties are the opportunities to obtain a large financial re-
covery, secure statutory protection from retaliation, acquire public 
vindication, achieve personal satisfaction in highlighting and helping 
deter wrongdoing that harms innocent victims, demonstrate leader-
ship and possibly advance professionally, protect employers’ profit-
ability or existence, protect themselves from being held complicit in 
the wrongdoing, and develop a support system of legal counsel and 
whistleblower groups. Additional factors are retaliation, animosity, 
ostracization among professional colleagues and personal friends, 
loss of one’s job, financial hardship, and significant psychological and 
physical maladies from stress. It is interesting to think about why 
the potential cost for private parties who join the regulatory game is 
so much greater than it is for regulators and targeted businesses. As 
we saw, potential cost for private parties increases so much more in 
Game Two than does the potential cost for the other players. After 
all, P’s potential losses increase 480%, R’s potential losses increase 
55%, and T’s potential losses increase 21% when P becomes a player. 
One possibility is that the costs regulators and targeted businesses 
experience are impersonal and are spread among many individuals 
within an organization. By comparison, a private party’s costs are 
borne by a single individual, and they are wrenching: personal and 
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professional hardships, ostracization by friends, disdain by col-
leagues and potential employers, and enmity by the community. 
 As Game Theory has shown, the factors affecting regulators’ pay-
offs are the opportunities to acquire investigative and litigative assis-
tance from P’s counsel, institutional knowledge about T and T’s in-
dustry, and inside information about the wrongdoing: what was go-
ing on, who was involved, and how best to investigate and prove it. 
Additional factors include the waste of resources caused by private 
parties who present incomplete or inaccurate information, the loss of 
initiative to determine who to charge and for what conduct, and 
damage to regulatory efforts by irresponsible private parties. 
B.   Altering the Nash Equilibria 
 Game Theory shows how entry of private players into the regula-
tory game alters the Nash Equilibria—the optimal strategies players 
pursue given the likely strategies pursued by other players. 
1.   Impact on Regulators 
 R’s optimal strategy in a regulatory world where P is not a player 
is to make its decisions within R, among R personnel, and under a 
cloak of secrecy.307 This tradition of confidentiality exists, in part, 
from habit and self-interest, but also for valid policy reasons such as 
protecting the reputation of innocent individuals or businesses under 
investigation, protecting witnesses who may be harmed or evidence 
that may disappear,308 safeguarding national security,309 and allowing 
enough time and opportunity for R to determine whether liability is 
appropriate.310 When private parties participate in regulatory efforts, 
R must modify this tradition of confidentiality if R wishes to benefit 
from P’s information.311 Examples from Game Theory demonstrate 
this. In Game Two, when R brings an action against T while working 
with P, R’s net benefit is 190. In Game One, when R brings an action 
                                                                                                             
 307. See, e.g., JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 10 (1987): 
Much of what prosecutors do is shrouded in secrecy. . . . Because the delibera-
tions and decisions of a prosecutor and his staff might, if made public, affect a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, they are invariably kept secret. Practically any-
thing a prosecutor does, if discovered, can become the subject of attack by a 
savvy defense lawyer. 
 308. See supra notes 80-88. 
 309. Michael Waldman, Time to Blow the Whistle?, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 25, 1991, at 13-14. 
 310. Interview with John T. Boese, Partner Fried Frank, in Washington, D.C., in 
CORP. CRIME REP., Mar. 2, 1998, at 13. 
 311. For the FCA to work, regulators and relators must work with each other, and 
trust each other. As federal agents who work on qui tam cases explain, “[t]here is . . . a di-
rect correlation between the successful resolution of [an FCA qui tam] case and the rela-
tionship between the investigators and relators during th[e] investigation, and this rela-
tionship can be summed up by one word—trust.” Mason & Leonard, supra note 138, at 12. 
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against T without P’s involvement, the net benefit is 100. Similarly, 
R’s net benefit in Game Two when R, working with P, wins the action 
against T, is 480, while R’s benefit when winning in Game One, 
where P is not present, is only 250. 
 Game Theory suggests an additional optimal strategy for regula-
tors once private parties join in regulatory efforts. Game Two showed 
that regulators can incur a significant cost when private players join 
the regulatory game. They can lose valuable resources by investigat-
ing misguided, ill-conceived, or incorrect information presented by 
private parties. To avoid this cost, regulators need to distinguish be-
tween helpful and unhelpful information. They also need to discour-
age private parties, by sanctions or otherwise, who bring unhelpful 
information to regulators.  
 In short, Game Theory shows how R’s optimal strategy changes 
from cloaking R’s decision-making process in confidentiality to open-
ing it to include P. Game Theory also shows that it is costly for R to 
work with poorly informed or mistaken Ps, and suggests that devel-
oping more efficient techniques for dealing with such Ps is important 
to the continued viability of including Ps in regulatory efforts. 
2.   Impact on Targeted Business 
 The entry of P as a player in the regulatory game affects T’s opti-
mal strategies in two ways: the extent to which T cooperates with R 
and the type of corporate compliance plan T implements. P’s pres-
ence adds incentive for T to cooperate with R and to cooperate early. 
When P becomes a player in the regulatory game, providing R infor-
mation and assistance, R is more likely to pursue T and is more 
likely to win any action R brings against T. As long as there is a rea-
sonable chance that T will not be caught or found liable, it makes 
sense for T not to cooperate with R. But once the chances of getting 
caught and found liable increase, the more T stands to gain by coop-
erating with R. Game Theory shows this. In Game One, where P is 
not a player, T achieves a net benefit of 100 when it chooses to dis-
close its wrongdoing to R; in Game Two, where P is a player, T 
achieves a net benefit of 150 by disclosing. In Game One, T achieves 
a net benefit of 200 by cooperating with R once R opens an investiga-
tion; in Game Two, T achieves a net benefit of 330 by adopting this 
cooperation strategy. In Game Three, T achieves a net benefit of 135 
by cooperating with R after R files an action against T; in Game Two, 
T achieves a net benefit of 170 with such cooperation.  
 Game Theory also demonstrates how, whether P is a player or 
not, T benefits more by cooperating with R once R has opened an in-
vestigation than by waiting until R files an action against T. In 
Game One, T obtains a benefit of 200 by cooperating with R when R 
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opens an investigation of T. Game Two, where P is a player, shows 
the same thing, just with higher stakes: T obtains a benefit of 330 by 
cooperating with R when R opens an investigation of T but only a 
benefit of 170 by waiting to cooperate when R files suit against T. 
This is for two reasons: the further the matter proceeds, the more re-
sources R has had to devote to it and the less valuable T’s help is, 
and also, when T waits until R has discovered enough to file an ac-
tion against T, T simply looks expedient, not remorseful, when T de-
cides to cooperate. As Game Theory shows, the terms and practice of 
the FCA encourage T to cooperate with R. The FCA requires that de-
fendants pay successful relators’ attorneys fees and costs, and by re-
solving the matter early, T minimizes these payments. Also, under 
FCA custom and practice, R often invites T to discuss T’s potential 
liability very early—as soon as R has completed its investigation of 
P’s information.312 During these discussions, T is given the opportu-
nity to review and respond to R’s evidence and to present additional 
information to R.313 This invitation for dialog is unusual but, for a va-
riety of reasons, makes sense for R under FCA practice. 
 The second way that P’s entry into the regulatory game affects T’s 
Nash Equilibrium is by encouraging T to implement effective corpo-
rate compliance plans. Because the FCA rewards Ps who come for-
ward and work with R, Ts need to be concerned about whistleblowers 
within their midst. Ts can minimize the risk that whistleblowers will 
come forward, or that they will have anything to blow the whistle on, 
by increasing the effectiveness of internal governance. Ts can in-
crease this effectiveness in two ways. If T’s internal culture encour-
ages employees to violate the law, engage in fraud, or look the other 
way when they see illegality occurring,314 T should change its cul-
                                                                                                             
 312. R officers seek a lifting, or partial lifting, of the seal on P’s case so as to allow a 
discussion between R and T of R’s case against T and to give T an opportunity to explain. 
This opportunity occurs early, before R decides whether to intervene. McDermott, supra 
note 107, at 25. 
 313. Id. at 26. On June 3, 1998, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General issued 
guidelines entitled, Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health Care Mat-
ters, to all Department of Justice attorneys who handle FCA cases. Known as the Holder 
Guidelines, this directive instructs DOJ attorneys to contact a health care provider before 
concluding the DOJ’s analysis of liability, “notify a provider of their potential exposure un-
der the False Claims Act and to offer the provider an opportunity to discuss the matter.”  
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, to All United States At-
torneys et al. (June 3, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/ 
chcm.htm (last vistited Jan. 10, 2004). 
 314. See, e.g., Marc Meltzer & Julie Knipe Brown, Bitter Pill: He Blew the Lid Off Lab, 
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 1997, at C3 (When Robert Merena, a computer analyst who 
became a qui tam whistleblower, raised questions about billing irregularities, he was told 
by his bosses: “[w]e don’t pay you to think, we pay you to do your job.”); Jim Smith, Penn 
Whistle-Blower Collects $2M for Warning About Scam, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2000, 
at C12 (recounting how mental health counselors were told by their employer that they 
would lose their jobs if they did not increase the enrollment of patients). 
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ture.315 In addition, Ts should ensure that they have an effective cor-
porate compliance plan,316 which not only discourages wrongdoing 
within T but also encourages rapid, internal reporting of wrongdoing 
instead of resorting to qui tam suits.317  
 In short, Game Theory shows how the FCA enhances businesses’ 
already existing incentives to cooperate with R, adds significant en-
couragement and opportunity for Ts to cooperate earlier in the mat-
ter, and compels businesses to establish internal systems to discour-
age future wrongdoing and to encourage internal reporting by em-
ployees instead of resorting to qui tam suits. 
3.   Impact on Private Parties 
 Of the three players, P is affected the most by the FCA. First and 
most obviously, the FCA encourages Ps to abandon what was P’s op-
timal strategy of not reporting T’s wrongdoing, in favor of reporting 
such information to R. As noted, in Game One, P reaped the greatest 
benefit (40) by not reporting T’s wrongdoing to anyone. In Game Two, 
such a do-nothing strategy yields P a net cost of -70, while reporting 
to R yields a net benefit of 200.318 The FCA also encourages Ps to 
work actively with R. The FCA does so by tying the amount of money 
P receives at the conclusion of the case to P’s helpfulness to R in un-
                                                                                                             
 315. Robert Vogel, Deterrent Effects of Whistleblower’ Lawsuits Justify False Claims 
Act, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 4, 1991, at 73: 
As these successful [FCA qui tam] cases are publicized and people become in-
creasingly aware of the qui tam statute, dishonest contractors will set up inter-
nal procedures to prevent renegade employees from committing fraud for which 
the contractor could be held responsible. In the long run, this will result in sav-
ings to the taxpayer, and improvements in the defense industry that far out-
weigh the costs of dealing with the baseless lawsuits. 
See also Phillips Interview, supra note 3, at 11 (“The prophylactic affect of this law will be 
the biggest payoff. You are not going to find people willing to take such risks when they 
expose themselves to this kind of action.”). 
 316. John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Scope of Civil False Claims Act Is Cause of 
Strife, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 1999, at S1 (“Recipients of federal funds are stepping up compli-
ance programs to protect themselves from the potentially devastating impact of an FCA 
suit . . . .”); Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 14, at 53 (“The threat posed by qui tam relators 
also has had a major impact on corporate regulatory compliance. Many responsible gov-
ernment contractors, in an effort to avoid qui tam actions, have placed regulatory compli-
ance on the top of the corporate agenda.”); Compliance Programs Key to Limiting Exposure 
to Qui Tam Suits, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 1 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Apr. 9, 1997 
(“Health care providers’ first line of defense against lawsuits brought by whistleblowers is 
to have in place a compliance program to effectively detect fraud and abuse . . . .”). 
 317. Components of an effective plan typically include a hot-line that protects a whis-
tleblower’s identity while also gathering enough facts to rule out quacks and falsehoods, an 
ombudsman, constant efforts to educate employees about the regulations that govern T’s 
business, and reminders to employees of their internal reporting obligation and viable ave-
nues for such reporting. FABRIKANT, ET AL., supra note 47, § 9.03. 
 318. See supra notes 259-96 and accompanying text. 
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covering and proving T’s wrongdoing. FCA practice reinforces this.319 
Experience under the FCA shows how collaboration between R and P 
can strengthen the case against T, especially if P is still employed at 
T.320  
 Game Theory also reveals a sad fact for Ps. There are costs for Ps 
once they are invited to participate in the regulatory game. For ex-
ample, the greatest cost P incurred in Game One where P was not a 
                                                                                                             
 319. For example, R often is willing to review P’s complaint prior to filing. As one 
AUSA experienced in qui tam cases explained, “[I]t is advisable [for relators] to contact the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office prior to filing the qui tam Complaint. . . . [Its attorneys] can offer 
valuable assistance in ensuring that the procedural mechanics operate smoothly.” McDer-
mott, supra note 107, at 22. 
 320. P can explain and interpret T’s policies and procedures, deliver otherwise difficult-
to-obtain documents to R, even wear electronic monitoring equipment. For example, Robert 
Merena, a financial analyst at SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories (SBCL), re-
mained so employed for eighteen months after he filed his qui tam lawsuit and had begun 
working closely with federal agents and attorneys. United States ex rel. Merena v. Smith-
Kline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1998). He produced numerous 
helpful documents for the agents, including an internal SBCL directory which listed key 
personnel at each of SBCL’s twenty-seven laboratories, located nationwide. Id. at 447. He 
also produced a copy of SBCL’s 1993 monthly Billing and Accounts Receivables Reports. 
Id. In another instance, Walsh, manager of General Electric Company’s overseas aircraft 
operations in Israel who discovered diversion of federal funds, smuggled relevant records 
out of Israel to Switzerland. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 
1992). 
 Removing documents and delivering them to investigators examining fraud charges can 
be risky. If the employee taking them does not have access to such records and authority to 
move them as part of his employment duties, such a practice could subject the employee to 
disciplinary action or even criminal charges of theft. In addition, if law enforcement offi-
cials directed such removal in contexts that constitute an illegal search and seizure, the 
evidence likely will be suppressed and the agents could face disciplinary action, if not legal 
liability under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002). 
 In United States ex. rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F. 3d 1032, 1037-
38 (6th Cir. 1994), Walsh, a General Electric employee assigned to serve as GE’s liaison to 
the Israeli military on contracts for F110 fighter engines, discovered fraud upon the U.S. 
government by a high ranking Israeli military officer and a GE executive. Before reporting 
the fraud, Walsh collected documents and secretly monitored conversations. Id. at 1037. 
After Walsh filed a qui tam action, he wore recording equipment at the DOJ’s request, col-
lecting further evidence. Id. at 1038. 
 Federal Agents explain how early contact by a relator helped in their investigation of a 
defense corporation (XYZ) for FCA violations: 
Another extremely important factor to the success of the investigation was the 
detail to which the complaint alleged criminal activity and documented specific 
acts on behalf of conspirators. The detail included references to meetings and 
other events that could be verified through subsequent investigation. The rela-
tors also kept detailed notes and records in the normal course of business which 
provided much of the substantiating documentation for the historical facts. 
Once [we] became involved, the relator still employed at XYZ was able to pro-
vide specific, day-to-day information as the case progressed, and to record con-
versations. These conversations and information were later used to persuade 
other individuals to cooperate, to provide probable cause for affidavits for 
search warrants, and used in court documents filed in support of the settle-
ment. 
Mason & Leonard, supra note 138, at 13. 
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player, was -225.321 When P works with R, however, the greatest cost 
P could possibly incur is -500.322 Thus, although P’s potential benefits 
increase significantly when P is invited to join regulatory efforts, so 
do P’s costs, mostly in the form of greater potential for retaliation.  
 Game Theory also demonstrates how the FCA affects P’s optimal 
strategy for dealing with T when P is an employee of T. In Game 
One, where P is not a player and does not have the FCA’s protection 
against T’s retaliation, P’s optimal strategy is to not report T’s 
wrongdoing or to challenge T in any way. Because the FCA gives 
power and protection to employees who are willing to blow the whis-
tle, Ps become significant threats to Ts that are engaged in wrongdo-
ing. This means that Ts risk much more if they discount, marginal-
ize, or penalize Ps who then alert R to possible wrongdoing within T. 
Such leverage may strengthen P’s position on multiple employment 
issues with T.323  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article began with two goals. The first was to explore how a 
private attorney general model such as the FCA alters the regulatory 
world and whether the alteration is for better or worse. To examine 
this issue, we asked three questions, beginning with why regulators 
would be willing to compromise their independence, prosecutorial 
discretion, and valued secrecy to work with private parties. Game 
Theory shows the reason: doing so delivers more benefits than costs. 
The benefits for regulators include obtaining information about 
wrongdoing that regulators otherwise would not know about, devel-
oping a stronger case against wrongdoers, and conserving investiga-
tive and litigative resources. 
 The second question was why private individuals would want to 
work with regulators when doing so almost certainly creates per-
sonal, professional, and financial hardships. Game Theory offers the 
same answer: the benefits of cooperating outweigh the costs of not 
doing so. In part, this calculus is because the costs increase for all Ps 
in not reporting wrongdoing. Once Ps are empowered by a regulatory 
mechanism like the FCA, there are many Ps who may blow the whis-
tle; those who knew of the wrongdoing but stood by may find them-
selves being held liable. Mostly, however, this is because the benefits 
offered to private parties who choose to participate with R are huge; 
they include the potential of collecting a generous financial reward, 
                                                                                                             
 321. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 252-302 and accompanying text. 
 323. The possibility that Ps may use FCA cases for leverage in other lawsuits or dis-
agreements P may have with T is troublesome to the DOJ when the DOJ is making its in-
tervention decision and determining how closely it will work with P. WEST, supra note 31, 
at 49. 
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the satisfaction of doing the right thing, and protecting oneself from 
blame. 
 The last question we asked was how the private-public partner-
ship produced by the FCA affects the decisions and strategies of tar-
gets. Game Theory shows that this partnering does two things: it en-
courages targets to cooperate with R, and it encourages T to imple-
ment effective corporate compliance plans.  
 Answering these three questions tells us that when the FCA or 
any similar mechanism that pulls private parties into the public 
regulatory effort, is good, it is very good. When it is bad, it is very 
bad. The key lies with the private party. If the private party brings 
information to regulators of real fraud, identifies real wrongdoers, 
and brings valuable resources to regulators, the FCA—or any similar 
mechanism—works enormously well. When the private party diverts 
regulators’ resources and creates unnecessary costs for honest busi-
nesses by bringing information about mistakes, not fraud, made by 
legitimate businesses, it is disruptive, oppressive, and irresponsible. 
Understanding these dynamics makes FCA practice more efficient 
and productive, and offers tantalizing opportunities for expansion of 
an FCA-like model into other regulatory avenues.324 
 The second goal of this Article was to demonstrate the effective-
ness of Game Theory for analyzing legal issues. I leave it to the 
reader whether this goal has been achieved. 
 
                                                                                                             
 324. Bucy, supra note 20, at 79-150. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1
Game 1(A); Node I
R Does Nothing
Benefits Value
R saves investigative resources 30
T may be deterred 5
Total Benefits 35
Costs
T is encouraged, emboldened if learns of R’s decision not to 
investigate
-10
T will have time to revise, improve upon its malfeasance 
strategies
-25
More victims will be hurt -25
Other Ts will be encouraged, emboldened if they learn of R’s 
decision not to investigate
-10
Total Costs -70
Net Cost -35
Chart 2
Game 1(A); Node II
R Opens Investigation
Benefits Value
R deters T 25
R deters other observant businesses 25
R’s opening of an investigation makes it difficult for T to continue 
refining its wrongdoing methodology
25
R’s opening of an investigation makes it less likely T will expand 
its wrongdoing to include more victims
25
R develops institutional knowledge of T’s behavior 25
Total Benefits 125
Costs
R’s investigation is inefficient, unfocused and unlikely to achieve 
full success
-25
R incurs an opportunity cost: inability to investigate other 
deserving Ts
-25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 75
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Chart 3
Game 1(A); Node III
R Finds Nothing; Closes Investigation
Benefits Value
R ends its investigative costs 25
R generates institutional knowledge 25
Total Benefits 50
Costs
R has incurred investigative expenses with no result -25
R is unable to protect the public -25
R loses credibility -25
Morale within R suffers -25
R signals encouragement to T -25
R signals encouragement to other observant Ts -25
Total Costs -150
Net Cost -100
Chart 4
Game 1(A); Node IV
R Initiates Action
Benefits Value
Enhanced credibility for R among T and other observant 
businesses
25
Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses 
against T (T’s employees and competitors)
25
Enhanced morale within R 25
Minimize, if not prevent, more harm to victims 25
Deter T’s wrongdoing 25
Deter wrongdoing by other observant businesses 25
Total Benefits 150
Costs
Action may not be successful due to lack of inside info. -25
Significant investigative and litigation costs due to lack of 
inside information
-25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 100
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Chart 5
Game 1(A); Node V
R Wins the Action
Benefits Value
Public acknowledgment that T’s behavior was wrong 50
Education of relevant industry as to permissible and 
impermissible behavior
50
Payment by T of judgment, fines, penalties 50
Enhanced credibility for R 50
Deterrence of T’s wrongdoing 50
Deterrence of wrongdoing by other observant businesses 50
Total Benefits 300
Costs
Opportunity costs: R was unable to pursue other Ts by 
allocating resources to this T -25
Possible inability to recoup investigative and litigative 
costs from T
-25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 250
Chart 6
Game 1(A); Node VI
R Loses the Action
Benefits Value
An end to R’s costs 25
Possible deterrence of T 10
Possible deterrence of other observant businesses 10
Total Benefits 45
Costs
Lost credibility -50
Lost out-of-pocket investigative and litigative costs -50
R incurs opportunity costs: inability to investigate other Ts -50
R’s loss signals to T and other observant businesses that 
they can continue their wrongdoing with impunity
-75
Total Costs -225
Net Cost -180
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Chart 7
Game 1(B); Node I
T Does Not Disclose Wrongdoing
Benefits Value
Avoids a finding of culpability 50
Avoids R sanctions 50
Avoid consequences that flow from R’s sanctions 50
Total Benefits 150
Costs
Uncertainty of when or if R will learn of T’s wrongdoing -25
Likelihood that R will impose greater sanctions on T if it learns of 
T’s wrongdoing and that T had adopted a policy of nondisclosure
-25
Opportunity cost: T loses the ability to influence R’s assessment 
of T’s liability
-25
Opportunity cost: T loses the ability to influence the collateral 
consequences of R discovering T’s wrongdoing and imposing 
sanctions
-25
Opportunity cost: T loses the chance to minimize or manage 
resources T expends in responding to R
-25
Total Costs -125
Net Benefit 25
Chart 8
Game 1(B); Node II
T Discloses Wrongdoing
Benefits Value
End the uncertainty of whether R will discover T’s wrongdoing 25
Influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability 50
Influence the sanctions R will seek 50
Influence the collateral consequences that flow from culpability 
and sanctions
50
Minimize or manage resources T spends responding to R 25
Minimize or avoid liability T, or T’s executives, may incur for 
failing to disclose T’s wrongdoing
25
Total Benefits 225
Costs
Opportunity cost: forgoes the possibility that R would never learn 
of T’s wrongdoing -25
Sanctions R imposes -50
Consequences of a finding of liability and sanctions R imposes -50
Total Costs -125
Net Benefit 100
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Chart 9
Game 1(B); Node III
T Does Not Cooperate After R Opens an Investigation
Benefits Value
Avoids R’s finding out about T’s wrongdoing 25
Avoids R’s sanctions 25
Avoids collateral consequences of R’s sanctions 25
Total Benefits 75
Costs
Prospect that R will uncover T’s wrongdoing -25
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect R’s assessment 
of T’s liability
-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of 
sanctions R seeks
-50
Opportunity cost: loss of the ability to impact the 
consequences that flow from R’s imposition of sanctions
-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or at least 
manage the resources T will expend in responding to R’s 
investigation
-50
Total Costs -225
Net Cost -150
Chart 10
Game 1(B); Node IV
T Cooperates After R Opens an Investigation
Benefits Value
T can make more informed decisions about strategy 50
T may be able to influence R’s assessment of T’s 
culpability
50
T may be able to influence the sanctions R imposes on T 50
T may be able to influence the collateral consequences for 
T of R’s sanctions
50
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the 
resources T expends in responding to R’s investigation
50
Total Benefits 250
Costs
T will have to stop or cut back on wrongdoing -25
T will spend resources in responding to R’s investigation -25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 200
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Chart 11
Game 1(B); Node V
T Does Not Cooperate After R Files Action
Benefits Value
T forces R to prove its case against T; T may escape 
liability if R cannot
25
T gets information about R’s case, commitment 25
Total Benefits 50
Costs
Uncertainty of not knowing how the action R has initiated 
will be resolved
-25
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect the finding of 
culpability on the part of T
-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of R’s 
sanctions if R prevails in the action
-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the 
consequences that flow from R’s imposition of sanctions
-50
Opportunity cost: T will be less able to manage and 
control its expenditures of resources in responding to R’s 
action
-100
Total Costs -300
Net Cost -250
Chart 12
Game 1(B); Node VI
T Cooperates After R Files an Action
Benefits Value
Enhanced abil ity to make an informed decision about 
future strategies
75
Ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability in 
resolving the action
25
Ability to influence R’s selection of sanctions against T 35
Ability to influence the consequences that befall T because 
of the sanctions R imposes on T
35
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the 
resources T expends in response to R’s init iation of an 
action
15
Total Benefits 185
Costs
T will have to stop or curtail its wrongdoing -25
T wil l  expend resources responding to and cooperating 
with R’s investigation
-25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 135
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Chart 13
Game 1(B); Node VII
T Loses the Action Brought By R
Benefits Value
An end to the tangible and intangible costs T was incurring 
in litigating the action against R
10
An end to the uncertainty in which T was operating since 
R first opened its investigation
10
Restructuring within T that possibly renders T a more 
effective business overall
10
Total Benefits 30
Costs
Lingering effects of T’s response to R’s investigation and 
action
-100
Fines, damages, mandated internal restructuring -300
Total Costs -400
Net Cost -370
Chart 14
Game 1(B); Node VIII
T Wins the Action Brought By R
Benefits Value
Avoids sanctions that accompany a finding of liability 200
Enhances T’s image as a “winner” 50
Obtains acquiescence to the behavior of T that was in 
question (if propriety of such behavior was an issue)
20
An end to the uncertainty about and within T after R 
opened its investigation
20
Total Benefits 290
Costs
Possible lingering effects of the expense (tangible and 
intangible) in responding to the investigation and defending 
the action brought
-15
Total Costs -15
Net Benefit 275
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Chart 15
Game 1(C); Node I
P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing
Benefits Value
P will not precipitate retaliation by T 50
P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional 
hardships associated with whistleblowing
50
Total Benefits 100
Costs
T’s wrongdoing may undermine P’s professional security -20
P may end up being held culpable for T’s wrongdoing -20
P may experience personal angst for not reporting T’s 
wrongdoing
-20
Total Costs -60
Net Benefit 40
Chart 16
Game 1(C); Node II
P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Internally
Benefits Value
Possible prevention of future problems for T 40
Demonstrating leadership; as a result, P advances within 
T
40
Minimizing or preventing P’s personal angst 20
Total Benefits 100
Costs
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within the relevant 
industry
-40
P’s time and energy -20
Personal and/or professional hardships as a result of 
reporting the wrongdoing
-40
Total Costs -100
Net Benefit 0
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Chart 17
Game 1(C); Node III
P Reports T’s Wrongdoing Externally
Benefits Value
Possible prevention of future problems for T 50
Demonstrating leadership; as a result P advances within 
T
30
Minimizing or preventing P’s personal angst for failure to 
report
30
Demonstrate P’s non-culpability 50
Obtains some protection against T’s retaliation of P 50
Motivate T to remedy the situation 50
Total Benefits 260
Costs
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within relevant 
industry; personal or professional hardships result for P
-160
P’s time and energy -40
Personal discomfort at becoming a public figure -25
Total Costs -225
Net Benefit 35
Chart 18
Game 2(A);  Node I
R Conducts Only a Minimal Investigation
Benefits Value
T is deterred from its wrongful activity if T learns that R is aware 
of T’s activity 100
Saves resources 5
Total Benefits 105
Costs
T is encouraged, emboldened if  learns of R’s decision to only do 
a minimal investigation
-10
Other Ts wil l  be encouraged, emboldened if  they learn of R’s 
decision to only do a minimal investigation
-10
T wil l  have t ime to revise, improve upon i ts malfeasance 
strategies
-25
More victims wil l be hurt -25
Signals to possible Ps within T that R is not responsive to them -25
Signals to Ps in general that R is not responsive -25
Encourages T and other aware businesses to retal iate against 
Ps
-25
Total Costs -145
Net Cost -40
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Chart 19
Game 2(A); Node II
R Actively Investigates T
Benefits Value
R deters T 35
R deters other observant businesses 35
R develops institutional knowledge 50
R signals support to future Ps 50
Total Benefits 170
Costs
Investigative costs -35
Opportunity cost: inability to investigate other deserving 
T s
-15
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 120
Chart 20
Game 2(A); Node III
R Declines to Intervene in P’s Action
Benefits Value
Save resources 125
Chance of sharing in any judgment P obtains 25
Total Benefits 150
Costs
Doom meritorious P case to dismissal or realization of less 
success than case warrants
-35
Less able to guide P's exercise of prosecutorial discretion -40
Empower T and observant businesses -75
Lose opportunity to shape norms (i.e., to encourage view of 
whistle blowers as courageous persons, not traitors)        
-75
Total Costs -225
Net Cost -75
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Chart 21
Game 2(A); Node IV
R Intervenes in P’s Action
Benefits Value
Enhanced credibility for R among T and other observant 
businesses
30
Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses 
against T (T’s employees and competitors)
30
Enhanced morale within R 30
Minimize if not prevent more harm to victims 30
Deter T’s wrongdoing 30
Deter wrongdoing by other observant businesses 30
Signals encouragement to future Ps 30
Total Benefits 210
Costs
Investigative costs -10
Opportunity cost: R cannot pursue other deserving Ts -10
Total Costs -20
Net Benefit 190
Chart 22
Game 2(A); Node V
R and P Win the Action
Benefits Value
Public acknowledgment that T’s behavior was wrong 75
Education of relevant industry as to permissible and 
impermissible behavior
75
Enhances R’s credibility 75
Payment by T as judgment, f ines, penalt ies 75
Deterrence of T's wrongdoing 75
Deterrence of other observant businesses 75
Signal encouragement to future Ps 75
Total Benefits 525
Costs
Opportunity cost: lost opportunity to pursue other Ts -15
Investigative and lit igative costs -15
Total Costs -30
Net Benefit 495
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Chart 23
Game 2(A); Node VI
R and P Lose the Action
Benefits Value
An end to R’s investigative and litigative costs 25
Possible deterrence of T and other observant businesses 20
Total Benefits 45
Costs
Lost credibility -75
Lost tangible and intangible expenses in pursuing the 
action
-50
Opportunity cost: unable to pursue other deserving Ts -50
R and P’s loss signals to T and other observant 
businesses that they can continue their wrongdoing
-75
R signals discouragement to future Ps -75
Total Costs -325
Net Cost -280
Chart 24
Game 2(B); Node I
T Does Not Disclose
Benefits Value
Avoids a finding of culpability 35
Avoids R sanctions 35
Avoid consequences that f low from R’s sanctions 35
Total Benefits 105
Costs
Uncertainty in whether R wil l learn of T’s wrongdoing -35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact R’s assessment 
of T’s culpability
-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the severity of 
sanctions R seeks against T
-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the collateral 
consequences of a finding of culpability and imposition of 
sanctions
-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or manage 
the resources T wil l expend in responding to R’s 
investigation
-35
Total Costs -175
Net Cost -70
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Chart 25
Game 2(B);  Node I I
T Discloses
Benefits Value
End the uncer ta in ty  o f  whether  R wi l l  d iscover  T ’s  
wrongdo ing
50
Affect  R’s assessment of  T’s culpabi l i ty 100
Af fect  R ’s  assessment  o f  what  sanct ions to  seek i f  T  is  
found culpable
100
Affect the col lateral  consequences that f low from a f inding 
of  culpabi l i ty  for  T and imposi t ion of  sanct ions on T
100
Min imize  or  manage the  resources  T  expends in  
responding to any invest igat ion R might in i t iate
50
Total Benefi ts 400
Costs
Opportuni ty  cost :  foregoes the possib i l i ty  that  R would 
never  learn o f  T ’s  wrongdoing
-50
Sanct ions -100
Col lateral  consequences that f low from a f inding of 
cu lpabi l i ty  and sanct ions
-100
Total Costs -250
Net Benef i t 150
Chart  26
Game 2(B) ;  Node I I I
T Does Not  Cooperate When R Begins an Invest igat ion
Benefi ts Value
Avoids a f ind ing of  cu lpabi l i ty 1 0
Avo ids  R ’ s  sanc t i ons 1 0
Avo ids  co l l a te ra l  consequences  o f  sanc t i ons 1 0
Total Benefi ts 3 0
Cos ts
Uncer ta in ty  i n  no t  know ing  i f  R  may  in i t i a te  an  ac t ion  
against  T
-20
Oppor tun i ty  cos t :  loss  o f  ab i l i t y  to  in f luence R’s  
assessment  of  T ’s  l iab i l i ty
-75
Oppor tun i ty  cost :  loss  o f  ab i l i ty  to  a f fec t  the sever i ty  o f  
R ’ s  s a n c t i o n s
-75
Oppor tun i ty  cost :  loss of  ab i l i ty  to  impact  the co l la tera l  
consequences  tha t  f l ow  f rom R ’s  sanc t i ons
-75
Oppor tun i t y  cos t :  l oss  o f  ab i l i t y  to  m in im ize  o r  mange 
resources  T  expends  i n  respond ing  to  R ’s  i nves t i ga t i on
-75
Total  Costs - 3 2 0
Net  Cos t - 2 9 0
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Chart 27
Game 2(B); Node IV
T Cooperates When R Begins an Investigation
Benefits Value
T can make more informed decisions about strategy 75
Abil i ty to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpabil i ty 75
Abil i ty to inf luence the sanctions R seeks to impose on T 75
Abil ity to influence the collateral consequences for T of 
R’s  sanct ions
75
Abi l i ty to minimize and manage, at  least somewhat,  the 
resources T expends in responding to R’s invest igat ion
75
Total Benefits 375
Costs
T wil l  spend resources in responding to R’s invest igat ion -25
T wi l l  have to stop or cut  back on wrongdoing -20
Total Costs -45
Net Benefit 330
Char t  28
Game  2 (B ) ;  Node  V
T Does  No t  Coopera te  When  R  Jo ins  P ’s  Ac t ion
Benef i ts Value
T forces R and P to prove the i r  case against  T wi thout  T ’s  help 15
In fo rmat ion  about  the  case aga ins t  T 35
Total  Benef i ts 50
Costs
Uncer ta in ty  o f  not  knowing how the act ion R has in i t ia ted wi l l  be 
reso lved
-10
Oppor tun i ty  cost :  loss of  ab i l i ty  to  in f luence R’s  assessment  o f  
T’s culpabi l i ty
-25
Opportuni ty  cost :  loss of  abi l i ty  to  af fect  sever i ty  of  R’s  sanct ions 
i f  R  p reva i l s  in  the  ac t ion
-100
Opportuni ty  cost :  loss of  abi l i ty  to  impact  the consequences that  
f low f rom R’s  impos i t ion  o f  sanct ions
-100
Oppor tun i ty  cost :  loss of  ab i l i ty  to  min imize or  manage 
expendi ture  o f  resources in  responding to  R’s  act ion
-100
Encourage the  ad jud ica t ing  au thor i t y  to  impose harsher  
sanct ions on T i f  l iab i l i ty  is  found on grounds that  T ’s  
noncoopera t ion  unnecessar i l y  consumed jud ica to ry  resources
-30
Tota l  Costs - 365
Net  Cos t - 315
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Chart 29
Game 2(B); Node VI
T Cooperates When R Initiates Action
Benefits Value
Enhanced ability to make an informed decision about 
future strategies
75
Ability to influence R’s assessment of T’s culpability 25
Ability to influence R’s selection of sanctions against T 40
Ability to influence the consequences that befall T 
because of the sanctions R imposes on T
40
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the 
resources T expends in response to R’s initiation of an 
action
40
Total Benefits 220
Costs
T will have to stop or curtail its wrongdoing -25
T wil l  expend resources responding to and cooperating 
with R’s investigation
-25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 170
Chart 30
Game 2(B); Node VII
T Does Not Cooperate When P Continues the Action
Benefits Value
Opportunity to avoid liability 60
Opportunity to avoid sanctions 50
Opportunity to avoid collateral sanctions 50
Total Benefits 160
Costs
Uncertainty of whether P wil l  prevail -5
Opportunity cost: to influence settlement -20
Opportunity cost: to influence collateral consequences of 
the settlement
-20
Opportunity cost: to minimize and manage resources T 
devotes to responding to P’s suit
-20
Encourages the adjudicating authority to impose harsher 
sanctions on T if T is found liable
-5
Total Costs -70
Net Benefit 90
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Chart 31
Game 2(B); Node VIII
T Cooperates When P Continues the Action
Benefits Value
Learn more about P’s case; enhanced abil i ty to make 
informed decisions about future strategy
25
Ability to favorably influence settlement 15
Ability to favorably influence collateral consequences of 
settlement
15
Abil i ty to minimize, manage T’s resources consumed by 
responding to P’s suit
15
Total Benefits 70
Costs
Helping P when P couldn’t win otherwise -200
T has stop or curtail wrongdoing -25
Resources (tangible and intangible) expended to 
cooperate
-25
Total Costs -250
Net Cost -180
Chart 32
Game 2(B); Node IX
T Loses the Action
Benefits Value
An end to the tangible and intangible expenses T was 
incurring in litigating the action brought against it
10
An end to the uncertainty created for T because of the 
ongoing litigation
10
Restructuring within T that could make T a more effective 
business entity
30
Total Benefits 50
Costs
Lingering effects of the investigation and action -100
Fines, damages, mandated internal restructuring -300
Empowering whist le blowers to come forward -50
Greater intolerance of financial aggression and resulting 
consequences
-50
Total Costs -500
Net Cost -450
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Chart 33
Game 2(B); Node X
T Wins the Action
Benefits Value
Avoids the consequences that accompany a f inding of 
liability
200
Enhances T’s image as a “winner” 40
Obtains acquiescence to the behavior of T that was in 
question (if propriety of such behavior was in question)
40
An end to the uncertainty created for T because of the 
ongoing litigation
40
Generates publicity that may discourage future 
whist leblowers
50
Total Benefits 370
Costs
Lingering effects of the expenditure of costs in defending 
itself
-15
Publicity may inform future whistle blowers -10
Total Costs -25
Net Benefit 345
Chart 34
Game 2(C); Node I
P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T’s Wrongdoing
Benefits Value
P will not precipitate retaliation by T 75
P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional 
hardships associated with whistleblowing
75
Total Benefits 150
Costs
T’s wrongdoing may undermine P’s professional security -50
P may be held culpable for T’s wrongdoing -50
P may experience personal angst for not reporting T’s 
wrongdoing
-20
Opportunity cost: P will lose the opportunity to be a qui 
tam relator and share in any judgment obtained
-100
Total Costs -220
Net Cost -70
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Char t  35
Game 2(C) ;  Node I I
P Repor ts  T ’s  Wrongdoing In ternal ly
Benef i ts Value
Possib le prevent ion of  fu ture problems for  T 40
P is  v iewed as demonstrat ing leadership;  as a resul t ,  P 
advances wi th in  T
40
Minimiz ing or  prevent ing P’s personal  angst 20
Secures protect ion under  the FCA against  re ta l ia t ion by T 50
Total  Benef i ts 1 5 0
Costs
Possible reta l iat ion by T and/or  others wi th in re levant  industry -30
P’s  t ime and energy -20
P suf fers  personal  and/or  profess ional  hardships as a resul t  o f  
report ing internal ly
-30
Risks preempt ion by  a  P who repor ts  ex terna l ly -40
Tota l  Costs - 120
Net Benef i t 30
C h a r t  3 6
G a m e  2 ( C ) ;  N o d e  I I I
P  R e p o r t s  T ’ s  W r o n g d o i n g  E x t e r n a l l y
B e n e f i t s V a l u e
P o s s i b l e  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  p r o b l e m s  f o r  T 60
P  i s  v i e w e d  a s  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  l e a d e r s h i p ;  a s  a  r e s u l t  P  a d v a n c e s  
wi th in  T
40
M i n i m i z i n g  o r  p r e v e n t i n g  P ’ s  p e r s o n a l  a n g s t  f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  r e p o r t 40
D e m o n s t r a t e s  P ’ s  n o n - c u l p a b i l i t y 60
S e c u r e s  p r o t e c t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  F C A  a g a i n s t  r e t a l i a t i o n  b y  T 60
M o t i v a t e s  T  t o  r e m e d y  t h e  s i t u a t i o n 60
T h r o u g h  t h e  F C A ,  P  o b t a i n s  a  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  r e p o r t i n g  T ’ s  
w r o n g d o i n g  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e f f e c t i v e  o u t s i d e  s o u r c e ,  t h e  D O J
75
O b t a i n s  b e n e f i t  o f  c o u n s e l  a n d  s u p p o r t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  c o u n s e l  
w i l l  k n o w  a b o u t
25
M a y  q u a l i f y  a s  q u i  t a m  r e l a t o r  w h o  w i l l  s h a r e  i n  a n y  j u d g m e n t  
ob ta i ned  i n  a  qu i  t am  l awsu i t
50
To ta l  Bene f i t s 4 7 0
Costs
I n c r e a s e d  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  p e r s o n a l  o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  h a r d s h i p  
r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  P ’ s  w h i s t l e b l o w i n g ,  e s p e c i a l l y  o s t r a c i z a t i o n  b y  
c o l l e a g u e s
-200
P ’ s  t i m e  a n d  e n e r g y -40
P ’ s  d i s c o m f o r t  i n  b e c o m i n g  a  p u b l i c  f i g u r e -25
C o s t  o f  c o u n s e l  ( n o t  c o m p e n s a t e d  o t h e r w i s e ) -15
To ta l  Cos t s - 2 8 0
N e t  B e n e f i t 1 9 0
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Chart 37
Game 2(C); Node IV
P Works Actively With R
Benefits Value
Increases P’s percentage of any judgment obtained T by 
act ively working with R
50
P’s counsel wi l l  encourage P to work actively with R 50
P has a greater chance of influencing the outcome of the 
case by act ive ly work ing wi th R
50
P increases P’s personal and professional satisfaction by 
act ively working with R
50
Total Benefits 200
Costs
P’s time and energy -25
Emotional stress -25
Total Costs -50
Net Benefit 150
Chart 38
Game 2(C); Node V
P Decided Not to Work Actively With R
Benefits Value
Conserves P’s t ime and energy 25
Minimizes P’s emotional stress 25
Total Benefits 50
Costs
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to increase the 
percentage of recovery P is possibly awarded
-50
Opportunity cost: P’s counsel loses the opportunity to 
earn larger attorneys fees compensated under the statute 
and a larger percentage of recovery; P may lose 
experienced counsel
-50
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to influence R’s 
conduct of the case
-50
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to gain personal 
and professional satisfaction by working actively with R
-50
Total Costs -200
Net Cost -150
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Chart 39
Game 2(C); Node VI
P Continues in the Case as Co-Plaintiff With R 
After R Intervenes
Benefits Value
P (with R) wil l  l ikely prevai l  in the suit 100
P will prevail without expending significant tangible 
resources
100
P will be protected against retaliation by T under the FCA 50
Total Benefits 250
Costs
P’s time and energy -25
Emotional stress -25
Ostracization by friends, colleagues -25
Future employment difficulties -25
Total Costs -100
Net Benefit 150
Chart 40
Game 2(C); Node VII
P Pursues Action Alone After R Declines to Intervene
Benefits Value
P may win the action 15
If P wins the action, P would be statutorily entitled to a 
larger percentage of the judgment (25-30%) if P pursues 
the action alone than if R joins (15-25%)
15
Total Benefits 30
Costs
Poor chance P will win the action -100
Tangible and intangible costs in pursuing action without R -100
Loss of experienced counsel -25
Greater risk of retaliation -25
Total Costs -250
Net Cost -220
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Game 2(C); Node VIII
P Dismisses the Action After R Declines to Intervene
Benefits Value
P avoids tangible and intangible costs 50
P minimizes the risk of retaliation 20
Total Benefits 70
Costs
Opportunity cost: P may win the action -5
Opportunity cost: If P won the action, P would be entitled to a 
larger percentage of the recovery because P pursued the case 
alone
-5
Total Costs -10
Net Benefit 60
Chart 42
Game 2(C); Node IX
P Wins the Act ion
Benefits Value
Monetary recovery 300
Public vindication 75
An end to an emotionally draining experience 50
Total Benefits 425
Costs
Emotional strain -50
Ostracization by col leagues, fr iends and within one’s 
profession
-50
Total Costs -100
Net Benefit 325
C h a r t  4 3
G a m e  2 ( C ) ;  N o d e  X
P  L o s e s  t h e  A c t i o n
Bene f i t s V a l u e
E n d  a n  e m o t i o n a l l y  d r a i n i n g  e x p e r i e n c e 2 0
Tota l  Benef i t s 2 0
C o s t s
O p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t :  l o s t  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  a  l a r g e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e c o v e r y
- 1 2 5
O s t r a c i z a t i o n  f r o m  f r i e n d s ,  c o l l e a g u e s - 1 2 5
D i f f i c u l t y  f i n d i n g  n e w  e m p l o y m e n t - 1 2 5
L i n g e r i n g  e f f e c t s  ( p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a n d  p h y s i c a l )  f r o m  t h e  
e m o t i o n a l  s t r a i n  o f  s e r v i n g  a s  a  w h i s t l e b l o w e r
- 1 2 5
Tota l  Cos ts - 5 0 0
N e t  C o s t - 4 8 0
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G a m e s  F r o m  R ’ s  P e r s p e c t i v e
G a m e  1  ( A ) G a m e  2  ( A )
N o d e E v e n t N o  F C A W i t h  F C A
N o d e  I R  d o e s  n o t h i n g - 3 5 - 4 0
Node  I I R  o p e n s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n 7 5 1 2 0
Node  I I I R  c loses  inves t iga t ion - 1 0 0
( R  D e c l i n e s  t o  
i n t e r vene )            
- 7 5
Node  IV R in i t i a tes  ac t ion 1 0 0
(R  i n t e r venes )   
1 9 0
N o d e  V R  w i n s 2 5 0 4 9 5
N o d e  V I R  l o s e s - 1 8 0 - 2 8 0
Games From T’s Perspective
Game 1 (B) Game 2 (B)
Node Event No FCA With FCA
Node I T does not disclose 25 -70
Node II T discloses 100 150
Node III
T does not cooperate in 
investigation
-150 -290
Node IV T cooperates in investigation 200 330
Node V
T does not cooperate after suit is 
filed -250 -315
Node VI T cooperates after suit filed 135 170
Node VII
T does not cooperate with P after 
R declines to intervene  ------- 95
Node VIII
T cooperates with P after R 
declines to intervene
 ------- -180
Node IX T loses -370 -450
Node X T wins 275 345
Note: For comparison purposes, Game 1(B) nodes VII and VIII are
listed as nodes IX and X respectively in Chart C3.
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Games From P’s Perspective
Game 1 (C) Game 2 (C)
Node Event No FCA With FCA
Node I P does nothing 40 -70
Node II P reports internally 0 30
Node III P reports externally 35 190
Node IV
P works actively with R during 
investigation
------- 150
Node V
P chooses not to work with R in 
investigation
------- -150
Node VI
P continued in case as a co-
plaintiff
------- 150
Node VII P pursues action alone ------- -220
Node VIII P dismisses action ------- 60
Node IX P wins action ------- 325
Node X P loses action ------- -480
Game 1 (A)
Regulatory Game Without FCA:  
From R’s Perspective
R learns of 
T’s possible 
wrongdoing.
R wins the 
action.
250
Node V
R loses the 
action.
-180
Node VI
R initiates 
action.
100
Node IV
R finds nothing.  
Closes 
investigation.
-100
Node III
R does 
nothing.
Node I
-35
R opens 
investigation.
Node II
75
T commits
wrongdoing.
R closes 
investigation.  
Takes no action.
R files 
action.
T does not
cooperate.
-150
Node III
T 
cooperates.
200
Node IV
R begins
Investigation.
R does 
nothing.
Game 1(B)
Regulatory Game Without FCA:
From T’s Perspective
T does not
disclose.
Node I
25
T 
discloses.
Node II
100
T loses the 
action brought 
by R.
-370
Node VII
T wins the 
action brought 
by R.
Node VIII
275
T does not
cooperate.
Node V
-250
T 
cooperates.
Node VI
135
T’s strategies.
R’s action.
Game 1 (C)
Regulatory Game Without FCA:
From P’s Perspective
P learns of T’s 
wrongdoing.
P does 
nothing.
Node I
40
P reports 
externally.
Node III
35
P reports 
internally.
Node II
0
T does nothing 
about the problem
T fixes the 
problem
T retaliates 
against P
T does not 
retaliate against P 
P’s strategies.
T’s action.
Game 2 (A)
Regulatory Game With FCA: 
From R’s Perspective
R learns of T’s 
possible wrongdoing 
from private party (P).
R & P win
the action.
495
Node V
R & P lose the 
action.
-280
Node VI
R intervenes.  
Works with P.
190
Node IV
R declines to 
intervene.
-75
Node III
Node I
-40
R actively 
investigates 
T.
Node II
120
R conducts a
minimal 
Investigation.
T commits
wrongdoing.  
P files qui 
tam action
T loses the 
action brought 
by R.
-450
Node IX
T wins the 
action brought 
by R.
Node X
345
T does not
cooperate.
Node V
-315
T 
cooperates.
Node VI
170
R does not 
intervene in P’s 
suit.
R initiates 
action; 
intervenes 
in P’s suit.
T does not
cooperate.
-290
Node III
T 
cooperates.
330
Node IV
R conducts a 
thorough
investigation.
Game 2 (B)
Regulatory Game With FCA:
From T’s Perspective
T does not
disclose.
Node I
-70
T 
discloses.
Node II
150
P continues 
alone.
T’s strategies.
R’s action.
T does not 
cooperate.
Node VII
90
T 
cooperates.
Node VIII
-180
P’s action.
R conducts a
minimal
investigation.
Game 2(C)
Regulatory Game With FCA:
From P’s Perspective
P learns of T’s 
wrongdoing.
P does 
nothing.
Node I
-70
P reports 
externally, 
including filing 
qui tam action.
Node III
190
P reports 
internally.
Node II
30
P works actively 
with R during 
investigation.
Node IV
150
P does not work 
actively with R during 
investigation.
Node V
-150
P continues in the case 
as co-plantiff  with R.
Node VI
P pursues 
action alone.
Node VII
-220
P loses the 
action.
Node X
-480
P wins the 
action.
Node IX
325
P dismisses 
action.
Node VIII
60
P’s strategies.
150
